Office of the Historian

840.48 Refugees/6–544

The British Embassy to the Department of State

Aide-Mémoire

Attached to this Aide-Mémoire is the text of a telegram received by the Foreign Office from the High Commissioner, Jerusalem.50 His Majesty’s Ambassador is instructed to inform the United States Government of the proposal set out in that telegram and to put before them the reactions of His Majesty’s Government which are as follows:

(a)
Assuming suggestion was put forward by Gestapo in form conveyed to us, then it seems to be sheer case of blackmail or political warfare. Implied suggestion that we should accept responsibility for maintenance of additional million persons is equivalent to asking the Allies to suspend essential military operations.
(b)
We could not bargain over any scheme with Gestapo and agree to trade lives against military and economic concessions calculated to stave off Germany’s defeat. Demand that we should in effect raise blockade is totally inadvisable [unacceptable]; to give Germany 10,000 lorries would bring important access of military strength to the enemy, and German stipulation of Spain and Portugal as sole exodus seems clearly designed to embarrass Allied military operations.
(c)
Once committed to this kind of blackmail coupled with raising of blockade, which seems inseparably connected with it, the Allies would be driven to even further lengths.
(d)
It would appear that selection of persons, if exchange were agreed, is to be in Hitler’s hands. On this we think should be borne in mind that immense numbers of Allies are held by the Germans under terrible conditions and that to arrange any exchange on a basis to be determined by Hitler, leaving Allied internees and prisoners [Page 1057] in German hands, would lay Governments open to extremely serious protest.
(e)
While however refusing to deal with this scheme and channels through which it has come, we realize importance of not opposing a mere negation to any genuine proposals involving rescue of any Jews and other victims which merit serious consideration by Allied Governments. Whole record of United States Government and His Majesty’s Government over refugees is a proof of their active sympathy with victims of Nazi terror. Accordingly if the German Government were willing to release Jews in position of extreme distress or danger, His Majesty’s Government and United States Government would be willing to examine the possibilities of moving to and accommodating in Spain and Portugal such persons as could be handled without prejudice to vital military operations.51

2.
His Majesty’s Government are informing Dr. Weizmann52 in strictest confidence of this proposal, but are making no comment beyond saying that they are in touch with the United States Government. It is presumed that the latter will similarly inform Dr. Goldmann.53 His Majesty’s Government are anxious to learn at the earliest opportunity the views of the United States Government on what action, if any, should be taken. In particular they would be glad to know whether the United States Government would agree to instruct their Ambassador at Ankara, if he is approached by the Jewish Agency, to associate himself in a reply on the lines set forth above. His Majesty’s Government would suggest that Dr. Shertok54 should be told that we cannot sanction him or any other Allied citizen having any dealings with the Gestapo, but that we would agree to his conveying the substance of our observations to his Zionist friend from Hungary. This would show that, although we cannot enter into the monstrous bargain now proposed by the Gestapo, we are yet far from indifferent to the sufferings of the Jews and have not shut the door to any serious suggestions which may be made and which are compatible with the successful prosecution of the war.
3.
His Majesty’s Ambassador at Ankara has been instructed to communicate the foregoing information in strictest confidence to his United States colleague, informing him that it has been transmitted to Washington in order that the reaction of His Majesty’s Government may be coordinated with that of the United States Government. His Majesty’s Ambassador has been instructed to return no definite reply to Dr. Shertok until the essential common line of action has been established between the two Governments.
4.
The Department of State may be interested to know that, on being informed of the Gestapo’s proposal, Dr. Weizmann merely observed that it looked like one more German attempt to embarrass the United States and United Kingdom Governments. He said, however, that he would like to reflect on the affair and receive news of any developments.
Washington , 5 June, 1944.
  1. Copy of cipher telegram 683, not printed; it reported proposal described in telegram 950, May 25, 4 p.m., from Ankara, p. 1050.↩
  2. The Assistant Secretary of War (McCloy) stated in a letter of June 10 to the Under Secretary of State: “I think that you can take it that the War Department’s views would coincide with subparagraph e of the aide-mémoire (5 June) sent you by the British Embassy.” (840.48 Refugees/6–1044)↩
  3. Chaim Weizmann, President of the World Zionist Organization; President of Zionist Federation of Great Britain and Ireland.↩
  4. Nahum Goldmann of the Jewish Agency for Palestine.↩
  5. Moshe Shertok of the Jewish Agency for Palestine at Cairo.↩