Lot 60–D 224, Box 57: D.O./Conv.A/UND 183
Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of International Security and Organization (Gerig) and the Executive Secretary of the Policy Committee (Yost)
Subject: The Dumbarton Oaks Conversations (First Phase): The Formulation Group
In order to expedite the work of harmonizing the various Proposals made by the American, British, and Soviet Governments, and to present the Steering Committee and the Plenary Committee with concrete proposals, it was decided by the Steering Committee on August 25 to set up a small Formulation Group.
This group consisted of: for the United States—Mr. Pasvolsky, Mr. Dunn, and Mr. Hackworth; for the Soviet Union—Mr. Sobolev and Mr. Berezhkov; for Great Britain—Mr. Jebb, Professor Webster, and Colonel Capel-Dunn. On specific questions Admiral Willson, General Strong, and Admiral Train participated for the United States; General Grove-White, Air Marshal Welch, and Sir William Malkin attended for Great Britain. Mr. Notter was generally present, and Mr. Gerig and Mr. Yost served as Secretaries for the group.
A Top Drafting Committee had also been designated by the Steering Committee on August 22 to consist of Sir William Malkin, Mr. Hackworth, and Mr. Sobolev. This Committee was intended to streamline the document and obviate any duplication, unclear passages, or inconsistencies, and was not supposed to deal with any matters of substance. In fact, however, the members of this Committee met in the latter stages with the Formulation Group so that only one meeting of the Committee was held. Its particular recommendation was to divide the document into chapters and sections and to remove the topical headings of the section on functions and powers under the General Assembly. A proposal by Sir William Malkin that all paragraphs be numbered consecutively in the document was not agreed to by the United States, on the ground that it would formalize the document, and was therefore dropped.
The Formulation Group met in both morning and afternoon sessions during the middle period of the Conversations and, as its name implies, [Page 902] was mainly responsible for the detailed drafting of the Proposals. Although it had no formal Chairman this office came, in fact, to be exercised by Mr. Pasvolsky who, more than any other single member of the group, was responsible for the precise wording of the document. Many of the articles and paragraphs went through innumerable versions after prolonged discussions until all the members were satisfied that it expressed the common view.
Mr. Gerig and Mr. Yost wrote the various drafts as they were developed in the group, sometimes sketching the evolving thought of the various members as they resulted from the discussion. Such drafts were immediately sent out for typing and were promptly returned to the group for further refinement.
Mr. Pasvolsky, Mr. Jebb, and Mr. Sobolev also attended the regular meetings of the Steering Committee where these texts were reexamined and, in a number of instances, were referred back to the Formulation Group for further revision. The group also took account of the views expressed in the Organization, the Legal, and the Security Subcommittees which met rather infrequently after the first several days of the Conversations.
It is not too much to say that both the substance and form of the Proposals as they were finally adopted in the Plenary Meeting on September 2898 resulted from the long and arduous exchanges of views and weighing of words and phrases in the Formulation Group. It was in this group where the precise choice of words, as well as the logical sequence and arrangement of ideas in the document, were given form.
The four paragraphs of this Chapter represent an amalgam of the views put forward in the three Proposals by the three Governments. Paragraph 1 is a combination of the “primary purposes” as stated in the United States Proposal99 and the British statement of “objects”.1 The phrase “suppression of acts of aggression” was a contribution of the Soviet delegation which was the only one which had this reference in its original Proposal.
The second paragraph was of Soviet origin, taken largely from Section 1, Paragraph 3 of the Soviet Proposal.2
Paragraph 3 was almost entirely a British-American Proposal representing the second primary purpose stated in the United States document together with Point 4, Paragraph 12 of the British document.[Page 903]
Paragraph 4 was of primarily British origin and corresponds with the object stated in Point 3 of paragraph 12 of the British document.
The origin of this Chapter was largely British and was based upon their argument that it would give the smaller states some satisfaction to know that the action of the organization would be bound by certain stated principles, thus removing certain possible objections on their part that the principal states might act arbitrarily in exercising their far-reaching responsibilities for the maintenance of security.
Paragraph 1 was taken largely from the Moscow Declaration and was quickly agreed upon by all three delegations.
Paragraph 2 was of British origin and corresponds with Point 3, paragraph 11 of the British document. The revised wording, however, was subject to rather prolonged discussion.
Paragraph 3 was of American and Soviet origin combining ideas found in Section 1, Point 2 of the Soviet document, and Section 5, paragraph 1 of the American document.
Paragraph 4 had its origin in Section 1, paragraph 3 of the American Proposal and was an idea strongly supported by the British as well as the Soviet delegations.
Paragraph 5 had its origin in Section VI, D, 5a of the American Proposal and reflects certain of the Soviet Proposals set down in Section 8 of their document on Methods of Preventing and Suppressing Aggression.
Paragraph 6 had its origin in Section VI, B, 2 of the American Proposal where it applied to all States “whether members of the international organization or not”. The Formulation Group considered that this obligation and the four preceding ones should be stated in terms of obligation of members of the organization, leaving it to an additional paragraph to cover the demands that would be made in these responsibilities on non-member states.
The last unnumbered paragraph of Chapter II states the requirement which the organization should lay down for insuring that nonmember states act in accordance with the foregoing principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of peace and security.
The Formulation Group originally had 3 paragraphs under this heading; the first as it now stands, the second indicating in general who the initial members should be, and the third indicating how a state not an initial member would be admitted to the organization (see draft of September 13, 19443).[Page 904]
As agreement was not reached in the Steering Committee as to whether any states other than the United Nations should be initial members of the organization, owing to the Soviet view on this question, it was decided to drop the two additional paragraphs.
There was no disagreement at any point on the statement that the organization should be open to all peace-loving states.
The Soviet delegation proposed a criterion that “fascist states or states of a fascist character” should not be admitted but this formula was not agreed to by the other delegations.
Chapter IV.—Principal Organs
This Chapter, except for the precise nomenclature, was taken almost entirely from Section I, D of the American Proposal.
The second paragraph of this Chapter was based on the second paragraph of the American Proposal, above referred to, but on the suggestion of the Soviet delegate was left in more general terms.
Chapter V.—General Assembly
The first paragraph of this Chapter reflects the views stated in all three original documents, namely that all members of the organization should be represented in the General Assembly.
In developing the section on functions and powers, Mr. Pasvolsky, in the Formulation Group, drew up the list of the different functions that had been attributed in the three papers to the General Assembly. On the basis of this list the various functions were elaborated by the group.
Paragraph 1 of Section B is based on Section 4, paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 of the Soviet Proposal—combined with Section II, B, 2a of the American Proposal. The British delegate at first objected to the inclusion of the term “disarmament”, but later gave way after a decision in the Steering Committee. The broad scope of the Assembly laid down in this paragraph was agreed to by the American delegation—provided the action of the Assembly was limited to the making of recommendations. The last sentence in this paragraph reflects specifically the American view that the General Assembly should not make recommendations on matters relating to the maintenance of peace and security which are being dealt with by the Security Council. All delegations, however, agreed readily on this provision.
Paragraph 2 on admission of new members follows closely the American and Soviet Proposals.
The first part of paragraph 3 on suspension of the exercise of rights of membership was of American origin and was readily supported by the British delegation but considerably questioned by the Soviet delegate in the Formulation Group. Soviet agreement to this inclusion appeared to be reached when the provision for expulsion [Page 905] in the second sentence was agreed to by the British and American delegates, the Soviet delegation being the only one who had proposed a provision for the expulsion of members from the organization. Both the American and British delegations had been rather strongly opposed to any provision for expulsion. Hence, the retention of this provision must be attributed to the insistence of the Soviet delegate.
The electoral functions of the General Assembly outlined in paragraph 4 follow closely the proposal put forward by the United States delegation and with less precision in the Soviet document. The less precise wording of the second sentence on the election of judges of the International Court resulted from the insistence of the British delegate, Sir William Malkin, that it would not be safe to assign this electoral function to the assembly categorically before the Statute of the Court had been revised.
Paragraph 5 on budgets follows closely the Soviet Proposal and reflects also the wording of the American Proposal though it is less precise in the latter case. The use of the plural form “budgets of the organization” left the question open as to the extent to which the agencies brought within the organization would be dealt with by the Assembly. This was of British origin and readily supported by the other two delegations.
Paragraph 6 is of American origin and follows in its initial phrases Section B, 2a and c. The inclusion of the term “political” together with economic and social fields was a contribution which developed in the course of the discussions in the Formulation Group. It is in addition to the American Proposal.
Paragraph 7 on the coordination of the policies of the specialized agencies was added to this Chapter only after Chapter IX had been developed. The effect of this addition was to state two times in the document that the General Assembly would have this coordinating function. This suggestion seems to have been of British origin and emphasizes the importance which they attached to this function. The decision to make this change took place in the Steering Committee.
Paragraph 8 empowering the Assembly to receive and consider annual reports follows closely the Soviet Proposal in Section 4, paragraph 5 of their document and also Section II, B, 2g of the American Proposal. It was swiftly drawn up and readily agreed to in the Formulation Group.
On paragraph 1, there was no difference of view among the delegations in the Formulation Group.
Much discussion ensued on the questions which would require a two-thirds majority and those requiring a simple majority, particularly [Page 906] as it appeared that the Soviet and British delegations wanted the normal vote to be by two-thirds majority, whereas the United States delegation appeared to favor the normal vote being a simple majority, provided certain specific questions were passed by two-thirds vote. After much discussion the Formulation Group finally adopted the Soviet proposal that “important” decisions, which would be enumerated, would be made by two-thirds majority while other questions would be by simple majority. Sir William Malkin was responsible for the wording of the second sentence, which left the decision as to the determination of the additional categories of questions which would have to be decided by a two-thirds majority, to be decided by a simple majority.
This section reflects the provisions laid down in both the American and Soviet proposals. In its paragraph 3, as to the setting up of bodies and agencies, it took paragraph j of the section on Powers of the General Assembly from the American document and placed it under Procedure.
Chapter VI.—The Security Council
Section A on Composition was the subject of prolonged discussion in the Formulation Group and its final phrasing represents the combination of the American and Soviet texts, with the British contribution being largely made in the course of the discussion.
Principal Functions and Powers
Paragraph 1 of this section is taken very largely from Section III, B, 1 of the American document, including much of the wording, though somewhat simpler and less precise in form. The idea of this paragraph was readily agreed to by all.
Paragraph 2 is of British origin and reverts to their idea that action by the Council should be in accordance with the purposes and principles of the organization in order to safeguard the position of the smaller states.
All members of the Formulation Group agreed that the specific powers of the Security Council should be enumerated elsewhere and not laid down in the Chapter on the Council, hence the reference to Chapter VIII.
No specific origin can be attributed to paragraph 4 but it is implicit in all three proposals and the wording was contributed by a number of members of the group.
Paragraph 5 is largely of American origin and follows almost precisely the wording of Section VII, paragraph 1 of the American draft [Page 907] in its first part, and incorporates the British contribution to the document of the Military Staff Committee.
The Formulation Group did not go into any detail of the question of voting in the Council since this was being dealt with by the Steering Committee. At one point the Formulation Group did formulate a series of questions for the Steering Committee’s consideration.
The question of “continuous session” of the Council was one on which the British and American delegations had strongly differing conceptions. The British view was that responsible Ministers should attend, hence the meetings should be infrequent. The American view was that to do its work effectively the Security Council should have permanent representatives located at the seat of the organization so that the Council could be in almost continuous session. This question was discussed at length in the Formulation Group, was made the subject of several drafts by the American Group and was discussed in the Steering Committee and the Organization Subcommittee. The draft as it stands reflects a compromise between the British and American views and was, in its first part, drafted by the Americans, while the latter sentence was drafted largely by the British delegation.
Paragraphs 2 and 3 on subsidiary bodies and agencies led to very little discussion and closely followed the American text.
Paragraph 4 follows in conception and in drafting Section III, A, 4 of the American Proposal.
Paragraph 5, which originally was a part of paragraph 4, was given a separate statement by the Formulation Group in the interest of clarity, it being considered that a party to a dispute should have a different status before the Security Council than a state whose other interests are affected. The proposal to make this distinction was American in origin.
Chapter VII.—An International Court of Justice
This chapter was drafted by the Legal Subcommittee and was adopted almost without discussion by the Formulation Group.
Chapter VIII.—Arrangements for the Maintenance of International Peace and Security Including Prevention and Suppression of Aggression
The original title of this chapter was simply “Arrangements for the Maintenance of Peace and Security”. At a later stage of the work [Page 908] of the Formulation Group, however, the Soviet delegation insisted on inserting a reference to “aggression” at a number of places throughout the document, including the title of this chapter. In order to balance the reference to “aggression”, the American representatives also obtained the inclusion in the title of “breaches to the peace”. This last reference was ultimately dropped as unduly complicating and lengthening the title.
Pacific Settlement of Disputes
Since the Soviet document contained only passing reference to the pacific settlement of disputes and the discussion in the British Memorandum B was in general terms, this section is largely based on Chapter V of the U.S. document. This section was drafted and redrafted several times.
Paragraph 1, which gives the Security Council wide investigatory powers, was introduced into the document with the full concurrence of all the delegations. It was drawn, of course, from Chapter V, paragraph 7, of the U. S. document.
The next three paragraphs of this section, which lay emphasis on the obligations of the member states rather than of the organization, were intended to emphasize the intention of the drafters that pacific settlement is a matter which should be dealt with initially by the states concerned and one in which the international organization should normally intervene only if the dispute is of a character likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security and if the parties fail to settle the dispute by means of their own devising. This intention is reflected in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 with particular reference to disputes which are likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. It will be seen that disputes not likely to give rise to these dangers are not dealt with in the document.
Paragraphs 2 and 3 and the first sentence of paragraph 4 are drawn from Chapter V of the U. S. document. The last sentence of paragraph 4 was added at the request of the Soviet representatives, although the original form of the sentence as suggested by the Soviets tended more categorically to introduce enforcement action into Section A of this chapter. The Soviets, however, accepted revisions in their language suggested by the British and U. S. representatives.
There was general agreement that the actual powers of the Security Council in regard to the pacific settlement of disputes, as set forth in paragraph 5, should be limited to recommending appropriate procedures and methods of adjustment. It was fully understood and desired by all three delegates that the international organization should not impose a settlement of a dispute upon the parties, except [Page 909] in so far as the imposition of a settlement should prove to be essential to the maintenance of peace and security.
Paragraph 6, in regard to justiciable disputes, was derived from both Memorandum B, paragraph 9, of the British document and from Chapter V, paragraph 10, of the U. S. document and was inserted with the full concurrence of the Soviet delegation.
Paragraph 7 was added at a later stage of the Conversations and primarily at the initiation of the British and U.S. delegations. It met, however, with the full concurrence of the Soviets.
Determination of Threats to the Peace or Acts of Aggression and Action with Respect Thereto
The comment made above in regard to the title of this chapter applies also in regard to the title of this section.
The first paragraph of this section was originally included in approximately its present form under Section A of this chapter. It was ultimately decided, however, that the paragraph, since it relates to the taking of measures for the maintenance of peace and security, belonged in this section which is concerned with enforcement action rather than in the preceding section, which is concerned with pacific settlement. As will be noted, the paragraph is somewhat stronger than are comparable paragraphs in the British and U. S. documents, which resulted largely from the urging of the Soviet representatives that, if all of the efforts at pacific settlement of a dispute likely to endanger peace and security should fail, the Security Council must be empowered to take the necessary measures to preserve peace. The other delegations readily concurred in this statement.
The second paragraph is derived largely from Chapter VI, A, 1 of the U. S. document. The phrase “in general” was introduced to indicate that, in addition to the power of the Council to take measures necessary to maintain peace and security in the case of failure to settle a dispute likely to endanger peace and security, as set forth in paragraph 1, the Council should also be able to determine the existence of a threat to the peace or a breach of the peace or an act of aggression which may not have arisen from an international dispute. The phrase “act of aggression” was introduced at the request of the Soviet delegation. The United States delegation pointed out that they considered that this term is included within the scope of the phrase “breach of the peace” but the Soviets felt it desirable, in view of the wide currency which the word “aggression” has had in recent years, that the power of the council to deal with aggression should be specifically stated in the document.
There was some discussion as to whether an effort should be made to define the threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, or acts of [Page 910] aggression the commission of which would justify the Council in resorting to enforcement measures. The British delegation was, however, particularly insistent in urging that any effort to define these terms would be likely to limit the scope of the Council’s powers and that it would be wiser to give the Council the fullest discretion to determine whether or not any particular action should be designated as falling within any one of these three categories. The other two delegations readily concurred in the British view.
Paragraph 3 of this section was derived from Chapter VI, C of the U.S. document and from Chapter VIII of the Soviet document. It originally consisted merely of the first sentence but the Soviets later insisted that it would be useful to specify the principal types of non-military enforcement measures to which the Council might resort and the other delegations, while seeing no real advantage and some possible disadvantage in this specification, nevertheless rather reluctantly consented.
The same comment applies to paragraph 4. It was upon the insistence of the Soviet representatives that in the first sentence specific reference was made to “air, naval or land forces”, rather than a mere reference to “armed forces”, and that the second sentence was added to the paragraph.
Paragraph 5 was derived chiefly from Chapter VI, D, paragraphs 2 and 6 of the American document. The other delegations saw no necessity for separating the provision of forces from the provision of facilities. The Soviet delegation for some time urged that there be included, either in this paragraph or in a separate subsequent paragraph, a provision whereunder members of the organization who are unable to provide armed forces adequate for the requirements of the organization should, nevertheless, be bound to provide, upon call by the Council, sites for bases required for enforcement action by the Council. The U. S. and British delegations felt that adequate provision was made for necessary agreements of this sort in the first sentence of paragraph 5 and that it would be unwise either to give the Council such wide powers in regard to taking over sites for bases without the agreement of the states concerned or to make the inability to provide adequate armed forces the criterion for determining whether or not bases or sites for bases should be furnished. After extensive discussion the Soviet delegation finally abandoned this point. The last sentence of the paragraph was introduced by the U. S. representative.
Paragraph 6 represents the conclusion of a long discussion which arose from the desire of the Soviet delegation to have provision made for an international air force corps which should be independent of the member states and completely under the control of the Council at all times. Both the U. S. and British delegations objected strenuously to this proposal for both military and political reasons. It was [Page 911] discussed at length in meetings of a special military group composed of the military members of the three delegations. It was made clear that the U. S. and British delegations were equally desirous with the Soviet delegation of having effective force immediately available upon the call of the Council for use in enforcement action. It was pointed out that the Council would have the power to determine when the contingents and particularly the air contingents provided for by the special agreements referred to in paragraph 5 should be called up and that they could be called up as soon as a threat to the peace developed and in time to have a deterrent effect. Although the Soviets continued to prefer the international air force corps, they reluctantly accepted the present paragraph 6 as being the most the other delegations were prepared to grant.
Paragraph 7 was introduced on the initiative of the Soviet delegation and was derived principally from Chapter VIII, paragraph J–2 of their document. It was intended to make perfectly clear that the Council might delegate enforcement measures in a particular case to one or several members of the organization or that it might call upon all members of the organization for assistance.
Paragraph 8 was adopted without discussion.
The British delegation throughout the Conversations attached the greatest importance to the organization and functions of the Military Staff Committee. There was, however, no important difference of opinion on this question. The word “disarmament” was introduced into the paragraph at the request of the Soviet delegation but the British insisted that it be preceded by the word “possible”. There was some discussion of the second sentence of the paragraph and the general understanding was that the Military Staff Committee should act more or less in the role which the Combined Chiefs of Staff has played in the present war. It was agreed that it would be undesirable to have representatives of any states other than the big four or five permanently represented on the Military Staff Committee but it was recognized that representatives of other states would have to be associated with the Committee from time to time in connection with particular enforcement actions and with the organization of the forces and facilities placed at the disposal of the Council. As to the last sentence of the paragraph the understanding was that the Military Staff Committee would not actually command the forces in the field placed at the disposal of the Council but that the Council would designate the commander, presumably from the forces of the state making the largest contribution to the particular enforcement action.
Paragraph 10 was adopted without discussion.
There was considerable argument in regard to the question dealt with in paragraph 11 and the Soviet representatives were inclined to think that this provision might suggest that the organization was [Page 912] concerned with international relief rather than international security. It was pointed out by the British and U. S. delegations, however, that in some cases it would be impossible to expect full cooperation in economic enforcement measures from states who might be economically dependent upon the state against whom the measures were being taken unless some such provision for the relief of a state suffering undue burdens was included in the Charter. This paragraph of course stemmed from Chapter VI, C, 2d of the U.S. document.
This subject was dealt with in the final stage of the work of the Formulation Group. None of the documents presented by the three Governments dealt with the subject except in general terms or by brief reference. This section, which was originally drafted as a single paragraph and later broken into three paragraphs, was largely formulated by Mr. Pasvolsky on the basis of the U. S. document on Regional Arrangements (ISO 434). The general tendency in the Formulation Group was to play down the importance of regional arrangements. This is reflected by the fact that paragraph 1, instead of stating positively, as did the U. S. document in Chapter I, A, 4 that “the Organization should be so constituted as to make possible the existence of regional organizations”, puts the matter negatively by declaring that “nothing in the Charter should preclude the existence of regional arrangements or agencies”.
Special emphasis was placed on the final clause of paragraph 2 stipulating that no enforcement action should be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council. There was originally contained in this same sentence an exception applying to enforcement action which might be taken by the victor states toward the defeated nations in the present war, but this exception was later transferred to Chapter XII, Transitional Arrangements. Both the British and the Soviet representatives indicated that they would expect military enforcement action to take place to a large extent on a regional basis, but they seemed to feel that this section as drafted met their desires on this point.
Regulation of Armaments
In the earlier drafts prepared by the Formulation Group, there was a separate chapter dealing with the regulation of armaments. The Soviet representatives were not enthusiastic about this chapter and considered that the reference to this matter in the chapter on the Assembly was adequate for the purposes of the Charter. If, however, [Page 913] there was to be a separate chapter on the regulation of armaments, they insisted that this chapter deal also with disarmament. The British, on the other hand, disapproved of placing emphasis on disarmament, feeling that the disarmament which had taken place among the victor powers after the last war had been a fatal error. The British also insisted that it be specifically provided that any international agreement for the regulation of armaments should provide that each state might maintain not only the forces required to meet its international obligations but also forces necessary to meet its requirements “for local defense and internal security”. When asked to explain the meaning of the words “local defense”, they referred to the northwest frontier of India.
Because of the divergent views of the three delegations on this subject, it was finally decided to omit the chapter entirely and to insert among the functions and powers of the Security Council the provision which now appears as paragraph 5 of Section B of Chapter VI.
Chapter IX.—Arrangements for International Economic and Social Cooperation
When, in the latter period of the Conversations, the Soviet delegation agreed to extending the scope of the organization to include economic and social cooperation, the Formulation Group considered a text which it would present for this purpose. A comparison of the text adopted with the corresponding section of the American Proposals will show that the text is almost entirely identical.
Neither the British nor the Soviet delegations had anything prepared on this subject and therefore the Formulation Group, by common consent, agreed to take the American text as a basis. The text, slightly abbreviated, was adopted almost in its original form.
It will be noted that the powers of the Economic and Social Council in Section C, 1, b are a slightly simplified form of the powers indicated in the American Proposals under B, 1. The new C, 1, e is an amalgamation of the American text B, 1, c and d.
At the suggestion of the Soviet delegation, supported by the British and approved by the American, it was agreed to add certain functions to the Economic and Social Council providing for assistance to the Security Council.
At the suggestion of the British delegation, the number of members of the Economic and Social Council was reduced from twenty-four, as suggested in the American Proposals, to eighteen states.
The American delegation was warmly congratulated for having available such a fully developed plan which the Formulation Group could adopt so readily.[Page 914]
Chapter X.—The Secretariat
The Formulation Group decided that the chapter on the Secretariat should be very brief.
The title of “Secretary-General” had been adopted as a result of a special committee headed by Mr. Fletcher set up by the Plenary Committee. The duties of the Secretary-General follow closely the recommendations of the American Proposals. Upon the suggestion of the British delegation, however, it was decided that he should be elected by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council, rather than with the concurrence of the Security Council, as the American plan suggested.
The empowering of the Secretary-General, in paragraph 3, with the right to bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten international peace and security, was originated by the British delegation. There seemed to be no objection to it, and the text was adopted largely as it stood in the British Proposals.
The Formulation Group considered that a separate chapter should be devoted to amendments, rather than to list this subject among the powers of the General Assembly, as had been suggested in the American Proposals.
There was considerable discussion as to whether only a majority or a two-thirds majority of the members of the General Assembly should be required to propose amendments. There was also some discussion as to whether such amendments required to be approved by two-thirds of the member states or only a majority, and a compromise was accepted by which it would be a majority, plus the states having permanent membership on the Security Council.
The main outlines of the amendments chapter was considered in the Subcommittee on International Organization and the Formulation Group took relatively little time in discussing the question further. The actual wording of the text was largely the work of the British legal adviser.
Chapter XII.—Transitional Arrangements
The substance of paragraph 1 of this chapter originally appeared in Chapter VIII, but, in view of the contention that it was out of place in the body of a document destined, it was hoped, to endure long after the interim period to which it referred, it was decided that it should appear in a separate chapter at the end of the document. There was some discussion of the paragraph being eliminated altogether, but there was a feeling, which was particularly held by the Soviet representatives, that a proposal relating to the maintenance [Page 915] of peace and security would be incomplete if no provision was made for dealing with this interim period. There was, however, a rather general expectation that this provision would not actually appear in the Charter of the International Organization.
The paragraph was based in general on paragraph D, 4 of the U.S. document. The Soviet representatives, however, suggested that it provide that the four powers “assume full responsibility” for the maintenance of peace and security during the interim period. The U.S. delegation, however, was not willing to go so far and pointed out that under our constitutional procedure the Executive would not have the authority to assume such a wide responsibility prior to the ratification by the Congress of the Special Agreement for the Provision of Armed Forces. It was therefore finally decided to copy the wording of paragraph 5 of the Moscow Declaration.
As stated above in the discussion of the section on regional arrangements, paragraph 2 of Chapter XII was originally included as a final clause in paragraph C, 2 of Chapter VIII. It was finally decided, however, that this too was a transitional arrangement and that it might be unwise to refer to “enemy states” and “the present war” in the Charter of an international organization which it is hoped will endure over a long period, It was felt at the same time, however, that it should be made perfectly clear that the states to whom the enemy states in the present war surrender should have full authority to deal with those states in accordance with the terms of surrender and that this authority should not be limited in any way by the provisions of the Charter of the international organization. It was contemplated, however, that the victor states might ultimately wish to transfer some of these responsibilities to the international organization.