Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1944, General, Volume I

500.CC/9–1944: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, September 19, 1944—1 p.m.
[Received September 19—9:25 a.m.]

3572. Before receiving this morning your personal message No. 2234, September 18, 10 a.m. [p.m.],¹² I had drafted the first part of a message on this subject. I am now sending you this part of the message as background and will follow shortly with more specific answers to the questions which you have raised. Original message follows:

“I submit the following for such value as it may have in your consideration of Marshal Stalin’s reply¹³ to the President’s message on the question of voting of the permanent members in the Council of the World Security Organization.

The British Ambassador has informed me of his discussion with Molotov on this subject, report of which I assume you have received.¹⁴ Molotov’s reaction followed precisely the same line as Stalin’s message to the President.

From the evidence we have, it would appear that the underlying reason for the position of the Soviets on voting is their unwillingness to allow the Council to deal with any dispute in which the Soviet Government is a party affecting their relations with at least their neighboring countries. Some of the evidence we have in mind is the following:

(1) You will recall that at the Moscow Conference when the question of European problems was discussed Molotov stated that the Soviet Government was prepared to consult with the British and yourselves [ourselves?] on matters relating to all questions except those between the Soviet Government and its immediate western neighbors. On these matters the Soviet Government was prepared to keep us informed but would take no further commitments.

(2) Light on the Soviet Government’s attitude toward small nations was reflected in an informal conversation Mr. Eden and I had at the British Embassy with Litvinov and Maiski¹⁵ in which Litvinov expounded the concept that it was unreasonable to consider that the interests of 30 million Poles should be given equal weight with those of 180 million Russians. Where the interests of the Russians conflicted with those of the Poles, the Poles would have to give way.

Recently Litvinov expounded the same philosophy to the Norwegian Ambassador when he said ‘The glory of the small nations is past’.

(3) Throughout the year we have seen evidence of the Soviet Government’s intention to prescribe unilaterally the manner in which the Polish political problem should be settled.¹⁶

(4) Throughout the period of occupation of Iran the Soviet Government has shown unwillingness to collaborate to any substantial degree with the British and ourselves and in fact has been unwilling to allow our observers to study conditions in northern Iran.¹⁷

(5) The Soviet Government’s agreement with the Italian Government for the exchange of representatives was reached without consultation.

(6) As soon as the Soviets decided that Turkey’s entry into the war was no longer vital they took the first pretext to break away unilaterally from their agreement at Moscow and Tehran to work with the British and ourselves for Turkey’s entry into the war.¹⁸

(7) The Soviet Government declared war on Bulgaria¹⁹ without consultation with the British and ourselves, giving us thirty minutes notice. It would appear probable that the reasons for failure to consult were political even if the move itself may have been based on military considerations as well.

(8) Molotov’s attitude in the discussions preceding the Rumanian armistice²⁰ has been cold to say the least toward real collaboration of British and American political representatives in Rumania. It is of course too early to judge the manner in which the Soviets will use their powers under the armistice.

(9) We have seen an unbending and impatient attitude toward Chiang Kai Shek particularly regarding the difficulties in Sinkiang. Our air force as well as China are being penalized by an unwillingness to allow the use of the overland route through the Soviet Union²¹ in order to bring political pressure on the Generalissimo.

I do not attempt to appraise whether the Soviets are right or wrong in their objectives in any one of the above cases. I refer to them only as indicative of their attitude and consistent method of unilateral action in accomplishing their objectives. I believe we have thus sufficient evidence to foresee that if the world organization is established requiring agreement of all permanent members for the consideration of any dispute regardless of whether or not one of them is involved the Soviet Government will ruthlessly block consideration by the Council of any question in which it considers its interests affected and will insist that the matter be settled by the Soviet Union within the other country or countries involved particularly any disputes with their neighbors.

I am convinced that Stalin and his principal advisers place the highest importance on the association of the Soviet Union in a major way with the three great powers in world affairs but have expected that their political and military strength would enable them to dictate the conditions. There is no doubt the Russian people crave peace and have been led to believe that the intimate relationship developed during the war with the British and ourselves will continue after the war and will be a guarantee of a lasting peace. I do not believe Stalin can forego the material as well as the psychological value of this association without causing grave concern among the Russian people. On the other hand it seems evident that there are powerful groups within his immediate circle who are unwilling to give up right of independent action where Russian’s interests are affected and to see Russia depend solely on an untried world organization with associates none of whom do they fully trust. As Stalin traditionally likes to have two strings to his bow, it has not appeared to him inconsistent to pursue these two methods at the same time to obtain security for the Soviet Union and to advance its national interests as he sees them.”

Harriman

12. Vol. iv, p. 991; see also telegram 3600, September 20, from Moscow, ibid., p. 992.
13. Telegram of September 14, p. 806.
14. Not found in Department files.
15. I. M. Maisky, Soviet Assistant Commissar for Foreign Affairs.
16. For correspondence on this subject, see vol. iii, pp. 1216 ff.
17. See vol. v, pp. 306 ff.
18. See ibid., pp. 814 ff.
19. September 4, 1944; see telegram 3321, September 5, from Moscow, vol. iii, p. 396.
20. September 12, 1944; see vol. iv, pp. 133 ff.
21. For correspondence regarding this subject see Foreign Relations, 1943, China, pp. 614 ff.