Lot 60–D 224, Box 55: D.O./P.R./25

Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State

Subject: Progress Report on Dumbarton Oaks Conversations—Twenty-sixth Day

Meetings with Ambassador Gromyko and Sir Alexander Cadogan

After my telephone conversation with you at 9:45 this morning Ambassador Gromyko came to Dumbarton Oaks at my invitation. I emphasized to him, as you requested, the very serious consequences, both for the creation of an international organization and for the Soviet Union, which might result from terminating these conversations without having reached agreement on the question of voting procedure in the Council. I asked the Ambassador whether, in the light of these circumstances, his Government would be willing to consider a new formula with respect to voting in the Council. Ambassador Gromyko replied that the position of his Government on this question is final and would not be changed regardless of whether the conversations were prolonged a week or a year. He emphasized that the Soviet Government would never consider joining an organization in which a major power involved in a dispute did not vote.

The Ambassador stated that it was his personal view rather than the official view of his Government that the Soviet Union would not agree to the holding of a conference of the United Nations before agreement had been reached among the four powers on the vital question of voting procedure. He stated, however, that he would obtain the formal view of his Government on this question. The Ambassador asked whether I believed the British could be expected to change their position, and I replied that it was my personal opinion that no change was in prospect in the reasonably near future.

I later repeated to Sir Alexander Cadogan my conversation with Ambassador Gromyko. Sir Alexander stated that his Government also could never accept the plan to bring the draft proposals before a United Nations conference prior to agreement on all basic issues by the four powers. He subsequently agreed, however, to take up with his Government my suggestion that the four nations join in inviting other United Nations to a conference, leaving open the issue of voting procedure in the Council.

I stated to Sir Alexander in Ambassador Gromyko’s presence that if the proposals were published in their present form the Secretary or President would find it necessary to make a statement clarifying the position of this Government. Sir Alexander said that the same would [Page 822] go for his Government. Presumably, Ambassador Gromyko has reported these statements to Moscow.

Sir Alexander again asked whether it would be necessary to have an opening ceremony for the Chinese. I replied that we must do so and that it was our intention that you would be present and would speak. Sir Alexander said that he thought this whole procedure was absurd and that he did not wish to sit with the Chinese for more than three days.

Meeting of the American Group

At the meeting of the American group at 9:30 this morning I reported the developments of Saturday and Sunday and subsequent developments during the morning. The group discussed at length the probable consequences of adjourning the discussions with the Soviet representatives prior to agreement on the question of voting. There was a marked division of opinion which led to the drafting of two memoranda.5 The first of these expressed the view of Mr. Long and our military representatives that an adjournment of the discussions would have the most serious political and military consequences and proposed alternatives, extending to full acceptance of the Russian position, for the purpose of reaching agreement prior to adjournment. The second, prepared by other members of the American group, weighed the consequences of adjournment prior to agreement and suggested a new course of action.6

  1. Neither printed; for an outline of the American Group’s views, see memorandum to President Roosevelt and the Secretary of State, September 21, p. 834.
  2. This second memorandum favored concluding the Conversations at the technical level and referring the problems of voting arrangements for discussion at a higher level.