500.CC/7–2444: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State
[Received July 25—12:30 a.m.]
2729. This telegram is of high importance with respect to the forthcoming conversations on an international security organization.
Some three weeks ago, Litvinov45 mentioned to Hamilton46 that a Soviet publication called Zvezda would shortly carry an article concerning the question of an international security organization and that this article would be worth attention. This article has now appeared in the Leningrad literary magazine of that name. The article is signed by N. Malinin which is evidently a pseudonym. A number of articles in War and the Working Class have been signed by this pseudonym. In the present instance, we think it highly probable that the article was written or inspired by Litvinov himself who is known to be concerned with matters of post-war security. In any case, it is hardly conceivable that an article on this subject would have been allowed to appear unless its contents had been carefully considered and approved by the highest Soviet authorities. For this reason, I consider that it may safely be taken as an authoritative statement of the preliminary line of thought on the subject of an international security organization.
The article is definite and businesslike in tone and in view of the high importance which obviously attaches to it, I propose to wire the entire text despite its length as soon as a careful translation has been completed. I hope that this text will go forward within the next day or two.47 Meanwhile, the Department may wish to have the following high spots: The key note of the article is the emphasis placed on the necessity for a predominant position in the proposed organization of those great powers who have proved themselves in the present war to have real [military power]. After discussing the faults of the old League,48 the article points out that even countries which are prepared to fulfill engagements entered into directly with one, two or even a small group of other powers look differently on general international engagements such as the League Covenant and the Kellogg Pact49 and are less inclined to observe [Page 695] them. It points out the need for speed of decision and for military and industrial power to back up decisions in matters affecting international security. The Great Powers must agree to resist aggression through their own forces, and their obligations in this respect must be documented not only in general engagements but in direct bilateral agreements or agreements between smaller groups. In these agreements, the role of each power in putting out conflagrations in this or that breeding place of aggression would be defined. These roles would vary according to circumstances but the principles of mutual assistance would be adhered to.
The organization should have a directive body composed of the great powers. This body would act only on unanimous decision.
This would not mean that small States would have no useful role to play. The Great Powers would need their help in various ways, as for example bases on their territory, the right of passage, and sometimes the participation of their armed forces. In individual instances groups of small powers might be asked to bear the main burden of military action. Small States might also be asked to participate in economic sanctions, the value of which is not rejected.
The plan for an international police force is rejected as Utopian and unnecessary, but it is admitted that an international air police force might have value.
It is agreed that almost all questions connected with the activity of the organization should pass through the general assembly; but decision should have to be approved in advance or subsequently confirmed by the directing body. The latter on the other hand would make independent decisions as a rule only in urgent matters of a military character. Decisions in the general assembly should be neither unanimous nor by simple majority, but be something between, as for example a two-thirds majority.
The organization should not be encumbered, as was the League, with a series of technical functions and suborganizations not directly concerned with the peaceful settlement of international disputes and the preservation of peace and security. The value of these technical services is not disputed but it is argued that they should be allotted to some general international organization created for the purpose or to individual organizations for each separate field. This would apply it is specifically stated, to the ILO.
It is considered that the constitution of the organization should be worked out by the four Great Powers and should then be submitted to a conference of the United Nations who would become original members. Neutrals could later be requested to join, and at a still later date ex-enemies. It would be possible however at any time to exclude states showing Fascist tendencies.
[Page 696]It is stated that the Russians do not have any finished and complete project for such an organization. Hope is expressed that the article which is put forward for purpose of discussion will stimulate counter proposals. Article ends with reaffirmation of the conviction that in the absence of firm leadership of a union of the Great Powers no international organization could exist without courting the fate of the League of Nations.
- Maxim Maximovich Litvinov, Assistant People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.↩
- Maxwell M. Hamilton, Counselor of Embassy.↩
- Despatch 719, July 25, 1944, not printed.↩
- League of Nations.↩
- For the “Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact”, a treaty providing for the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy, signed at Paris on August 27, 1928, by the United States and other Powers, see Foreign Relations, 1928, vol. i, p. 153.↩