The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt 34

Number 828. Your Number 655. I have consulted the Cabinet and separately the Chiefs of Staff and we all gravely doubt whether any such statement should be made. I do not think that the Germans are very much afraid of the treatment they will get from the British and American armies or governments. What they are afraid of is a Russian occupation, and a large proportion of their people being taken off to toil to death in Russia, or as they say, Siberia. Nothing that we can say will eradicate this deep seated fear.

2.
Moreover, U. J.35 certainly contemplates demanding two or three million Nazi youth, Gestapo men, etc., doing prolonged reparation work, and it is hard to say that he is wrong. We could not therefore give the Germans any assurances on this subject without consultations with U. J.
3.
It seems to me that if I were a German soldier or general, I should regard any such statement at this juncture, when the battle for Cologne is at its height, as a confession of weakness on our part and as proof positive of the advantages of further desperate resistance. The Chiefs of the Staff and Ministry of Information both independently agree with me that this might well be the consequence of any such announcement now. I do not see any alternative to the General Grant attitude “To fight it out on this line, if it takes all summer”. We, therefore, are opposed to any reassurance being volunteered by us at this juncture.
4.
The brilliant French success in the south, your capture of Metz and the break-through of the Seventh American Army upon Strassbourg now taken are substantial facts which must be added to the intense pressure of the American First and Ninth Armies and our [Page 566] own British efforts towards Venlo. Even if we do not conquer at the strongest point towards Cologne, enough has been already gained to make the battle a notable step towards our goal. Words, I am sure, would play no part now and we can, it seems to me, speak no words of which the Russians, who are still holding on their front double the number of divisions opposite us, are not parties.
5.
I, therefore, earnestly hope that we shall fight the battle out till winter comes about the middle of December and throw extra weight into the points of penetration. I am sure it would be hurtful to our prestige and even to our initiative if we seemed to try high-level appeals to the Germans now. All kinds of propaganda can be thrown across the battle-fronts locally as they do to us, and the staffs are working at a plan on which a separate telegram will be sent, which is designed to meet Eisenhower’s desire to get at German morale by underground methods. But to make the great governments responsible for anything which would look like appeasement now would worsen our chances, confess our errors and stiffen the enemy resistance. Please, however, do not hesitate to correct me if you think I am wrong. Meanwhile, I remain set where you put me on unconditional surrender.
Prime
  1. Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y. On November 27, 1944, a paraphrase of this telegram was transmitted to the Department of State by the British Embassy.
  2. Uncle Joe (Stalin).