740.00119 European War 1939/2635
Memorandum by Brigadier General John
Magruder, Deputy Director of Intelligence Service, Office
of Strategic Services, to Mr. Fletcher
Warren, Executive Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of
State (
Berle
)
Washington
, 17 May,
1944.
Attention: Mr. A. A. Berle, Jr.
Subject: Overtures by German Generals and Civilian
Opposition for a Separate Armistice.
There is enclosed herewith copy of a document90 concerning the
above subject, which has been prepared by this agency. The information
contained therein was obtained from a series of cables from our Bern office,
the most recent of which is dated May 13.
A copy of this document has been transmitted formally to the Secretary of
State by the Acting Director, OSS.91
[Enclosure]
Overtures by German Generals and Civilian
Opposition for a Separate Armistice
Washington
, May 16,
1944.
- 1.
- Since early 1944 the OSS representative in Bern92 has been approached
periodically by two emissaries of a German group proposing [Page 511] to attempt an overthrow of
the Nazi regime. The group includes Leuschner,93 socialist leader and
former Minister of Interior in Hesse; Oster,94 a
general formerly the right-hand man of Canaris, arrested in 1943 by
the Gestapo, kept under surveillance after his release, and recently
discharged from official functions by Keitel; Goerdler,95 former Mayor
of Leipzig; and General Beck.96 The last two men have been described by the
OSS representative as leaders of the group; it is from them that the
two emissaries have brought proposals for negotiation.
- 2.
- Early in April the emissaries talked with the OSS representative
in Bern, conveying the suggestion of a deal between this German
opposition group and the Western Allies. The group expressed their
willingness and preparation to attempt ousting Hitler and the Nazis.
They stated their belief that the time in which successful action
could be carried out was rapidly shortening. They said they were the
only group able to profit by personal approach to Hitler and other
Nazi chiefs, and the only one controlling enough arms and enough
influence in the Wehrmacht to accomplish the purpose of Nazi
overthrow. The group stated that the German generals now commanding
in the West—particularly Rundstedt and Falkenhausen—would be ready
to cease resistance and aid Allied landings, once the Nazis had been
ousted. They thought that similar arrangements might be worked out
for the reception of Allied airborne forces at strategic points in
Germany. While ready to attempt a coup, the group did not guarantee
success.
- 3.
- The condition on which the group expressed willingness to act was
that they would deal directly with the Western Allies alone after
overthrowing the Nazi regime. As precedent for excluding the USSR
from all negotiations they cited the recent example of Finland,
which they said dealt solely with Moscow.97 This condition the
group based on the conservative character of their membership and
supporters. However, the group declared their willingness to
cooperate with any leftist elements except the Communists; in
February they had described Leuschner as an acceptable type of head
for an interim government, assuming that neither the military nor
the Communists would dominate during the transition period. The
group feared political and ideological sway over Central Europe by
Bolshevism, with a mere exchange of Nazi totalitarianism for a
totalitarianism of [Page 512] the
radical left accompanied by the submergence of democracy and
Christian culture. They stated that if capitulation were to be made
primarily to the Soviet Union, it would have to be carried out by
another group in Germany.
- 4.
- The OSS representative expressed to the emissaries his conviction
that the United States and Great Britain would not act regarding
Germany without the concert of Russia. In commenting on the
opposition group’s proposal, he expressed skepticism of their
capability since Beck and Goerdler have been so prominently
mentioned as potential leaders that the Gestapo must be aware of the
situation and is only waiting to crack down until plans have gone
farther or because the Gestapo may wish to keep an anchor to
westward.
- 5.
- In May 1944, approximately one month after the April visit of the
emissaries to the OSS representative, they received an oral message
by courier from the opposition group. Now mentioned as members were
also Halder,99 Zeitzler,1 Heusinger2 (chief of operations for Zeitzler),
olbr[i]cht3 (chief of the
German Army Administration), Falkenhausen, and Rundstedt. The group
was reported ready to help Allied units get into Germany if the
Allies agreed that the Wehrmacht should continue to hold the Eastern
Front. They proposed in detail: (1) three Allied airborne divisions
should land in the Berlin region with the assistance of the local
Army commanders, (2) major amphibious landings should be undertaken
at or near Bremen and Hamburg, (3) landings in France should follow,
although Rommel4 cannot be counted on for cooperation, (4)
reliable German units in the area of Munich would isolate Hitler and
other high Nazis in Ober Salzburg. The opposition group is reported
to feel that Germany has lost the war and that the only chance of
avoiding Communism in Germany is to facilitate occupation of as
large a section of Europe as possible by American and British forces
before collapse on the Eastern Front.
- 6.
- The emissaries, who had remained in Switzerland, replied to the
courier that discussion of the plan would be unavailing because of
the proviso concerning the USSR. Later the group dispatched to them
a telegram advising no further action “for the time being”. The
emissaries think nevertheless that the subject is still open. They
have characterized the group’s proviso as unrealistic, and regard as
the core of the proposal only the plan that American and British
forces should become entrenched in Germany before the Russians; [Page 513] they urged that it was
entirely a military matter if some of the German generals wish to
assist the Allied invasion and try to take over the Nazi regime. The
OSS representative reiterated to the emissaries that Great Britain
and the United States would adhere to their Russian commitments. In
answer to the objection that point (1) of the group’s plan
(paragraph 5, above, on page 3) might be regarded by the Allies as a
trap, they stated that since they were not military men they could
only say that sufficient opportunity for requisite precautions would
be presented in the form of direct prior contact with German
military authorities. The emissaries said that Zeitzler had been won
over by Heusinger and Olbr[i]cht; they added that he was preoccupied
in respect of military matters with the Eastern Front, that he would
cooperate in any plan to bring about a systematic liquidation of
that front in order to escape the blame for a military disaster
there—which he greatly fears.
- 7.
- One of the opposition group’s emissaries acknowledged his lack of
confidence in the political courage of the German generals, on the
basis of past experience, and said the Allies might do well to
ignore their propositions if there were assurance of early victory
and a speedy Allied occupation of Germany. The OSS representative at
Bern is convinced of the sincerity of this intermediary, as the
result of investigation and of experience with him. The
representative is of the opinion that there are some German generals
who wish to liquidate their responsibility in the war by
collaborating in the construction of an Anglo-American bulwark
against the pressure of the USSR in Europe, and he is convinced that
the two emissaries are in contact with such a group. Doubtful that
the group would have the determination to act effectively at the
appropriate time and sensitive to the problem of Soviet relations in
the effectuation of any plan in which the group might participate,
he believes that the group’s activities may nevertheless be useful
to undermine the morale of the top echelon in the Wehrmacht.
