740.0011 European War 1939/33979
Memorandum by Brigadier General John
Magruder, Deputy Director of Intelligence Service, Office
of Strategic Services, to the Director of the Office of European
Affairs (Dunn)
Washington, 5 April,
1944.
Transmitted herewith for your information is a copy of a dispatch, from the
Bern office of this agency, giving reported German reactions, to three major
Allied propaganda lines.
[Page 506]
[Annex]
Germany: Reaction to Allied Psychological
Warfare
On the basis of numerous reports and extended consultation, the OSS
representative in Bern transmits the German reactions to three major
Allied propaganda lines:
- 1.
-
The trend toward a German defeat is
inescapable. The Germans are certainly aware of this
inescapable trend. Their hopes at present consist solely in:
(a) diminution of Russian interest
upon attaining the 1941 boundaries, or else friction between the
USSR and the western Allies; (b)
frustration of attempts to land in the Balkans or in France,
added to war fatigue on the part of the western countries, the
forthcoming elections in the US, and the degree to which the US
views the war against Japan as its primary concern; (c) a miracle of some sort, such as a
secret weapon, although this hope is fading; (d) an era of chaotic confusion throughout Europe, from
which Germany would emerge in as good shape as any other
country.
- 2.
-
Unconditional surrender does not mean total
disaster. The majority of Germans suspect that the
Allies wish to ruin the economic as well as the military
strength of Germany; “unconditional surrender” therefore
signifies to most of them total catastrophe for the country and
for the individual German. We ourselves have done nothing to
offer them a more hopeful meaning for this expression; we have
never, for example, indicated that it refers only to military
and party leaders. The Germans’ pessimistic interpretation of
“unconditional surrender” is also supported by the widespread
feeling that the Atlantic Charter has been discarded or at least
does not hold good for Germany, and by Churchill’s mention of
compensation to Poland by giving her German territory. In the
face of Goebbels’73 propaganda system, it
would be difficult to “sell” the German people on a new and more
optimistic interpretation of “unconditional surrender”; however,
granting the issuance of authoritative and harmonizing
proclamations from Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin, it probably
could be achieved in time. Thus far, back-handed encouragement
from the Free German Committee74 in
Moscow has been the only source of hope for the Germans, and
many Germans regard this Committee as a trap.
- 3.
-
Overthrow of the Nazis by a minority
group. Unless Hitler and certain other Nazi leaders
were murdered, and the Army takes over,
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most Germans believe that no minority
faction could now seize authority over the existing ruler.
Moreover, no effective opposition group, military or civilian,
exists which favors the western powers. Most anti-Nazis who
desire western orientation see no justification for risking
their lives to promote any plans for Germany thus far submitted
by the western powers. Other anti-Nazi elements in the Reich
prefer to have the authority and responsibility maintained by
the Nazi and military cliques until the ultimate debacle, so
that the whole blame for the war and for Germany’s downfall will
rest for all time on the shoulders of Hitler and the military.
The German Socialists, especially, do not intend to assume
control, as they did the last time, and thus have to answer for
the armistice and peace terms. The Catholics’ point of view is
much the same. The Communists possess no known leader. Of
course, a new group probably would be created in case we chose
to offer any indication that such a group could deal with us;
until the capitulation, however, the strength of this group
would be insignificant.
