740.00119 EAC/7–2744: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

5945. Personal for James Dunn. Embassy’s despatch 17092, July 26.63 In forwarding the draft of surrender terms with accompanying documents, I thought I should report to you certain details that are not included in the official attached communication.

Under our alternative schedule for chairing the European Advisory Commission, I took over on July 14. The Commission met that afternoon. The Commission again met on Monday, July 17. Gousev then asked for a postponement of the next meeting until he had time to communicate with his Government. Meetings tentatively scheduled for Wednesday July 19 and Thursday July 20 were further postponed until Monday July 24. I took advantage of the news of the German crisis64 and asked both Gousev and Strang65 to meet me in my apartment Friday evening. In formal conversation without overpressing, we all came to an agreement that the business of the EAC had to be expedited. I believe it was this latter meeting that resulted in the [Page 453]Russian delegation agreeing to free the surrender terms for immediate formal forwarding together with the report to the Governments and the release of the letter to the interested European nations.66 The addendum to the instrument of surrender was attached and signed at the request of the Russians. The changes in the letter directed to the French Committee and compared with the identic letters addressed to the other governments were made at my suggestion and without opposition by either Gousev or Strang. I addressed this letter “Dear Mr. Paris”.67 Vienot68 had died the day before. In spite of the footnote insisted on by the Russians in the confidential report to the three Governments, they made no objections to a letter going to the Polish Foreign Minister.69

Last night Gousev came to see me to discuss the German and Austrian protocols. I believe without great difficulty, we can find a substitute phrase for “auxiliary contingents” which the Russians have objected to and straighten out certain detailed boundary questions as well as one or two matters of lesser importance in the German protocol, but Gousev also told me that his Government would have to insist on the definite allocation of the Northwest and Southwest Zones. These have been left blank in the document because we and the British have not been able to agree as you know, as to which area each would occupy. Could you help me by getting a decision on this matter? I realize the differences and difficulties involved.

I understand that in the disposition of our air forces policing Germany that it may be of advantage to use airfields in Austria. If I could state this in connection with the “token forces” proposal, it would facilitate a prompt settlement of differences in relation to the British and the Russians regarding tripartite occupation of Austria. My difficulty in the latter situation has been due to the Department’s instruction that I should get written agreement on the President’s reservation. The question of quantitative forces had not been raised in either settling the German zones or the Berlin area. Since this was the fact, I had felt that a verbal statement which both the Russions and the British had been willing to accept would have been sufficient. I have maintained our position with respect to tripartite control in Austria.

I would appreciate advice or help you may give me in these matters.

  1. See footnote 4, p. 252.
  2. A plot to overthrow Adolf Hitler was revealed following an unsuccessful attempt on his life on July 20, 1944.
  3. Sir William Strang, United Kingdom Representative on the European Advisory Commission.
  4. For texts of these documents, see pp. 256, 254, and 63, respectively.
  5. Jacques-Camille Paris, First Counsellor of Embassy in the United Kingdom of the French Committee of National Liberation.
  6. Pierre Viénot, Ambassador in London of the French Committee of National Liberation.
  7. Tadeusz Romer.