740.00119 EAC/10–2644: Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State

9227. For the Secretary, Under Secretary and Mr. Winant.25a On October 16 Eden handed Molotov a memorandum on the work of the EAC reported in Embassy’s despatch 18844, October 26.26 Summary follows:

It is urgent to prepare joint plans as quickly as possible for post-surrender control of Germany and Austria. Risks of confusion and misunderstanding might arise if such joint planning were unduly delayed. Five main points remain to be settled in the EAC:

(1)
Machinery of control in Germany, more particularly military missions of the Allied powers;
(2)
Proclamations and general orders, to be issued jointly by the three Commanders in Chief;
(3)
Directives, to be similarly issued;
(4)
Agreement on plans for the occupation and control of Austria;
(5)
Urgent setting up tripartite nucleus control groups for Germany and for Austria by sending Soviet nucleus group to London to join with United States and United Kingdom groups now being formed. In conclusion, EAC should be enabled to make greater use of expert committees on particular problems, for sake of greater speed. End summary.

Today Soviet Chargé Kukin27 handed Jebb28 of Foreign Office following memorandum in reply, dated October 25. Since Foreign Office insists that even knowledge of existence of this memorandum [Page 370] be held strictly secret pending Gousev’s return to London, knowledge of it here will be restricted to Mosely and General Meyer and telegram sealed. Summary of Soviet memorandum follows:

(1)
With respect to remaining point regarding control machinery in Germany, Soviet Government agrees that principally interested European Allies should send military missions for contact with Control Council and to ensure representation of their interests with respect to Germany without prejudice to the principle of control by the three Allied powers.
(2)
Since EAC has completed instrument of surrender and protocol on occupation and is completing draft protocol on control machinery, Soviet Government considers opportune for EAC to start work on additional requirements to be presented to Germany in development of article 12 of surrender instrument, particularly following questions of prime importance:
(Sub 1)
Repatriation of prisoners of war, internees and displaced persons of the United Nations;
(Sub 2)
Additional military requirements for disarmament and demilitarization of Germany;
(Sub 3)
Requirements for abolition of Hitler regime and surrender of war criminals;
(Sub 4)
Provisions concerning control over German economy.
On completion of these questions and as far as possible simultaneously with that, EAC could draft other orders and proclamations to the German people and authorities and also directives to the three Commanders in Chief for their guidance in carrying out surrender terms.
(3)
In view of urgency of agreement of plan of occupation of Austria, Soviet Government has instructed its delegate on the EAC to begin discussion on this matter.
(4)
Soviet Government recognizes advisability of immediately beginning preparation of personnel for control machinery so that, by moment of Germany’s surrender and of organization of Allied control machinery, the three Governments would possess prepared cadres for this machinery. Soviet Government is now selecting necessary personnel and will send it in nearest future to London to start, together with their British and American colleagues, more detailed preparation of plans and instructions for the work of the Allied control machinery in Germany.
(5)
While sharing British view on slow tempo of EAC, Soviet Government points out that delays in its work have been due to British and United States delegations as well. It hopes that its future work will proceed without further delays. Soviet Government has instructed Gousev to propose consideration in EAC of questions according to priority set forth above and hopes British Government will give similar instructions to Strang. End of summary.

Much elation over this attitude of Soviet Government expressed by Strang who feels British are fully prepared to follow this priority of treatment.

Following are Mosely’s comments: [Page 371]

(1)
Soviet proposals for more rapid procedure in EAC indicate that they now have fully formulated policies ready to present on these questions; if we are not similarly equipped to speak in name of our Government, onus for delays will fall on us alone.
(2)
Soviet willingness to speed up EAC work makes it all the more imperative to secure immediate clearance of United States directives on the four subjects listed under Part II of the Soviet memorandum, including particularly control of the German economy, in addition to our other directives.
(3)
If Moscow Embassy has not yet approached Soviet Government with proposal to set up reparation and economic security discussions in Moscow, fresh thought should perhaps be given to whether this subject should not now be treated in London since Soviet delegate will apparently be prepared to discuss economic and reparation problems in the EAC or in a subcommittee thereof.

Gallman
  1. Ambassador Winant was in Washington for consultation between October 26 and November 18.
  2. Not printed.
  3. Konstantin Mikhailovich Kukin, Counselor of the Soviet Embassy in London.
  4. Hubert Miles Gladwyn Jebb, Counselor of the British Foreign Office.