Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1944, General, Volume I

740.0011 EW/10–2144

Memorandum by the Political Adviser to the United States Delegation to the European Advisory Commission (Mosely) of Conversation With the British Representative (Strang)

[London,] October 21, 1944.

Subject: UK Attitude to JCS 1067,¹⁶ Directive on Post-surrender Military Government in Germany.

I. UK telegram to Military Mission, Washington, October 7.

In this telegram the British authorities express their objections to JCS 1067, a directive drafted in JCS as a proposed guide to SCAEF in the period between the cessation of hostilities in Germany and the establishment of tripartite control. The telegram objected strongly to the proposed publication of this directive as well as to a number of matters of substance.^16a It pointed out that tripartite control was to begin in Germany as soon as the Instrument of Surrender had been signed or, in case of collapse, proclaimed. It maintained that the pre-surrender directive to SCAEF would be adequate for military government needs until such time as SCAEF disbanded. Any special post-surrender directive, it pointed out, would have to be agreed upon jointly with the Russians in order to preserve the basis of tripartite policy in post-surrender Germany.

The telegram went on to maintain that it was wrong to publish such a plan before it begins to operate since the Germans might then use that knowledge in order to frustrate our plans; it might also have the effect of stiffening German resistance. If the US Government needed to publish some statement on German policy because of political pressure, it might publish a unilateral statement, not in the form of a directive.

The telegram pointed out finally that the draft directive would require considerable amendment before the UK Government could accept it, as well as discussion with the Russians. The US draft directive was open, it stated, to many questions. To issue it would prejudice the application of the directives for the post-surrender period which had been prepared in draft form by the UK Government and distributed informally during the preceding six months.

II. Telegram from the British Military Mission in Washington to the UK Government, October 10.

Mr. Harry Hopkins had stated that he was sure that the idea of publishing the US post-surrender directive, JCS 1067, would be dropped. He thought the draft directive should be placed before the EAC, to be considered along with the UK directives. Mr. Hopkins had consulted Mr. Matthews and Mr. McCloy,¹⁷ and both agreed that any post-surrender directive would have to be discussed with the Russians.

III. Foreign Office to Mr. Eden in Moscow, October 10.

This telegram relayed a telegram from Mr. Harry Hopkins to the Prime Minister dated October 9.¹⁸ In it Mr. Hopkins assured the Prime Minister that there would be no publication of the US directive, JCS 1067, and no publication, even unilateral, of a policy statement relating to Germany. In conclusion this short telegram stated: “At any rate we have sent to Winant as member EAC the American proposal for post-war directives to our respective military commanders.”

IV. UK Government to British Mission, Washington, October 12.

This telegram approved the proposal to table the US draft, JCS 1067, in the EAC, for agreement on a tripartite basis and later issuance to the three Commanders-in-Chief in Germany.

V. British Mission in Washington to London, October 14.

Following the CCAC¹⁹ meeting of October 12, Mr. McCloy and General Macready²⁰ had an informal discussion of JCS 1067. General Macready asked for early consideration in the US Government of the UK collected and bound draft directives²¹ in order to provide Mr. Winant with instructions for discussing them in the EAC. The US officials showed great interest in learning about these directives and agreed to consider them.

General Macready went on to report informally that JCS 1067 had received the backing of Mr. Hull, Mr. Stimson, Mr. Morgenthau and the President. The Americans maintained that the pre-surrender SHAEF directive was suitable only for use in “the wake of battle”. The treatment of Germany after its surrender must be harsher, they maintained, than during the course of hostilities. The Americans further argued that many months may elapse between the collapse of Germany and the occupation of the three zones and that in this period of transition Anglo-American command was unavoidable.

The Americans (apparently Mr. McCloy) expressed a hope that instructions could now be sent more rapidly to Mr. Winant, but went on to point out that the EAC may not have produced tripartite policy prior to German surrender and that the JCS and the US Government would then be severely criticized.

Mr. McCloy proposed that, therefore, the CCAC should consider the post-surrender directive in Washington through an ad hoc working party, for use in case Germany collapsed before the EAC had done its work. General Macready informed McCloy that London was opposed to such a procedure. In the first place, JCS 1067 was not of much use to SCAEF. In the second place, JCS 1067 would require many amendments before it would be acceptable to the UK Government. Mr. McCloy proposed that as an alternative SCAEF should be directed to act on the British handbook of directives in the period following German surrender or collapse and until the establishment of tripartite government. McCloy pointed out that detailed study of the British handbook of directives was needed in order to brief Mr. Winant; hence it would be desirable for the members of an ad hoc committee under the CCAC to arrive at an informal combined (Anglo-American) agreement concerning the post-surrender directive.

In conclusion General Macready reported that Mr. McCloy objected to the detailed provisions of the British objectives and preferred broad, simple directives.

VI. UK Government to British Mission, Washington, October 20.

The UK Government feels strongly that a post-surrender directive should not be issued by the CCS to SCAEF. It would be better to use the pre-surrender directive in order to tide over to the period when the effective tripartite control would begin.

The telegram went on to urge the need for speedy action in the EAC on post-surrender directives for Germany. The UK Government would be willing to discuss the JCS post-surrender directive informally with the US on two conditions: (1) Such discussion must be on the basis of documents circulated in advance to the EAC, since otherwise the tripartite basis of Allied policy in Germany would be prejudiced. The first step would be for the US Government to circulate its draft directive to the EAC, or else to accept as a basis of discussion the documents already before the EAC (i.e., the British draft directives). (2) Such discussion should take place in London between the US and UK Delegations to the EAC, since otherwise great confusion would arise from discussing the same subject simultaneously in two capitals and likewise the two Governments would be placed in an impossible position vis-à-vis the Russians.

Accordingly, the telegram proposes that any such bilateral discussions be conducted informally in London, preferably on the basis of the UK directives, dropping the proposed US directive 1067 to SCAEF. The proposed short US directive on general policy towards Germany could, if desired, be circulated to the EAC as equivalent to directive No. 1 of the UK handbook of directives.

If the US Government should decide to circulate in the EAC its post-defeat directive (JCS 1067), that directive would, in the UK view, require substantial amendments. If its discussion is taken up in London, the UK Government will also introduce its own draft directives for consideration in the EAC.

The telegram concludes that while the UK directives are long, they leave great discretion to the Commanders-in-Chief and do not go too far into detail; it points out that in the post-surrender period much more detailed instructions to the Commanders-in-Chief will be needed than in the pre-surrender period.

VII. In our conversation about these messages, from which Sir William^21a allowed me to make detailed notes, Sir William stated confidentially that our authorities in Washington (meaning apparently Mr. McCloy) had stated that they knew nothing of the British directives until the complete set was presented to the CCAC on October 12. I informed Sir William that each UK directive had been forwarded immediately to Washington through State Department channels, and that during my time in Washington they had been immediately multiplied and distributed to all interested divisions in the State, War and Navy Departments. I said I could not vouch for the procedure in Washington since the last week of June, but that I assumed the same procedure had been continued. Apparently, I added, the War Department was so huge that the UK directives had never been brought to the attention of Mr. McCloy until that was done by General Macready.

Sir William expressed some anxiety as to whether this discussion in Washington had not caused some confusion in US procedures. I told him that, on the contrary, I was glad to see that UK [US?] thinking here about procedure was closely parallel to that of the UK authorities. I told him confidentially that we had prepared about 24 directives here on the basis of all materials available from different agencies of our own Government, and that these directives were awaiting clearance in Washington in order to be circulated informally to the EAC.

I further explained that from the point of view of speed in negotiation we would have had no real objection to taking the British draft directives as a basis for discussion and then making our own comments and proposing our own amendments to them. We felt, however, that from the point of view of expediting tripartite negotiation there was a psychological advantage in our producing our own directives, even though they were close in many respects to the British ones. I said that, in general, our directives were somewhat less detailed and might be easier to negotiate.

I added for Sir William’s information that we were now promised more rapid consideration of our directives in Washington and that we hoped to be able before long to circulate them informally, since it would be valuable to have the US ideas, independently stated, placed before the Russians, as it was clear that they had already made a careful study of many of the British directives. I said that I agreed with him that it would be very confusing and very dangerous to the tripartite basis of our negotiations if consideration of post-surrender directives were suddenly transferred to Washington and placed on an Anglo-American basis. I said that if, after we had circulated the US directives to the Russians, and if the Russians showed no inclination to move on to that phase—which I thought rather unlikely—we could then review the directives informally on an Anglo-American basis, as we had done to advantage in the case of the Proclamations and General Orders.

Sir William seemed much relieved to find that the handling of this question of JCS 1067 by the British Mission in Washington corresponded so closely to the Ambassador’s own approach.

Philip E. Mosely

16. See bracketed note, p. 341.
17. In a message to Prime Minister Churchill on September 29, 1944, not printed, Hopkins said that it would be very much to President Roosevelt’s interest to publish J.C.S. 1067. Hopkins expressed the conviction that the directive, with minor amendments, would be approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff (Hopkins Papers, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.). In a message which Hopkins received on October 9, not printed, Churchill replied that there was much in J.C.S. 1067 which the British liked but that agreement to its issue or publication could not be made until certain important considerations had been discussed. Churchill emphasized that the unilateral American issuance of a directive to Eisenhower would violate the principle of tripartite post-surrender control of Germany. (Hopkins Papers)
17. John J. McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War.
18. Hopkins’ message (not printed) was in reply to Churchill’s message described in footnote 16a, p. 359.
19. Combined Civil Affairs Committee.
20. Lt. Gen. G. N. Macready, Head of the Army Delegation, British Joint Staff Mission in Washington.
21. Thirty-six United Kingdom draft directives for Germany and Austria previously introduced in the European Advisory Commission were collected in a bound volume entitled: “Germany and Austria in the Post-Surrender Period—Policy Directives for the Allied Commanders-in-Chief”, dated September 1944. Subsequently, the volume was enlarged to include thirty-eight draft directives and was circulated in the European Advisory Commission by the United Kingdom Representative as document E.A.C. (44) 26, dated October 27, transmitted to the Department in despatch 19155, November 10, from London (not printed). The following is a list of the draft directives included in the volume:

    1. Germany in the post-surrender period

    2. Austria in the post-surrender period

    3. Relations of Germany with countries at war with any of the United Nations

    4. Neutral missions in Germany, and communication with German missions to neutral countries

    5. Treaties, conventions and other international agreements

    6. Reform of Nazi law and release of political prisoners in Germany

    7. Dissolution and disbandment of Nazi organizations, etc.

    8. Re-education of Germany

    9. Recall of German and Austrian nationals resident abroad

    10. Prevention of German nationals from leaving German territory

    11. Prisoners of war and internees in German hands

    12. Nationals of the United Nations interned in neutral countries

    13. Displaced persons

    14. German records and archives

    15. The German police

    16. Preservation of law and order, and guard duties: use of German forces

    17. Definitions of “German armed forces”, “forces under German command”, etc.

    18. Discharge and disbandment of the German armed forces

    19. Control of German aircraft movements and disposal of German aircraft in German service

    20. Disposal of ships, aircraft and personnel of other enemy countries found in Germany at the time of her surrender

    21. Evacuation of territory by the German armed forces, officials and civilian population

    22. Surrender of arms and war material by forces under German command in contact with United Nations forces

    23. Surrender of arms and war material by forces under German command not in contact with United Nations forces

    24. Information regarding German war material

    25. Ownership and disposal of German war material

    26. Control of broadcasting

    27. Control and censorship of public information and means of intercommunication

    28. Regulation of movement and travel

    29. Control by the United Nations of inland transport

    30. Exercise of German rights in international transport bodies

    31. Shipping and associated matters

    32. Establishment and control of the frontier between Germany and Austria

    33. Finance and property in Germany (excluding Austria)

    34. Food and agriculture

    35. Rationing and distribution of textiles

    36. Building and housing

    37. Leather and footwear

    38. Determination of Austrian nationality

22. Sir William Strang.