740.00119 EAC/9–1744: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State
[Received 9:10 p.m.]
7679. Personal to the Secretary. I have received from the Soviet Ambassador a copy of a letter of September 14, (my despatch 18070, September 1679) addressed by him to Sir William Strang in reply to the latters August 31 letter (my despatch 17832 September 2;80 my telegram 7138, September 1, 8 p.m. Comea 79) of conditional acceptance of the German surrender instrument.
Translation of second paragraph of Gousev’s reply follows:
“Inasmuch as the British Government has accompanied its confirmation of the above-mentioned terms by a series of reservations as set forth in your letter, I must state that the Soviet Government reserves to itself the right, in case important new circumstances appear, likewise to introduce corresponding changes into the terms of unconditional surrender of Germany.”
At the September 15 meeting of the European Advisory Commission, I raised with my colleagues the whole question of the effect of the conditional British and Soviet acceptances upon the status of the surrender instrument and of the further work of the Commission which must be based upon a firm understanding with regard to the [Page 339] surrender terms. I pointed out that by letters of August 9, I had accepted the surrender instrument on behalf of my Government,81 and that the Soviet Ambassador had done the same in letters of August 21 (my telegram 6763, August 21, 8 p.m., Comea 75). The British acceptance of August 31 had been given “subject to an understanding” on four points which went beyond the surrender instrument itself. And now the Soviet letter of September 14 left it open to serious question whether there was any tripartite agreement on the surrender terms themselves. I went on to point out that this left my Government as the only one which had approved the terms without reservation and which was bound by a firm commitment. This, I explained, was a disturbing fact because what applies to the main instrument can also apply to any of the other documents which derive from and are based on it. I went on to say that the value of the EAC lay in the possibility of arriving at agreements between the three Governments, but if every agreement reached was to be approved by the Governments only subject to numerous conditions and reservations the whole question of the utility of the work of the EAC was thereby jeopardized. I concluded by asking my colleagues to raise with their Governments the question of whether the United Kingdom Government could not accept the surrender terms without reservations and whether the Soviet Government might not then join with my Government in accepting the terms as stated in Gousev’s letter of August 21. Both agreed to do this.
That evening I had a long talk with the Soviet Ambassador and I have had several conversations with Strang. Gousev is personally sympathetic to my proposal that both British and Soviet Governments confirm the terms without reservations, but it is not certain whether his Government will withdraw from the position which they have already adopted because of the British letter. I was deeply disturbed by the British letter and warned them at that time of what the Russian reaction would be. When I went to Eden, he told me he would make clear that the stipulations set forth in the August 31 letter should be regarded as desiderata and not as conditions or reservations. The disturbing thing about the Soviet letter of September 14 is that it reserves the right to introduce new provisions into the terms, and not merely to introduce them into the Commission for discussion. If it is impossible to persuade the Soviet Government, which obviously resented greatly the British procedure of presenting reservations in its August 31 letter, to withdraw entirely its letter of September 14, I shall ask you to intervene on behalf of our Government. It seemed best to me to first raise the question in the Commission rather than [Page 340] taking it up on a governmental level. I still hope to get favorable action and will keep you informed.
I thought you personally ought to have this background and a report on the present status of the surrender instrument since so much is bound up with the successful maintenance of fully tripartite policy towards Germany, a policy which, at least potentially has been called into question by the conditions attached first by the British and now by the Russians to their acceptance of the surrender instrument agreed on in the Commission on July 25.