740.00119 EAC/8–1944: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State
[Received August 20—1 a.m.]
6750. Personal to the Secretary and for the President. We are in agreement with the Department’s view that an interim arrangement for securing prompt and substantial contribution from the German economy in the early post war period is essential in order to accelerate European rehabilitation and to avert an unduly heavy imposition of European requirements on the American economy while the war against Japan is still in progress. It is also clear from discussions in the EAC that the Russians, the British and ourselves agree that there shall be central controls during this same early post surrender period.
No discussions have as yet taken place on partition. We recognize that this problem presents three distinct lines of action (1) division of Germany into three or more completely separate states; (2) a cutting off of certain areas east and west; (3) decentralization of the political structure within a territorially united Germany.
In considering the immediate decisions before the EAC which are necessary to military planning and recognizing the thinking of the Department and the Chiefs of Staff as outlined in messages and preliminary papers which have reached us in London I would recommend that for the time being the EAC give priority (1) to acceptance of unconditional surrender terms and (2) the implementation of these terms which includes (a) completion of the protocols in regard to the assignment of zones in Germany and the areas of Berlin and the stationing of troops in Austria; (b) control machinery in Germany and Austria; (c) basic proclamations and orders to accompany the surrender instruments; (d) directives to be agreed upon as instructions to the three Commanders-in-Chief for their guidance in administering Germany and Austria.
It is understood that such actions and assignments as may be made in these fields in respect to the satellite states fall within the sphere of the deliberations of EAC except in cases where emergency requirements lead to their being handled directly by the three Governments.
Any confusions which have arisen between EAC planning [and] SHAEF planning have been due to the slowness of the EAC in reaching tripartite agreement and the military necessity of the US–UK Allied forces to be prepared to act in case of partial occupation of Germany or immediate surrender. These latter contingencies have prompted SHAEF to plan on a bipartite basis rather than to wait for the formulation of tripartite agreement. There is also the recognition [Page 275] by SHAEF of the transition period during which the combined US–UK command divides into separate US and UK commands. The European Advisory Commission in its initial conception was organized as a deliberative body. In fact because of the action of the three Governments it has been used as an instrument for negotiation. Under the Moscow resolution its powers were advisory in character. Under its present practice its findings are purely preliminary until confirmed by the three Governments.
I believe that when the work outlined above by the EAC is completed it will be found necessary to merge the EAC into a high commission for Europe with authority to deliberate, to advise and to execute within the framework of general policies laid down by the Governments. (2–42C preliminary August 3, 1944).
The Russian and the US delegations have had neither the equipment nor the personnel nor the authority to function under the mandate laid down in the Moscow resolution. If the EAC went out of existence on completing the military phases of its assignments the need for secrecy which was agreed to under the mandate and is justified because of the military character of the information before us and its value to the enemy would be understood and at the same time the new commission would be able to operate under more flexible conditions from the point of view of public relations (I have also felt in studying the economy of Germany and Austria which was part of our assignment that it is difficult to formulate an economic policy towards Germany and Austria without considering its effects on the economy of the rest of Europe. I, therefore, believe that it would be wise to have these matters considered by a subcommittee of the European high commission whose assignment would cover all of Europe rather than by a group whose mandate was limited to the treatment of enemy countries. This change would not delay consideration of these subjects as the work of preparation has been and will continue to be carried on by coordinated groups of the respective Governments.
In a message to the Department25 I suggested that the preliminary formulation of a policy on reparation be undertaken in Moscow. The Soviet has a committee that has been working for a long time on this subject and I believe that better progress would be made if we and the British were close to those forming Soviet policy. It has been made plain to me that the Russian Government has difficulty in delegating [Page 276] to its agents sufficient latitude and discretion to enter into informal discussions away from their home base without delay and constant reference back for instructions.
When conclusions of such an advisory group were reached they could be reported back to the three Governments and after review forwarded to the European High Commission.
- Telegram 6512, August 14, 6 p.m., not printed. In this telegram Ambassador Winant suggested that because of the pressure of other questions in the E.A.C. there would be advantages in having an exploratory ad hoc meeting on reparations in Moscow. He added that better progress on reparations matters would be made if negotiators were close to those forming Soviet policy, and an offer to go to Moscow to discuss these matters would help relations with the Soviet Union. (840.50/8–1444)↩