The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to Mr. Harry L. Hopkins, Special Assistant to President Roosevelt 13
[Received 4:35 a.m.]
954. Please read Department’s message 6254 of August 8th my message 6370 of August 9th and Department’s 6285 of August 9th.
Although I am aware that technically after recommendations are formally made by the European Advisory Commission and forwarded to their respective Governments action taken by the respective Governments falls outside the jurisdiction of the European Advisory Commission I am still deeply disturbed by the President’s suggestion that China be shown a draft of the unconditional surrender terms for Germany and be given an opportunity to approve the surrender instrument without proper notice having been given to the United Kingdom and Russia.
My fear in regard to the security of Chinese communications further complicates the problem.
At Moscow when the European Advisory Commission was created on Molotov’s request it was agreed that the deliberations of the European Advisory Commission be secret. Gousev on many occasions has made clear the Russian position on this point. He stated from the beginning that his Government considered the surrender terms as a part of military strategy and on one occasion when he believed the British were responsible for leakage on a direct order from Moscow registered a vigorous protest to both the Prime Minister and to Eden as well as bringing the matter before the Commission. For three months following this incident no additional information was placed before the Commission by the Russian Delegation. Strang and I have both concurred in supporting the confidential character of all discussions and findings of the Commission and pledged our agreement [Page 267] to this policy. When the British suggested that certain Allied Governments be shown the final draft of the surrender terms at an appropriate time Gousev refused to concur.
I am very fearful if I carried out Stettinius’ suggestion of informing my Soviet and British colleagues of notification to the Chinese of the surrender terms it might lead to either withdrawal of the Russians from the Commission or block further discussions in that body. Such action at this critical point in our work or even further prolonged delay in carrying forward our work would be most unfortunate.
Stettinius suggests that the Canadians probably have knowledge of the draft terms. This may be so. When the Prime Ministers of Canada, New Zealand, and South Africa were here and sitting as members of the War Cabinet it was understood in the Commission that they were probably informed of the work of the Commission. Although there was no vote taken on this question I feel this fact was accepted because of the contributions of the Dominions to the war effort and the form of government that exists under the Commonwealth. I do not think that either the Russians or the British would feel that any precedent had been established to include other nations in a consideration of the problems affecting the three powers. Would it be possible to treat the action already taken by the State Department at the President’s wish as simply a personal communication from the President to General Chiang Kai-shek13a taking great care to see that the individual at the Chinese Embassy in Washington entrusted with this message carry it directly to the Generalissimo for his eyes only. Limiting this notice to a trusted ambassador in Washington might be even a better procedure.
I very much doubt if the President was fully aware of the understandings in relation to security that have bound the Commission in its work and implied secrecy unless notice was given to the other powers.
I hope very much that you will discuss this problem with Stettinius. I am cabling this message to you because of your relationship to the President and because this means of communication is more rapid and secure.