Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1944, General, Volume I

800.0146/298

The Director of the Office of European Affairs (Dunn) to the Director of the Civil Affairs Division of the War Department (Hilldring)

Washington, April 5, 1944.

My Dear General Hilldring: I should like to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of February 25, 1944⁴⁸ enclosing a copy of CCS 320/4 (Revised)⁴⁹ setting forth the views of the United States Chiefs of Staff with respect to certain European spheres of occupation for the United States and British forces. You recommended that these views be transmitted to Ambassador Winant for consideration in the European Advisory Commission.

This document was transmitted to Ambassador Winant in accordance with your recommendation. Mr. Winant replied by telegram on March 23⁵⁰ to the effect that his recommendations on this subject would be brought to the Secretary of State, and would be presented by Mr. George F. Kennan, the Counselor of our Delegation in the Commission.

I now enclose a memorandum prepared by Mr. Kennan in which these recommendations are set forth. I understand that Mr. Kennan has also spoken to the President about the proposed boundary of the Russian zone, and that the President expressed himself on that occasion as being favorably inclined to an acceptance of the western border of the Russian zone as proposed by the British and Russian delegations.^50a

In view of these circumstances, the Department proposes to have drawn up in the Working Security Commission [Committee] new instructions to Mr. Winant on the subject of the zones of occupation. The draft of these instructions will be made known to you in the usual manner by the War Department representative on the Working Security Committee.

Sincerely yours,

James Clement Dunn

[Enclosure]

Memorandum by the Counselor to the United States Delegation to the European Advisory Commission (Kennan)

[Washington,] April 4, 1944.

On March 8, the Department sent to Ambassador Winant (Instruction no. 3831) a letter from General Hilldring enclosing a memorandum, dated December 4, setting forth the views of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff with respect to proposed zones of occupation in Germany “for negotiation in the European Advisory Commission”.

On March 23, Mr. Winant cabled that his recommendations on this subject would be brought to the Secretary and to the President by me.

I am taking this means to set forth these recommendations.

Mr. Winant feels that it would be most inadvisable to present this memorandum, as it stands, to the Commission. His reasons are the following:

(1) Since the memorandum was written, the Russians and the British have placed before the Advisory Commission identical proposals on this subject which would give the Russian zone a western boundary beginning about at Lübeck in the north and running from there generally south to the vicinity of Plauen. Our proposal placed the western boundary of the Russian zone along a line anywhere from 50 to 150 miles further east, beginning at Stettin, in the north, and running south from there.

If we were to come forward now with the Joint Chiefs’ proposal, the Russians would only conclude that we had decided to cut down their zone by nearly fifty percent over what they themselves asked for. This would cause them to be highly suspicious of our motives, and Mr. Winant would be asked at once for explanations as to why we wanted to do this.

Mr. Winant has not been told why we want the line so far east, and could give no explanations. He would thus find himself in the embarrassing position of having made a proposal which he could not defend; and the Russians, receiving no answer, would be offended, and doubly suspicious.

(2) The other members of the Commission would ask why our proposed borders of the zones do not coincide with German administrative boundaries, and what we propose to do about the administration of territorial units dismembered by these borders. Mr. Winant would have no explanation to give on this point.

(3) The other members of the Commission would ask on what basis the Russians would be deprived of the important railway junction of Cottbus. Mr. Winant could give no explanations on this subject.

(4) Mr. Winant would surely be asked exactly where the line would be drawn between the Soviet zone and the proposed British zone in the South. On this point, again, he could give no answer.

(5) Mr. Winant would be asked whether our Government had not given attention to the proposals with respect to zones of occupation placed before the Commission by the British and Soviet Delegates, and, if it had, what objections it had to make to the boundaries of the Soviet zone set forth therein. He has no instructions which would enable him to answer these questions.

Mr. Winant hopes that it will be found possible to accept the boundaries of the Soviet zone as already agreed to by the Russians and the British. If this should not be the case, he feels that he must have adequate argumentation to support any counter-proposals he may make.

George F. Kennan

48. Not printed.
49. Ante, p. 196.
50. Telegram 2352, March 23, 2 p.m., from London, not printed.
51. In a letter of May 10, 1944, to Ambassador Winant (not printed), Kennan gave the following brief description of his meeting with the President, which apparently occurred on April 3: “He did most of the talking, but I was able to explain the mix-up about zones of occupation and to give him the messages you had asked me to deliver. He received the latter with interest and inquired very kindly about you.” (740.00119 EAC/5–1044) After his meeting with the President, Kennan left at the White House an informal record, in the form of a questionnaire, of his own personal views on the work of the American delegation to the European Advisory Commission. A copy of this record was attached to Kennan’s May 10 letter to Winant.