740.00119 EAC/113: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Winant )
1976. Eacom 13. Your message 1944, March 10, noon, Comea 38, has been considered. We feel your talk with Strang and Gousev was helpful, especially since British now envisage use of a short instrument of surrender.
We believe with the British that agreement among the three Governments on policies for implementing the surrender instrument and for the control of Germany is essential prior to Germany’s capitulation. We have assumed that, in addition to the negotiation of a surrender instrument, joint policy agreements embodying the basic objectives and procedures for the implementation of the surrender instrument would be worked out in the Commission ad referendum, for eventual transmittal by the three Governments in the form of directives to the respective Allied and Soviet Commanders-in-Chief.
We would expect the Commission, in drawing up these policy agreements, to consider the points covered by the British draft as well as the various documents transmitted from here, and assume that this [Page 200] procedure would meet Strang’s point. At the time of surrender, and subsequently, there would be issued to the Germans such proclamations, orders, and ordinances on the basis of the policies agreed to by the three Governments as are deemed necessary. The Commission may wish to proceed to draw up the initial proclamations and orders. We believe with the Russians that none of these documents should be shown to the Germans before signing the surrender instrument. We desire to avoid any implication that those documents involve a contractual relation with the German authorities. Document EAC (44) 1140 should be modified to conform with the foregoing comments.
This Government is in accord with the Soviet Government in its determination to bring the war against Germany to a close as early as possible and under conditions which will preclude a renewal of German resistance and a revival of German aggression. However, we do not believe that the present German leaders would be more willing to make an essentially military capitulation as prescribed by the Soviet draft than to accept the United States terms. We have to assume that they expect severe terms in any case, and will surrender only when no other choice is open to them.
We consider the inclusion of Articles 4, 5, 6, 7, and 9, or their substantial equivalent, to be essential to prevent later legal disputes concerning the rights and powers of the victors, and to forestall a repetition of the criticism, made after the last war, that the victors increased the severity of the armistice terms once Germany was unable to renew hostilities. These articles would establish an incontestable recognition of our right to take all measures deemed appropriate for the control and reorganization of Germany and for the punishment of war criminals.
In addition to the disadvantages of the Soviet draft on the foregoing points, article 20 of that draft might be interpreted as imposing serious limitations on our freedom of action in Germany, since the additional requirements to be presented are limited to “questions connected with the surrender of Germany”, and are to be carried out by “the German Government and the German Supreme Command”.
We are gratified to learn of probable British and Soviet willingness to omit from surrender instrument reference to war guilt.
Comment on the question of prisoners of war will be transmitted to you later.
We are not clear whether your suggestion of a continuing tri-partite authority for control of Germany in post-hostilities period, referred to in your telegram, was based on our proposal outlined in WS–15c.41
[Page 201]We trust these comments will assist you in arriving at joint recommendations to be submitted by the Commission to the three Governments.