760N.61/83: Telegram
The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State
[Received 6:45 p.m.]
3619. Reactions of Baltic leaders in Stockholm to Moscow communiqué vary according to individual expectations entertained by these men before and during Conference.
Those who expected no announcements of definite decisions regarding future of Baltic States (they include more experienced political leaders and diplomats) find encouragement on following grounds.
- First, chances of a Russo-German agreement attended by a German, abandonment of Baltic States to Russia have been lessened if not eliminated.
- Second, while Baltic exiles remain convinced that Stalin’s policy still aims at domination of Eastern Europe and, according to some, eventually world, they perceive in his willingness to make some temporary concessions to American and British principles a possible avenue by which Baltic States can escape complete Soviet domination. Soviet participation in European Advisory Commission24 to be established in London is cited as evidence that for some time at least Soviets will cooperate, however cynically, with western powers.
- Third, though the strategic consideration motivating declaration regarding Austria25 and Austria’s good fortune in succumbing to what is now losing side are appreciated, one Baltic leader expressed opinion that recognition of Austria’s independence rights constitutes an important precedent for an eventual decision regarding future of Baltic States whose loss of independence is stated to have had many features in common with German absorption of Austria.
Those Baltic exiles who expected, despite announcements and indication to contrary, Moscow Conferees to announce definite and favorable decision regarding Baltic States were of course disappointed. They and their less optimistic colleagues agree, however, that deferment of a favorable decision until anticipated Soviet reoccupation of their [Page 594] countries will be tantamount to an adverse decision. On basis of past Soviet actions in their countries, particularly eleventh hour wholesale deportation measures carried out during Soviet evacuation of area in 1941, they are convinced that once Soviets have re-occupied Baltic States they will by deportation and execution eliminate anti-Russian element and replace it with Russian or pro-Russian elements. Thus in a very short time Soviets will be able with confidence to agree to or even to urge a plebiscite to determine wishes of population regarding incorporation into Soviet Union.
A feature of communiqué which some find alarming is omission of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania from list of countries and areas to which Germans will be sent and tried for their atrocities. Inferences drawn therefrom are that Baltic States are considered as “invaded parts of Soviet Union” and that western democracies have thus expressed tacit agreement with Soviet contention that Baltic States are legally part of USSR.
A practical problem which communiqué presents active Baltic leaders is its omission of any very specific statements which may be used to counter contention of German propaganda that Moscow Conference affords latest and most conclusive evidence that Baltic States have been abandoned to Russians. As illustrated in Legation’s despatch 2242 of September 2926 Baltic underground periodicals strongly emphasize all signs of Anglo-American benevolences towards Baltic States. Leaders now feel that their ammunition is running low and that their countrymen’s will to resist is thereby impaired.
- This Commission to consider all problems affecting the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union was provided for at the Moscow Conference; see vol. i, p. 756. For its organization in London and its early operation, see ibid., pp. 782 ff.↩
- Ibid., p. 761.↩
- Not printed; it reported the first issue of the periodical Päris Eesti on political affairs in Estonia, and transmitted a copy (860i.00/541).↩