Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1943, The British Commonwealth, Eastern Europe, the Far East, Volume III

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to President Roosevelt ¹³

Moscow, November 5, 1943

Personal for the President. Now that I have had a chance to take a long breath I thought you would want from me a review of the more important impressions of the Soviet attitude we got in and outside of the Conference room. Certain of the doubts which some people have had regarding Soviet intentions are now laid to rest. On the other hand the character of certain real difficulties that exist has been more sharply defined.

(1) The Soviet Government before they agreed to the Conference had evidently decided that they would take a shot at working together with the British and ourselves in dealing with war and postwar problems. On the whole the Soviets are delighted with the way the Conference went and it has strengthened their tentative decision. It was interesting to watch how Molotov expanded as the days passed. As he began to realize more and more that we had not come with a united front against him and were ready to expose frankly our preliminary thoughts, he showed increasing enjoyment in being admitted for the first time into the councils as a full member with the British and ourselves. Before the Conference I doubt if they had any intention of allowing the inclusion of China as an original signatory of the Four-Nation Declaration.¹⁴ Their acceptance of China is a clear indication that they are genuinely satisfied with the way things went and are ready to make important concessions to further the new intimacy. On the other hand it cannot be assumed that this policy is already so set that we can take liberties with them.

(2) They were unquestionably chagrined by the British and our attitude re Turkey and to a lesser extent regarding Sweden. Eden’s¹⁵ final understanding with them on Turkey helped to offset their early disappointment but they are expectantly hopeful that we will join in this agreement at an early date. I am convinced, however, that only Turkey’s entry into the war will satisfy them. Without coming to Moscow it is hard to appreciate how differently they view the war from the British and ourselves. The Russians have the primitive view that they have suffered and bled to destroy Hitler and see no reason why the Turks should not do the same if it can help shorten the war. They honestly believe that the entry of Turkey will force the Germans to move a considerable number of divisions from the Eastern front. In posing this demand they are entirely indifferent to any moral or actual obligation to assist the Turks in fighting the Germans. Our attitude in this regard is inexplicable to them. The Russians feel that only if the Turks actively fight against Germany now are they entitled to any consideration in the post-war scheme of things. To a somewhat modified degree they feel the same way about the Swedes. In addition to the military value of the entry of these countries into the war, they believe that closing in on Germany from all sides will hasten the deterioration of enemy morale.

The early misunderstanding about the ships was a disappointment.¹⁶ They feel all right about it now, provided some definite conclusion is reached in the near future. The above were the only two matters of importance not concluded in principle to their satisfaction. (Your cable accepting the Soviet proposal regarding Turkey has arrived just as I was dispatching this message to you, and will, I know, be tremendously well received.)

(3) The Soviets accepted the explanation of our military plans but our whole permanent relations depend in a large measure on their satisfaction in the future with our military operations. It is impossible to over-emphasize the importance they place strategically on the initiation of the so-called “second front” next spring. An invitation to the next military conference is, I believe, essential if the seeds sown at this Conference are to germinate. It is clear they never like to be faced with Anglo-American decisions already taken. If they are asked to the conference they will expect to participate during the consultative stage. It is obvious that this will be to some extent a nuisance and time consuming, but from the long view it will be, in my judgement, well worthwhile. It is important to invite Molotov as well as the military staff. His position as second to Stalin is more apparent than on my previous visits. A subsequent brief meeting with Stalin himself is still of the highest importance, and I feel that every effort should be continued to find a way to bring this about. I expect to cable you further on this subject. It would be helpful in this connection if you could inform me of your decision regarding the invitation to the military conference.

(4) Their attitude toward Germany as revealed at the Conference is fundamentally satisfactory. There is of course no doubt that they are bent on the complete destruction of Hitler and Nazism. They are ready to deal with Germany on the basis of a three-way responsibility. Our difficulties with them, if any, will be that their present intent toward Germany is tougher than we have in mind, particularly in regard to the magnitude of reparations.¹⁷ Their measure of Germany’s capacity to pay reparations in goods and services appears to be based on the concept that the Germans are not entitled to a postwar standard of living higher than the Russians. They definitely did not exclude the possibility of an enforced dismemberment of Germany and are certainly determined to make sure that there will be no military threat from that quarter in any foreseeable future. They convinced me that any public references coming from Moscow or from the Free Germany Committee showing friendliness to the German people is just propaganda to weaken German resistance.

(5) Their flirtation with the French Committee appears to have cooled off as a result of their satisfaction with their new intimacy with the British and ourselves. It may of course be revived if the development of these new relationships is not to their satisfaction.

(6) Although Soviet territorial questions were never raised at the Conference, it can only be inferred that the Soviet Government expects to stand firmly on the position they have already taken in regard to their 1941 frontiers. I believe they have the impression that this has been tacitly accepted by the British, and the fact that we did not bring up the issue may have given them the impression that we would not raise serious objection in the future.

(7) The problem of Poland is even tougher than we believed. They regard the present Polish Government-in-exile as hostile, and therefore completely unacceptable to them. They are determined to recognize only a Polish Government that will be a wholeheartedly friendly neighbor. On the other hand, Molotov told me definitely that they were willing to have a strong independent Poland, giving expression to whatever social and political system the Polish people wanted. They gave us no indication during the Conference that they were interested in the extension of the Soviet system. I take this with some reservation, particularly if it proves to be the only way they can get the kind of relationships they demand from their western border states.

They are determined to have no semblance of the old “cordon sanitaire” concept in Eastern Europe.¹⁸ Molotov told me that the relations they expect to establish with the border countries did not preclude equally friendly relationships with the British and ourselves. In the Conference, however, it was indicated that although they would keep us informed they would take unilateral action in respect to these countries in the establishment of relations satisfactory to themselves. It is my feeling that this rigid attitude may well be tempered in proportion to their increasing confidence in their relations with the British and ourselves in the establishment of overall world security. Although Finland came up only indirectly in our discussions, we sensed a bitter and uncompromising attitude toward her.¹⁹ As to the states west of the areas bordering on the Soviet Union, they appear fully prepared to cooperate with the British and ourselves in working out problems involved, provided they are given full partnership in the decisions.

(8) The discussions on Iran were only on a staff level. One never gets very far on this level in dealing with the Soviets. Although they accepted an unpublished resolution reaffirming their fidelity to their treaty obligations toward Iran, we got no clarification of their real attitude.²⁰ Because this subject was left to the end, Eden decided not to insist that it be thrashed out in the main Conference.

(9) I will leave a report about the Far East till I see you. As far as it went, it was entirely satisfactory.

(10) I cannot leave this review of the Conference without speaking of the Secretary.²¹ His dignity and determination and sincerity in presenting our attitude toward the preservation of world peace and world conditions compatible with it profoundly impressed the Soviet officials. I cannot over-emphasize the important contribution his presence made toward the favorable outcome of the Conference.

(11) Anthony²² did a first class job. He supported the Secretary faithfully whenever occasion required. Ismay²³ and Deane worked as a team and so did the rest of our delegations.

[Harriman]

13. Copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y. This telegram was sent in six parts between November 4, 2:10 p.m., and November 5, 2:38 p.m., and was received in Washington on November 6, except for the fourth part (numbered paragraphs 4 and 5), which finally came in on November 9, 1:55 p.m.
14. For text, see vol. i, p. 755.
15. Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
16. This reference is in regard to the question of the allocation of the Italian warships and merchantmen among the Allies, and the share of these ships to go to the Soviet Union.
17. A translation of an article by the economist, Academician Eugene Varga, entitled “The Reparation of Damage by Hitlerite Germany and Her Accomplices,” was sent to the Department in despatch No. 22 of November 2, 1943 (not printed). This article, which set forth in detail the current attitude in the Soviet Union on the question of reparations from Germany, was printed, among: other places, in War and the Working Class, No. 10 (October 15, 1943).
18. The displeasure of the Soviet Union with “all kinds of artificial plans for the creation of federations of the states of Central and Eastern Europe,” especially as advocated by the governments in exile of these states, was plainly stated in the article, “On the Results of the Moscow Conference,” in the November 1, 1943, issue of War and the Working Class: “It is likewise clear that under the guise of federations it is proposed to revive the policy of the notorious ‘cordon sanitaire’ directed against the Soviet Union.” (740.0011 Moscow/182) See also a report on the Izvestiya editorial of November 18, in telegram No. 2009, November 22, from the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, p. 600.
19. For correspondence concerning the interest of the United States in Finland and in its relations with the Soviet Union, see pp. 213 ff.
20. For correspondence on the relations of the Soviet Union with Iran, see vol. iv, pp. 319 ff., passim.
21. Secretary of State Cordell Hull.
22. Anthony Eden.
23. Maj. Gen. Sir Hastings Ismay, Chief of Staff to the British Minister of Defence (a post held concurrently by Prime Minister Churchill), and member of the British Mission.