862.01/379: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State
[Received September 4—8:10 p.m.]
1240. A careful study of the precedings [proceedings] of the Free Germany conference held in Moscow July 12 and 13 which were reported in extenso in my telegrams numbers 1009, August 3, 1099, August 17, 1191, August 27, and 1212, August 27 [28],79 reveals that the basic appeal of conference is overthrow Hitler government and end war and thereby save Germany as a strong free State. This thread runs through all speeches. The propaganda approach extremely effective [Page 572] the outlook for German victory hopeless; unless Hitler’s leadership is repudiated and regime overthrown, the outlook for Germany is likewise hopeless. But if Hitler and the Nazis are abandoned there is promise of a new free democratic Germany supported by force of repentent and converted but not disarmed army. Choice of speakers at conference excellent; spokesmen for all groups about whom a serious resistance movement might grow up participated—labor, middle class, church and army. Nazi ideology in all its phases was dissected and its basic tenets condemned and rejected; barrenness of Hitler’s promises ascribed in stirring language. No doubt was left that this movement rejected Nazi and Fascist concepts in their entirety.
Available evidence does not indicate degree to which the movement has been fostered by Soviet Government. It is intimated in Soviet press that impulse came from groups of German prisoners of war. In any event plans for convening conference were made by Erich Weinert an acknowledged Communist. Soviet Government facilitated the holding of conference at Moscow and had given considerable publicity to the proceedings both in Soviet press and on the screen. Therefore appears reasonable to conclude that position taken by conference represents the present Soviet attitude toward post-war role of Germany.
It is conceivable of course that Soviet Government is merely exploiting Committee for propaganda purposes to weaken German resistance and hasten Germany’s collapse and that its ideas about postwar Germany are entirely at variance with those expressed at that conference. Notwithstanding its apparent sponsorship of movement Soviet Government has not committed itself in any way to program or given the movement official support.
There is nothing in conference proceedings to indicate the movement is nucleus for post-war regime in Germany or that any of members of Committee are men of sufficient stature to form or participate in post-war government.
It may be significant as an indication of Soviet policy toward Germany that two of the avowed Communists at conference Pieck and Bredel80 emphasized that a free and independent Germany could exist only if German people disassociate from Hitler before end of war and that if they clung to Nazis tend [to the end?] the results would be catastrophic and military occupation for long time would ensue.
Basic weakness in propaganda appeal of National Committee was probably correctly stated by Count von Einsiedel: Fact that Committee [Page 573] was organized and is operating in Soviet Union. This permits. German propaganda to play on all the prejudices, fears, hatred of bolshevism and bolshevization of Germany which it has carefully cultivated for a decade. Many Germans will feel even without promptings of German propaganda that Committee can only be tool in hands of Soviets.
Yet program for Free Germany which is set forth in manifesto and was enlarged upon by the speakers at conference contains much that can command support both in Germany [and] among United Nations. It incorporates four freedoms and closely follows many principles of Atlantic Charter.81 Questionable and controversial proposals were introduced by some speakers, such as plan for preserving Wehrmacht intact as a fighting force and dream of new Germany which would be strong and powerful. These concepts will probably have high propaganda value in Germany and in Wehrmacht but run counter to views held by some United Nations.
Embassy is not aware whether any efforts have been made to create similar movement among German prisoners and refugees in United States and Great Britain. Fostering of collaboration between Free Germany Committee in USA, Britain and Russia, in absence of basic agreement between these countries on their general policy toward Germany would of course be dangerous politically. At present time Free Germany Committee here has in Embassy’s opinion perhaps chiefly propaganda value. If it were supported by association with similar movements in Britain and America, however, it might attain greater stature and significance than it now has.
While Soviet officials have not mentioned the matter to me there are indications that Soviet Government was surprised by violent reaction in British and particularly the American press to the annunciation of Committee’s formation. It apparently sees in this reaction evidence of strong undercurrent of anti-Soviet feeling in U.S.A. and Britain and indication that we do not fully recognize legitimate Soviet interests in European affairs and perhaps desire to exclude Russia so far as possible from European settlement. In these circumstances we have choice of at least three possible attitudes toward Free Germany Committee:
- 1.
- We may oppose Committee. We could officially ignore its existence and allow the Soviet Government to assume that our Government approves the position taken in American press. We could as a Government actively indicate our displeasure at the formation of Committee and its activities. We might be successful in our opposition; if not we would have permitted Soviets to take more active steps than any other Government has so far taken in organizing resistance movement in Germany. This would tend to strengthen Soviet position [Page 574] in any subsequent discussions regarding Germany and its future. This course would mean there had arisen in relations between Soviet Union and U.S.A. a cause of disagreement.
- 2.
- A second course of action which our Government might adopt would be to sponsor formation of a comparable organization of German prisoners or refugees in U.S.A. to cooperate with Moscow Committee. This policy would be open to objections previously stated unless there were first worked between the U.S.A. and Soviet Union agreement as to basic policy toward Germany.
- 3.
- Third course which our Government [might] adopt would be to endeavor for propaganda purposes to select and sponsor a contribution to common war cause parts of Committee’s programs as we can accept.
The Embassy has not overlooked possibility that in permitting formation of Free Germany Committee Soviet Government may have been motivated by considerations mentioned my 925 of July 23, 10 a.m. Notwithstanding the possible undesirable political implications however I feel that we should examine carefully any possibilities which the movement may offer toward weakening resistance in Germany hastening collapse of Nazi regime and shortening war. I therefore suggest that serious consideration be given to ways and means for realizing from the U.S.A. and Great Britain those aspects of propaganda appeal of Free Germany Committee which our Government can support, while taking precautions to ensure against acquisition be [by] Committee of undesirable political stature. I suggest that effect of common appeal from Germans in U.S.A., Britain and Soviet Union on morale of German Army and fear might be very considerable. At same time such move might open further avenue to closer cooperation with the Soviet Government in laying the foundations for the post-war world.
- None printed.↩
- Willy Bredel, German Communist from 1920, with varied career, a propaganda specialist among German prisoners of war in the Soviet Union and a radio commentator in Moscow in 1943.↩
- Joint statement by President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Churchill, August 14, 1941, Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. i, p. 367.↩