740.0011 European War 1939/31666
The Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile (Biddle) to the Secretary of State
[Received October 22.]
Sir: I have the honor to report the main points of my very recent conversation with Polish Prime Minister Mikolajczyk.
Reference to reply of Joint Chiefs of Staff to Polish General Staff’s request for equipment for “Underground” forces.
The Prime Minister referred to a secret report which the Polish General Staff had just received from the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington, to effect that current circumstances prevented the latter’s making any definite commitment, at this time, as to a large-scale supply of arms and ammunition to the “Underground” organization in Poland.
The Prime Minister said that, while the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s communication had explained the circumstances which prevented the aforementioned commitment, he and his associates in the Government were deeply disappointed to learn of the impossibility of making early deliveries of the “Underground’s” requirements.
Polish Governments examination of situation now confronting “Underground” organization; conclusions drawn.
Together with a representative of the “Underground” forces (at present in London), he and his associates, the Prime Minister continued, had examined all aspects of the situation that now confronted that organization. As a result, the following conclusions had been drawn: a) that in response to a question put to the meeting as to what instructions should be given the Commander in Chief of the “Underground” regarding orders he in turn should issue, in event of a Russian entry into Poland, it was decided that he should instruct his organization “to lay low and refrain from coming to grips with the Russians[”];* b) that the Polish “Underground” must eventually—and [Page 473] certainly in advance of a possible Russian entry into Poland—rise up against the Germans. This would be necessary for the following reasons: 1) in order that the “Underground” render its potentially valuable assistance towards delaying the Germans, in event the German retreat extended over Polish territory. In this connection, Mikolajczyk said that to delay a German withdrawal in front of advancing Russian forces would be to render the Russians effective service, in the nature of that rendered by the Russian guerilla forces on Russian territory. Furthermore, he said, and no less important, was the possibility that this delaying action by the Poles might prove the decisive factor in favor of the Western Democracies, in event of a close race between the Russians and the forces of the Western Democracies to reach Germany; 2) to avoid the possible—even probable—subsequent reaction on part of public opinion in the Allied Democracies to effect that the Poles had not shown a sufficiently vigorous, hence effective resistance to the Germans. In this connection, Mikolajczyk said it would be more than likely that the Russians would be quick to spot any signs of such reaction and to exploit them in their own interests; 3) to minimize the possibility of rendering the Russians a pretext for deporting Poles en masse into Siberia and other remote areas in Russia on the ground that the latter had failed to render the Russian forces assistance by rising up against the Germans.
Mikolajczyk’s remarks to British Foreign Secretary that whether or not the “Underground” received the tools they would nevertheless rise up against the Germans.
Of connected bearing, he had recently told the British Foreign Secretary that if the “Underground” did not receive the tools, it would fight the Germans anyway; that unfortunately without sufficiently adequate weapons the loss of Polish blood would, of course, be all the greater, and the efforts the less effective.
In this connection, the unhappy question had passed through his mind as to what posterity might say if it read that the Poles had fought but had not received from their allies the required tools, when they had notified the latter of their desire to rise against the Germans.
[Here follows section in which the Prime Minister expressed apprehension concerning the possibility that the Allied Military Command had been reluctant to supply the Polish Underground with arms and ammunition for fear they would be turned against the Russians. He stated that on the other hand reports from Poland indicated that Russian “partisans” in Poland were killing Poles and not Germans, but that the information had not been released, in the interests of preserving the unity of the United Nations front. He deplored “a reported tendency in the United States to play down the Polish case.”]
[Page 474]Polish Government’s views as expressed to the British Foreign Secretary by Polish Foreign Minister, regarding Polish interest in connection with Three-Power Conference.
Mikolajczyk went on to say that in expressing his Government’s views to the British Foreign Secretary as to Polish interests in connection with the Three-Power Conference,42 M. Romer, Polish Foreign Minister, had made two main points: (a) that his Government earnestly hoped that the Russian Government would agree to an early renewal of diplomatic relations; that the Polish Government would be inclined to regard this in the nature of a test of the Russian Government’s good will towards Poland; and, (b) that his Government hoped that the Russian Government would agree not to discuss frontier questions until after the war.
The British Foreign Secretary had asked M. Romer whether he thought there was any likelihood of any members of the Polish Government’s willingness to concede Russia its desired “security frontier” in Eastern Poland, provided Poland, in turn, were to acquire East Prussia and a part of Upper Silesia. In response, M. Romer had stated that no Polish Government in exile could possibly entertain such ideas. These were matters which would have to be left to the Polish people to decide. Supposing, M. Romer had asked, the Polish people did decide in favor of such a formula, did the British Foreign Secretary think that the Allies would be prepared to guarantee the rest of Poland. In reply, the British Secretary had said in effect that this was a question concerning which he would not wish to speculate at this time.
At this point Mikolajczyk said that, as regards the possibility of Poland’s acquiring a part of East Prussia and Upper Silesia, he had just been informed that Dr. Rawitzki,† prominent in the “Free Germany” movement in Britain, was now engaged in writing a book showing how Germany might avoid giving up any part or all of these two territories. If the British censors permitted the publication and distribution of this book in Britain, Mikolajczyk added, it would hardly seem consistent with the views frequently expressed by British official circles, concerning the desirability of Poland’s acquiring East Prussia and part of Upper Silesia.
Serious consideration of plan envisaging “the dropping” of the Government into Poland in near future.
In concluding his remarks, Mikolajczyk told me that he and his associates were seriously considering making a formal request of the [Page 475] Allies to facilitate his Government’s being “dropped” from planes into Poland in the near future. He and his associates thought that the situation had become so serious for Poland that it might be well for them to be with their people in their trying hour. He was confident that the people would welcome this move, and equally confident that the presence of himself and his associates would serve to rally the forces of resistance at the moment of their uprising against the Germans. He was just about, he said, to attend a Cabinet meeting at which this matter would be discussed in further detail. Moreover, he would keep me posted. Should this plan eventually be carried out, he would hope that we and the British might see our way clear towards sending, perhaps, liaison officers to serve near the Government and the authorities of the “Underground”.
Respectfully yours,
- In this connection Mikolajczyk said that should the Russians succeed in forcing a German withdrawal to some line in Poland and should the Poles accordingly find themselves confronted with Russians again on their soil, the situation would be a dangerous one indeed for his compatriots. There was a real dread of this among the Poles, and he was apprehensive lest, notwithstanding the aforementioned orders to the C-in-C of the “Underground”, there might be skirmishes in various sections of the country between the Russians and Poles, which would undoubtedly prove costly to the Polish communities concerned. This possibility had given rise to the deepest concern in his and the minds of his associates. This, in turn, had raised the question as to what measures might be taken to provide for the safety of the Polish people in case of a sudden entry by the Russians. Would it be possible to send an Anglo-American Commission to Poland in order to assure a just and decent treatment of the Poles? This, Mikolajczyk thought, provided, of course, it met with Russian agreement, might possibly prove helpful in an emergency. [Footnote in the original.]↩
- The Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers.↩
- See my despatch No. 409 (Polish Series) dated September 18, 1943 and enclosure thereto. [Footnote in the original. Despatch not printed.]↩