Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1943, The British Commonwealth, Eastern Europe, the Far East, Volume III

740.0011 EW39/31460½

Memorandum by the Polish Ambassador (Ciechanowski)

I —While the war is entering its final and decisive phase, the Polish Government, fully conscious of great sacrifices and of the unfaltering attitude of the Polish Nation, confident of the forces that the Polish Nation can still muster to a larger extent than any other occupied European nation for the struggle against the German foe—on Polish soil as well as abroad,—is firmly determined to face the great dangers and difficulties which still lie ahead for Poland.

As to the attitude of the Polish Nation at this crucial moment, the true sentiments of the population inside the occupied country are expressed in a resolution of August 15, 1943, adopted in Warsaw by the four leading political parties, text of which was handed to the American Ambassador to the Polish Government in London.³⁷

The armed forces at the disposal of the Polish Government consist of the airforce and the navy, both of which have been continuously active in the war, as well as of land forces, which are in readiness for action.

II —The Polish Government views with deep satisfaction the strengthening of Anglo-American relations as a fact of utmost importance to the future welfare of the world and reiterates the assurances of full solidarity of Poland with the Anglo-Saxon Powers, as well as its confidence in their cooperation in the defense of Poland’s lawful rights and interests.

III —In particular, the Polish Government is fully aware of the need of understanding between the Anglo-Saxon Powers and the Soviet Union,—an understanding towards which Poland has never ceased to strive despite the attitude of the Soviet Government and its claims, by no means directed against Poland alone,—which do not contribute to the creation of confidence, so indispensable for a durable reconciliation.

The readiness of the Soviet Government to support generously the revindication by Poland of some territories belonging to Germany in view of inducing Poland to forfeit the Eastern half of her territory to the USSR,—can be interpreted as an intention on the part of the Soviet Government to subordinate the whole of Poland and to use it as a spring board for subjugation of Central Europe and Germany.

In the estimation of the Polish Government, the reestablishment of normal diplomatic Polish-Soviet relations, brought about by the firm action of the Governments of the United States and Great Britain, would be the test of the good will of Soviet Russia for durable collaboration with the Anglo-Saxon Powers on the broadest basis in war, and later in peace. Such action should eliminate the settlement at this time of frontier problems—in accordance with the views expressed by the Secretary of State—and should be based on the minimum program submitted to Premier Stalin on August 11, 1943, by the American and British Ambassadors. This would open the possibility of further direct Polish-Soviet conversations, with American and British assistance, aiming at the solution of the remaining most urgent difficulties. Since the Polish Government is firmly determined to defend the territorial integrity of Poland in the East, the question of frontiers should be postponed to a later date.

IV —Anxious to maintain good neighborly Polish-Soviet relations in the future, the Polish Government would deem undesirable either temporary or partial occupation of Polish territories by the Soviet armies. However, if such occupation were unavoidably to take place as a result of military operations against Germany,—it must be dependent upon a previous Polish-Soviet understanding, based on the reestablishment of mutual relations. If such understanding does not take place, one should reckon with an open attempt of the Soviet Government to communize Poland using for that purpose the “Union of Polish Patriots”, headed by Wanda Wasilewska, and the military units commanded by Colonel Berling,³⁸ as well as by means of extermination or deportation of all the leading and nationally conscious Polish elements. Such action on the part of the Soviet Government would unavoidably cause a desperate self-defense on the part of the population of Poland; in the fifth year of unceasing and uncompromised resistance of the Polish people against Germany, it would be a dire tragedy not only for Poland, but for the entire community of the United Nations.

In the face of this danger the Polish Government feels compelled to appeal to the American and British Governments for a guarantee of independence and integrity of the Polish territory and for security of its inhabitants.

However, should the entrance of Soviet troops on Polish territory take place as a result of the adjustment of relations and agreement between Poland and Soviet Russia, then—in conformity with the principle established at the Quebec Conference³⁹—the right to take over the administration of the country by sovereign Polish Government authorities should be guaranteed. To safeguard such a guarantee, American-British troops, or at least the necessary detachments of such troops, should be stationed on the territory of Poland to prevent Polish-Soviet friction, and especially to protect the population against eventual Soviet reprisals.

V —The Polish Government desires to begin negotiations with the United States and British Governments regarding Polish participation in the occupation of Germany.

The Polish Government anticipates the occupation by Polish troops and Polish administration of the Eastern provinces of Germany which, as a result of this war, are going to be ceded to Poland.

However, in other adjoining regions of Eastern Germany, which are of special importance to the safety of Poland, particularly in the initial, most difficult post-war period,—Inter-Allied occupation, with the participation of Poland, should take place.

VI —The Polish Government upholds in principle the program of federation in Central Europe without entering into details at the present time, but emphasizes that this program is not directed against Soviet Russia or her interests.

The Polish Government temporarily considers the satellite countries like: Roumania, Hungary and Slovakia, from the viewpoint of necessities and pace of war with Germany in which, like Italy, they still can render services to the United Nations. In the above countries the Polish Government has at its disposal Polish refugees and considerable influence. The Polish Government could not be indifferent to the occupation of those countries by Soviet troops, as such occupation would mean the encirclement of Poland by countries under Soviet control. The policy of the Czechoslovak Government is already influenced by Soviet Russia.

The Polish Government maintains its reservations against the alliance of Czechoslovakia with the USSR as planned by Mr. Beneš.⁴⁰ Nevertheless, in case of a permanent adjustment of Polish-Soviet relations, the Polish Government expresses its readiness to participate in a general security pact which, besides the directly interested countries of Eastern Europe, would also comprise Soviet Russia and the Anglo-Saxon Powers.

VII —The Polish Government announces that it is interested in the work of the Mediterranean Commission.⁴¹ This interest is motivated by the anticipated use of Polish Armed Forces also in this part of Europe.

In Italy the following problems are of special concern to the Polish Government: Polish refugees, Poles forcibly inducted into the German army who either deserted or were taken prisoners, as well as the problem of the Holy See.

The Polish Government is anxious to have more precise information regarding membership and jurisdiction of the Mediterranean Commission.

Anticipating that countries of Central Europe will not be included in the above Commission and because of the increasing importance of those countries in the strategy of the United Nations, the Polish Government suggests the establishment of a separate Commission of Central European countries—with the participation of Poland.

VIII —The Polish Government suggests the creation of an official Inter-Allied body for problems of general strategy in Europe in which Poland would participate. Such participation is justified by the numerical strength of the Polish Armed Forces as well as by the matters to be discussed. The latter should include all matters directly concerning Poland: use in action of the Polish Armed Forces, their speedy access to Poland, supply of weapons to the underground army in Poland for the purpose of armed insurrection against the Germans, decision as to the date and conditions of such insurrection in coordination with the general operational plans.

[ Washington ,] October 6, 1943.

37. The text of the “Declaration of the Political Agreement Between the Four Political Parties Forming the Polish Home Political Representation,” signed on August 15, 1943, was handed by the Polish Foreign Minister to the Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile and forwarded by him to the Department in despatch Polish Series No. 432, October 6. The Declaration, which enumerated the war aims and postwar objectives of the four parties stated that they would “cooperate in Poland, in the Polish Home Political Representation, in the Council of National Unity, and possibly, in the Council of the Republic,” and would “collaborate in full solidarity with the Delegate of the Polish Government in London.” (860C.00/924)
38. Lt. Col. Zigmund Berling became head of the Polish armed forces in the Soviet Union after the break in Polish-Soviet relations on April 25, 1943. He was promoted to Major General on August 10, 1943.
39. The First Quebec Conference, between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, with their advisers, was held August 17–24, 1943. For the statement on administration of liberated areas, adopted at the Conference on August 22, see telegram No. 5417, September 4, midnight, to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, p. 458.
40. A treaty of friendship, mutual assistance, and post-war collaboration between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union was signed at Moscow on December 12, 1943. For text, see British and Foreign State Papers, vol. cxlv, p. 238.
41. The Mediterranean Commission (Political-Military Commission), composed of representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union, was set up September 4, 1943, the day after the armistice with Italy was signed, to deal with economic and political questions touching Italy and the entire Mediterranean basin. For correspondence connected with the creation and work of the Commission, see vol. i, pp. 782 ff.