Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1943, The British Commonwealth, Eastern Europe, the Far East, Volume III

860C.01/649: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

London, July 20, 1943—6 p.m.
[Received July 21—6:25 a.m.]

4715. For the Secretary and Under Secretary. After sending you my 4526, July 10,⁸ I asked Mr. Eden if at a later date he could give me a more detailed and considered judgment on the new Polish Government. I have just received the following letter from him which I think you will find of particular interest as representing the British Government’s view:

“When you came to see me on the 14th of July I promised to let you have a short statement about the Polish political situation. As you will have gathered, the formation of the new Polish Government which was announced in the press on the 15th of July was not achieved without considerable difficulties. These difficulties arose chiefly out of the question of the constitutional relationship between the President, the Commanders-in-Chief and the Prime Minister and were connected with the problem of the interpretation to be placed upon those articles of the Polish Constitution of 1935 which dealt with that relationship. The 1935 Constitution, which was adopted at the end of the Pilsudski era, placed far-reaching powers in the hands of the President of the Republic. The Polish Democratic and Left Wing parties have never willingly accepted this aspect of the Constitution and when the Polish Government was first reconstituted in France at the end of 1939 an understanding was reached that the President would not exercise his full prerogatives during the period of emigration.

Under the Constitution, the President of the Republic is empowered in time of war to nominate his own successor. President Raczkiewicz had himself been so nominated by his predecessor, President Mościcki,¹⁰ and he in his turn had nominated as his eventual successor General Sosnkowski. The President also enjoys under the Constitution the power to appoint and dismiss the Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Armed Forces. It was in the exercise of this power that President Raczkiewicz decided shortly after General Sikorski’s death to nominate General Sosnkowski to succeed him in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief.¹¹ In taking this decision he was primarily influenced by the need of stabilizing opinion in the Polish Armed Forces both here and in the Middle East, whose discipline and loyalty he felt might be seriously affected if there were a long delay.

This decision was not pleasing to the Left Wing parties and in particular to M. Mikolajczyk himself who, as Deputy Prime Minister under General Sikorski, became Acting Prime Minister on the latter’s death. He felt that adequate arrangements should be made to ensure that the Commander-in-Chief did not occupy too commanding a position which he might welcome. In addition to commanding the Polish Armed Forces he also directed the underground military movement in Poland. He would have preferred that an [no?] appointment be made to the post of Commander-in-Chief or that at least, if one were made, the man chosen should be someone less influential than General Sosnkowski. M. Mikolajczyk was undoubtedly influenced by the wish to ensure that his party and those of like mind should retain their influence in Poland itself against the day of the Polish Government’s return to their country.

These considerations led M. Mikolajczyk to inform the President that he was unable to accept office as Prime Minister and form a government unless means could be found of limiting the authority of the Commander-in-Chief. After protracted discussions, it appears that satisfactory arrangements to this end have been made and M. Mikolajczyk has succeeded in forming an all party Government of National Union in which representatives of his own Party (the Peasant Party) and the Socialist Party, predominate. This Government seems to us as satisfactory as can be hoped for. Its democratic character, and the fact that M. Mikolajczyk has pledged it to continue General Sikorski’s policy, suggest that it should not be unduly provocative of Soviet-Russian susceptibilities. It should also be in a position to command the loyalty both of the Polish Armed Forces abroad and of the vast majority of Poles in Poland itself and to ensure the maintenance of the resistance movement inside the country. From the military point of view, the choice of General Sosnkowski also appears to have a good deal to commend it. He is the senior general in the Polish Army, whose loyalty he is believed to command. It is true that he was an ardent follower of Pilsudski, and that he opposed General Sikorski’s action in signing the treaty with Soviet Russia in July 1941. However if, as appears to be the case, adequate measures have been taken to ensure that he is subordinated to the Government as a whole, this aspect should assume less importance.”

Winant

8. In this telegram Ambassador Winant reported as follows: “Today Mr. Eden told me that in his opinion the reorganization of the Polish Government was reasonably good. He said that Biddle’s influence had been most helpful. Everybody here including the Allied Governments recognize the tragic loss of General Sikorski.” (8600.01/647)
10. Ignacz Mościcki, President of Poland, June 1, 1926–September 30, 1939. Wladislaw Raczkiewicz was appointed President of Poland by President Mościcki’s decree of September 17, 1939, and began his term on September 30, 1939.
11. In telegram Polish Series No. 45, July 9, 10 p.m., the Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile reported President Raczkiewicz’s appointment of General Sosnkowski as Commander in Chief and the opposition voiced by Mikolajczyk (860C.002/325).