760C.61/2068b: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile (Biddle), at London5
Polish Series No. 16. As you are aware, the Department has for some time been working out with Admiral Standley and the British Government a formula for a joint British-American approach to the Soviet Government with the ultimate view of assisting in reestablishing Polish-Soviet relations on a firm and lasting basis.
Substantial agreement has been reached between the American and British Governments on this question and Admiral Standley and the British Ambassador in Moscow plan in the near future to request an interview with Stalin for the purpose of presenting our suggested solutions to the Polish-Soviet dispute. Admiral Standley will inform the Department as soon as possible of the date of the interview with Stalin in order that the Polish Government may be advised simultaneously of the joint proposals.
The Department’s instructions to Admiral Standley outlining the proposed solution of the problem have been repeated to Ambassador Winant6 for his confidential information in the event that the British Government during the working out of the arrangements should desire to discuss details with him.
[Page 445]For your strictly confidential information and in order that you may be cognizant of the background of the proposals you should obtain from Ambassador Winant copies of these messages. To complete your background on the question the next following telegram to you will repeat Admiral Standley’s replies to the Department’s last two telegrams to him on this subject.
Upon the receipt of further instructions indicating the date the approach is to be made to the Soviet Government you will deliver the following aide-mémoire to the Polish Government7 which has so far not been informed of the Department’s proposals:
“The Government of the United States as a member of the United Nations and as a cobelligerent of Poland and of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is deeply concerned over the differences which have arisen between the Governments of these two countries and which have resulted in a breach of diplomatic relations between them. In the opinion of the Government of the United States the absence of friendly relations between the Polish and Soviet Governments is injurious to the common war effort in that it disrupts the unity of the United Nations, it lends encouragement to the endeavors of the enemy to create and intensify differences among the United Nations, it tends to strengthen those forces throughout the world which contend that prolonged cooperation among the United Nations during and after the war period is impossible, and it distracts the minds of millions of persons who should be concentrating all their energies upon the winning of the war.
The American Government therefore feels that it should not fail to take any steps which might assist in settling the differences between the Polish and Soviet Governments, might lead to the reestablishment of relations between the two Governments on a firm, equitable and lasting basis, and might lay the groundwork for friendly post-war cooperation. The Government of the United States has therefore instructed the United States Ambassador at Moscow to approach the Soviet Government with the suggestions set forth below in the hope that these suggestions may be of material aid in eliminating some of the differences which exist at the present time between the Polish and Soviet Governments.
- 1.
- All racial Poles in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics who were domiciled in Poland on September 1, 1939 to be immediately recognized by the Soviet Government as Polish citizens.
- 2.
- The Polish and Soviet Governments to permit all non-racial Poles in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics who were domiciled [Page 446] in Poland on September 1, 1939 to opt for Polish or Soviet citizenship.
- 3.
- All racial Poles and non-racial Poles who opt for Polish citizenship and who have close relatives abroad, especially those who are members of the immediate families of the men in the Polish armed forces outside the Soviet Union, to be permitted to leave the Soviet Union as soon as possible.
- 4.
- Similarly every effort to be made to evacuate abroad Polish orphans and other Polish children as soon as suitable arrangements can be made for their care in areas further removed from the war zones.
- 5.
- In order that the Polish citizens in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics may receive the relief supplies sent from the United States and elsewhere, the Polish Government to agree to permit relief and welfare work to be carried on by Soviet organizations, with the understanding that Polish citizens are to receive treatment no less favorable than that granted to Soviet citizens under similar circumstances.
- 6.
- To enable Polish citizens to have the facilities which are customarily available to foreigners in all countries, the Soviet Government to grant the right to the Polish Government to establish consulates in those areas in the Soviet Union where large numbers of Polish citizens are located, the latter to be accorded the usual right of access to their consular officials.”
In presenting the aide-mémoire you may stress orally that after careful study of the question the United States Government feels that its suggestions, if accepted in the friendly spirit in which they are made, offer a possibility of bringing about as normal and permanent a relationship as the difficult situation permits.
If the Polish Government should raise serious objections to any of the proposals, particularly to points 2 and 5, you may state that it is felt that the Polish Government after studying the proposals will agree that they eliminate the principal elements of friction in the Polish-Soviet Agreement of 1941 and are of such a nature that if they are accepted by both sides in a spirit of mutual confidence they can form the basis for the establishment of an enduring relationship.
You may also point out that the proposals do not involve in any way the question of frontiers which is a matter we feel is not subject to discussion at this time and which is not germane to the principal questions involved—the legitimate rights of individuals and the restoration of United Nations unity in order to attain the fullest possible cooperation in the prosecution of the war against our common enemy.
Furthermore, it would be advisable to inform the Polish authorities that it is felt that the question of recruiting in the Soviet Union for the Polish armed forces should be taken up subsequently.
You should give particular stress to the fact that we feel that any conversations which may follow our proposals with regard to citizenship [Page 447] should not interfere with any plans agreed to by the Soviet Government for the immediate evacuation of special categories of Poles.
In presenting the aide-mémoire you may indicate that it is the Department’s understanding that the British Government has informed its Ambassador in Moscow that if the Russians inquire of him as to the British attitude on the position taken by us, he may state that his Government fully shares and supports the views of the United States.
Please keep Ambassador Winant informed.
Repeated to Moscow.
- Repeated on the same date to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union as No. 584.↩
- See the following telegrams to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union: No. 427, June 12, p. 428; No. 428, June 12, p. 430; No. 497, June 29, p. 434; and No. 548, July 10, p. 440.↩
- In telegram Polish Series No. 23, August 11, midnight, the Department informed the Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile that the American and British Ambassadors in the Soviet Union were to see Premier Stalin that evening, and instructed Ambassador Biddle to deliver the aide-mémoire at the earliest possible moment (760C.61/2068b suppl.). Biddle accordingly presented the aide-mémoire to Polish Foreign Minister Tadeusz Romer the following morning at 10:30. (Mr. Romer succeeded Count Raczyński as Foreign Minister on July 14, 1943, when Prime Minister Stanislaw Mikolajczyk formed the new Government, after the death of General Sikorski.)↩