760C.61/1006: Telegram

The Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile (Biddle) to the Secretary of State

Polish Series [No.] 7. For the President, the Secretary and the Under Secretary. Referring my cable Polish Series number 3, January 28, midnight, and my despatches Polish Series 262, January 20 and 267, February 15,58 Sikorski states that the recent meeting59 between Polish Ambassador Romer and M. Stalin entailed discussion of six main points in the following light:

(1)
In response to Romer’s suggestion that his Government was prepared immediately to take measures to destroy all railway and highway bridges in Poland over which supplies are carried to the German forces in Russia, M. Stalin expressed his appreciation but said he did not think the moment yet ripe for such action. He would bear this in mind and would keep in touch with the Ambassador on the subject.
(2)
Romer had informed him that the approximately 200,000 Poles which had been enrolled by force in the German Army had indicated their willingness to go over at a given moment to the Russian side if assured they could fight as a unit alongside the Red army. In reply, M. Stalin said he would want them to be dispersed in detachments among the Red army. Sirkorski told me that in response to his Ambassador’s report on this point, he had requested the Ambassador to state his desire that the matter be regulated by the terms [Page 343] of the Russian-Polish Military Convention of August 1941.60 (Sikorski, usually more of a realist vis-à-vis Russia than many of his compatriots, said he felt that this question was open to compromise; that his and the Russian Government, however, would have to make a record of their legal rights in the matter.)
(3)
Romer raised the general question of Polish citizenship. In response, M. Stalin stated that he would leave it open to all Poles who happened to be in the eastern area of Poland at the time of the plebiscite of November 1 and 2, 1939, to opt for Polish nationality, adding that those who so opted might leave Russia eventually via Iran. He thereupon gave Molotov instructions in this sense.
(4)
Regarding welfare for Poles in Russia, M. Stalin suggested that a way might be found whereby Polish relief could be distributed according to Russian laws. (Sikorski said that he and his associates were preliminarily inclined to regard this as a vague suggestion with a very limited objective. This point, he added, was now being negotiated.)
(5)
M. Stalin urged a truce in the press controversy. (Sikorski considered this suggestion encouraging in light of its indication of Russian concern over repercussions in the United States and Britain.)
(6)
Romer’s raising of the frontier question had met only with a polite but cold reception.

Summing up his Government’s opinion of the Russian attitude, Sikorski said that M. Stalin appeared to be offering small practical concessions as a quid pro quo for concessions in matters of principle by the Polish Government. As to matters of principle, he added, the latter had to stand firm.

Sikorski went on to say that Ambassador Romer had just reported his definite impression that Moscow had two alternative forward-looking views regarding Poland: (a) Stalin’s view envisaging a strong independent Poland; and (b) Molotov’s envisaging Poland as the one seventh [seventeenth?] [Soviet] Socialist Republic.

As forecast in my aforementioned cable, Sikorski’s political position is under tense fire from the Polish Armed Forces both in Scotland and the Middle East, as well as from opposition circles in London and from the “home front” in Poland. It was due to this pressure, as well as to exaggerated rumors, deliberately circulated by the Russian Embassy here, alleging Polish territorial aspirations, in Russia, that in defence both of his own and his Government’s position, Sikorski had given his interview to the New York Times on February 20. Notwithstanding continued pressure from Polish quarters, I find Sikorski philosophical, and confident he can handle this aspect.

He deeply appreciated the President’s message sent him through Polish Ambassador, and asked me to tell the President that he had greeted it with full comprehension.

[Biddle]
  1. Despatches not printed.
  2. On February 26, 1943.
  3. A military agreement between the Polish High Command and the Soviet High Command was signed at Moscow on August 14, 1941; for text, see Polish-Soviet Relations, 1918–1943, Official Documents, p. 126.