740.0011 European War 1939/28755
The Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile ( Biddle ) to the Secretary of State
[Received March 30.]
Sir: Referring to General Sikorski’s New York Times’ interview of February 20,50 concerning certain causes for growing Polish-Russian friction; and to my Despatch Polish Series No. 230 of November 9, 1942,51 reporting General Sikorski’s disclosure as to his concern over the political activities of Russian officers and agents dropped by parachute into Poland and his protest in regard thereto to the Russian authorities, I have the honor herein to report the following strictly confidential disclosures made by a leading officer of the Polish Government-directed Underground Organisation,* who has recently arrived in London, concerning (a) activities of the “Government-directed Underground” in Poland, and its growing concern over Russia’s potential aims in Poland; (b) the structure and activities of the Communist-guided underground movement in Poland and its subtle attempts to “liquidate” the “Government-directed Underground” and to ferment revolution. My informant stated, at the outset, that the “Government-directed Underground” was well organised and determined in its purpose. At the time that General Sikorski had signed the Polish-Russian Agreement (July 1941), the Organisation had taken a realistic view of the matter, appreciating the necessity of forming a solid Allied Front against Enemy No. 1, Germany; that it had, therefore, communicated to Sikorski its approval as to the principle of the Agreement. Recently, however, his compatriots had become fully aware of Russian disloyalty as [Page 339] Allies as well as to the spirit and terms of this Agreement. Moreover, his compatriots were becoming increasingly concerned over the implications of Moscow-directed activities in certain parts of the country. In fact, conditions had now reached the point where it was necessary that the “Government-directed Underground” had to contend with the following elements:
Partisans.
“Partisan Bands”: these consisted mainly of Russian prisoners of war, who had broken prison camp and subsequently hidden in the woods at the time of the German advance in the summer of ’42. Subsequently, these bands had been joined by many young Jews who had escaped the Ghettos. The strength of the bands had been further augmented by young peasant boys who had been kidnapped by the Partisans and forced to cooperate with them. These bands operated under the leadership of Russian officers flown in by Russian planes and dropped by parachute. Their hiding places and bases of operation were the forest lands which lay in the area between Siedlče and Pulăwy, and in the forests which lay directly East of the Bug River. These bands were neither numerous nor powerful, but widely dispersed and powerful enough to provoke German reprisals vis-à-vis the Polish population and the “Government-directed Underground”. On this account the Organization’s Commander-in-Chief, in his Underground Press Reports, frequently ascribed to “Partisans” sabotage which his own organization had conducted, in order to avoid reprisals.
Polish Workers’ Party.
This was a movement, separate from the Partisans, which was inspired and directed by the Polish Communist Party, whose leaders, in some cases were Russians, in others, Polish Communists of the international order of mentality, who took their orders from the Comintern.52 The Polish Workers’ Party, organised for the purpose of establishing a front against the Germans, had its own military detachments and its own Underground. While the Party was neither numerous nor powerful it was widely spread throughout the Gouvernement General. The Party recruited its strength from among the working masses, most of whom joined because of its patriotic appeal, and without knowing the forward-looking political purpose of its Communist leaders. This was the restoration of a powerful Poland as the Seventeenth Republic of the U.S.S.R. The Party claimed to be Catholic and Nationalist; it denied any Communist connections or collaboration with Communists.
[Page 340]The Polish Communist Party.
As above stated, the Polish Communist Party inspired and directed: the activities of the Polish Workers’ Party. The Communist Party, my informant said, maintained great secrecy as to its membership and its headquarters. It had undergone no expansion since the outbreak of the war, but now had its own underground newspapers. Moreover, through the Polish Workers’ Party and the latter’s underground organisation, the Polish Communist Party was a constant thorn in the side of my informant’s “Government-directed Underground”. Members of the Polish Workers’ Party, on orders from their leaders, were constantly attempting to make contact with the members of my informant’s Organisation. In this connection, experience had shown that whenever the former had succeeded in forming such contact, the Workers’ Party members promptly appealed for cooperation between the two organisations, and tried to obtain the names and addresses of the members of my informant’s organisation. In each case, wherein this information had been imparted, the leaders of the Workers’ Party had taken steps to denounce to the Gestapo54 those, whose names and addresses they had thus obtained. This had become such a danger to the “Government-directed Underground” that it had been found essential to expel anyone immediately who had been contacted by the Workers’ Party. He and his associates, my informant said, were now “on to the game”. It was now clear that the leaders of the Workers’ Party aimed to obtain a membership list of the “Government-directed Underground” in order to denounce the people concerned, either to the Gestapo or, in event of a Russian invasion, to the N.K.W.D.55 The foregoing, together with detection and reprisals by the Gestapo now comprised the greatest dangers for the “Government-directed Underground”.
Official Emissaries of the Comintern.
These came by parachute from time to time in an effort to make contact with the Commander-in-Chief, officers and delegates of my informant’s “Government-directed Underground”. They, as in the case of the aforedescribed Communist leaders in Poland, aimed at obtaining the names and addresses of the organisation’s membership. Thus far, however, they have failed to make the desired contacts.
Discernible Traces of the “Russian Hand”.
My informant went on to say that due to the aforementioned dangers, he and his associates had to exercise great care in their contacts with Poles outside their own Organisation. Fortunately, however [Page 341] they had learned to recognize the “Russian hand” by the line the agent adopted in his approach. It usually ran approximately as follows:—
- (a)
- He wanted to see a powerful, progressive and democratic postwar Poland;
- (b)
- He wanted a big Poland reaching to the Oder;
- (However, my informant said, there was never a word regarding Poland’s Eastern Frontier).
- (c)
- He was not opposed to the Rightists; he was “with all” categories of Poles, and he sought close contact and cooperation with all;
- (d)
- He wanted a post-war Poland in close collaboration with Russia;
- (e)
- He urged open sabotage and a revolution at once.
Attitude of People in General to the Partisans and Polish Workers’ Party.
My informant said that the Socialists (P.P.S.56), even to a greater extent than the Rightists, were bitterly opposed to collaboration with the Partisans or the Workers’ Party.
“Government-Directed Underground’s” Present Predicament.
As a result of the foregoing examples of Russian disloyalty, both as Allies and to the Polish-Russian Agreement, my informant continued, a “horrible situation” had developed in Poland. Moreover, the “Government-directed Underground” had become deeply concerned lest it be considered here as disloyal to Polish-British relations, if it were to take measures against the aforementioned Russian activities.
Resultant Delicacy of General Sikorski’s Political Position.
My informant further disclosed that the aforementioned examples of Russian disloyalty to the terms and spirit of the Polish-Russian Agreement together with the implications of Russia’s claim that all Poles now in Russia were Russian citizens, had served to place General Sikorski’s political position in a delicate light. My informant was aware, moreover, that this was the case not only with public opinion in Poland, but also with the forces in Scotland and in the Middle East.
My informant had already discerned a sense of restiveness among the circles here, which had rallied behind General Sosnkowski’s57 opposition to the signing of the Agreement in the terms in which it was written. Public opinion in Poland was well aware that General Sosnkowski’s resignation from the Cabinet was due to the stand he [Page 342] had taken regarding the terms of this Agreement—and in this, besides his heroic leadership during the war in Poland, lay his strength. On the other hand, Sikorski’s sterling qualities and courageous, determined leadership in the continued struggle to restore Poland’s independence were greatly appreciated. The Poles, both inside and outside Poland, now looked hopefully to him to lead them out of the aforedescribed predicament.
My informant concluded by emphasising that he and his associates “at home” were deeply worried lest any measures they might take against the aforementioned Russian “subversive activities” be construed both in London and in Washington as contrary to the spirit of the United Nations’ Front. He was, therefore, most anxious that we understand the predicament in which the “Government-directed Underground” was being placed by what it conscientiously considered deliberate subversive activities directed from Moscow.
Respectfully yours,
- See New York Times, February 22, 1943, p. 13, col 1.↩
- Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. iii, p. 197.↩
- Organised and directed by the Polish Government immediately following and since the cessation of the Polish-German conflict in Poland. In order to identify it in the reader’s mind as against other underground elements hereinafter mentioned, I shall describe it as the “Government-directed Underground”. [Footnote in the original.]↩
- The Third (Communist) International, founded by the Bolsheviks at Moscow in March 1919.↩
- The German Secret State Police (Geheime Staatspolizei).↩
- N.K.V.D., the Secret Police of the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs of the Soviet Union.↩
- Polska Partia Socjalistyczna.↩
- Gen. Kazimierz Sosnkowski resigned as Deputy Prime Minister of the Polish Government in Exile on July 26, 1941, in protest against the signing of the Polish-Soviet Agreement.↩