Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1943, The British Commonwealth, Eastern Europe, the Far East, Volume III

740.00119 European War 1939/2031: Telegram

The Secretary of Slate to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson)

Washington, December 7, 1943—8 p.m.

1332. British Embassy here has acquainted us with reports from Mallet⁵⁵ regarding conversations he has recently had with Boheman and Kollontay regarding Finland and from which we get the impression that Boheman is actively exploring the possibility of a Finnish-Soviet peace. Boheman stated he was in almost daily consultation with Kollontay and was delighted to find “both sides are being quite remarkably reasonable”. He said he did not wish to say more because he felt at the present stage the less said the better and it was most important there should be no gossip or publicity. Mallet had the impression he may intend to visit Helsinki before long.

Mallet also reports that in a conversation which he had with Kollontay she said that she regarded the idea of a trial of Finnish leaders as war criminals⁵⁶ as absurd and on the contrary thought that Mannerheim at heart [was] anti-German and, as he would be needed to head the Finnish army in driving Germans from Finland, thought that it would be a great mistake to insist on his overthrow as part of the armistice terms. In her opinion the first step should be the disappearance of Tanner and next the reappearance of Paasikivi and a visit by him or some other suitable representative to Moscow. Ryti would eventually have to resign. Kollontay seemed to understand the undesirability of a Soviet military occupation of Finland and talked as if this were not intended.⁵⁷ She said that Finland would have to give up Karelia, but there was no question of Russia annexing all Finland. She was noncommittal regarding Hangö and said that with respect to the Aaland Islands, all her Government wanted was neutralization of the Islands as before. She did not expect any sudden developments because of the Finnish slow-moving temperament but thought that matters were steadily moving in the right direction.

It is not our intention to take any initiative at this time in this matter and you should not open the subject yourself with either the Swedes or the Russians; nor do we feel it advisable that Legation at Helsinki be apprised of these reports. We should of course, however, wish to receive any information regarding the foregoing which may come to your attention.

Hull

55. Victor A. L. Mallet, British Minister in Sweden.
56. On November 15, the British Broadcasting Company had broadcast excerpts from the Soviet newspaper. Krasnaya Zvezda, which demanded punishment for Finnish as well as for Nazi and Fascist leaders branded as war criminals.
57. At the Conference of Prime Minister Churchill, Premier Stalin, and President Roosevelt at Tehran during November 28–December 1, 1943, Stalin had said that to allay Finnish fears of Soviet intentions toward Finland the Soviet Government had instructed Madame Kollontay to inform the Swedish Government, ostensibly for the information of the Finns, that the Russians “had no designs on the independence of Finland, if Finland by its behaviour did not force Russia to do so.” See Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, p. 590. Further evidence that Madame Kollontay had been so instructed was reported by the American Minister in Sweden in his telegram No. 3977, December 8, in which he stated that the Soviet Minister had said Russia did not want to destroy Finland (760D.61/1691).