Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1943, The British Commonwealth, Eastern Europe, the Far East, Volume III

811.20260D/20

Memorandum by Mr. L. Randolph Higgs, of the Division of European Affairs, to Mr. James O. Dunn, Adviser on Political Relations

[Washington,] November 26, 1943.

Mr. Dunn: Reference is made to your memorandum of November 25th⁵² regarding propaganda to Finland.

I. For several months OWI⁵³ propaganda directives on Finland have been to the following effect:

(a) No threats and no promises.

(b) Emphasis on the increasing isolation of Finland resulting from Finland’s collaboration with Germany.

(c) Factual presentation of news illustrating the steady declination of Nazi military power, and the widespread nature of Nazi terrorism in Axis-held Europe.

It has not been felt that this Government could honestly promise the Finns that if they discontinue their collaboration with Germany they could obtain the sort of peace which they would consider reasonable and just. From a propaganda point of view it has been calculated that it would be a bad line to threaten the Finns that if they did not discontinue their collaboration immediately, they will be severely punished, for the reason that we are unable to say that if they do discontinue such collaboration they will receive what they would consider just and reasonable treatment. In the absence of such promises, the threats tend only to increase the Finns’ unity and determination to continue and even increase their military collaboration with Germany, This is clearly illustrated by recent reports from our Legation at Helsinki to the effect that the assumption there that the terms of unconditional surrender apply to Finland led to a decision by the Finnish Government to follow a more pro-German line, as they felt that unconditional surrender would mean their national extermination against which all Finns would fight as long as physically possible. Hence the calculation that a “tougher” propaganda line to Finland would defeat its own purpose.

Under the circumstances it is felt that the main emphasis of our propaganda to Finland would be most effective if confined to points to (b) and (c) above. Such a line envisages the Finns drawing their own conclusions as to the effect on the Finnish position of their continued collaboration with Germany in the face of steadily declining German military power.

II. This Government is not committed to the imposition of unconditional surrender on Finland, and it is not clear that there is any legal obligation under the Four Power Declaration for either Britain or the USSR to impose such terms on Finland. (It seems to be a fact that Finland is not a signatory to the Tripartite pact and hence it is not an “Axis Power”, though it may be an Axis “satellite”).

Despite the position of this Government with respect to the foregoing, the British Political Warfare Executive, Weekly Directive for BBC Finnish Services, November 6–12, 1943, states that our line to Finland must be as follows:

[“]We stress that there can be no getting around unconditional surrender. There is absolute agreement between Britain, America and Russia on this. Any Finn who still thinks his country can hope to profit from differences between the Three Powers on this issue, is living in a fool’s paradise. The fact that the USA is not at war with Finland makes no difference to the application of the formula of unconditional surrender.”

The question may be raised as to the propriety of British propaganda speaking for the American Government in this regard, especially in view of the Secretary’s Press Conference statement on November 15th to the effect that there was nothing new in our relations with Finland as a result of the Moscow Conference. If you agree, you might wish to inform Mr. Wright to that effect.

III. In summary, we do not recommend any change in the present American propaganda line to Finland in view of, (a) Official policy of this Government toward Finland; (b) We do not believe that a “tougher” line would be good propaganda under the circumstances.⁵⁴

52. Not printed; it advised that Mr. Michael Wright, First Secretary of the British Embassy, had inquired in behalf of the British Foreign Office “whether it might be appropriate for British and American broadcasting to Finland to be ‘toughened’.” (811.20260D/20)
53. Office of War Information.
54. A reply along the lines recommended in this memorandum was telephoned to Mr. Wright on December 10 by H. Freeman Matthews, Chief of the Division of European Affairs, who had noted at the end of this memorandum: “I agree.” (811.20260D/21)