740.00119 European War 1939/1938: Telegram
The Chargé in Finland (McClintock) to the Secretary of State
[Received 2:20 p.m.]
1224. I called on the Foreign Minister this morning at his suggestion.
Dr. Ramsay was unfeignedly disturbed and downcast over the communiqués from the Moscow Conference.36 He said the general [Page 303] reaction in Finland was one of pessimism. He assented to my view that much of a constructive nature had been accomplished with a view to the future peaceful organization of Europe and the world but said that “although an angel of heaven might feel very pleased about the long range prospects we here in Finland cannot but be anxious.”
Specifically the Foreign Minister was worried about two points: 1, was Finland an “Axis power” within the definition of the Moscow communiqués? 2, Would the terms of unconditional surrender also be applied to Finland?
I said it was not in my province to define the Moscow communiqués and that the language to me seemed quite clear. Furthermore, definitions might be dangerous. Ramsay himself seemed to feel that the answers to both his questions were affirmative. He referred with deep gloom to the fate of Finland in the event of unconditional surrender to Russia, and felt that the fact that this surrender might also be collective so far as the British Empire was concerned would not avail in preventing the Soviet Government from doing more or less what it wished in this country. He said wistfully that to read the Four Power Accord in Moscow in terms of strict logic it might almost have been better if Finland were also at war with the United States and China since thus there would be these two additional powers at the peace table when Finland’s fate was decided.
In discussing the fate of Bulgaria the Minister said he supposed since the USSR was not at war with that country terms of unconditional surrender would be applied by the United States and Great Britain.
Conversely in the case of Finland unconditional surrender would be demanded by Russia and Britain.
Dr. Ramsay wondered if Finland were also a “satellite state” within the meaning of the Moscow Conference. I said in my own view it certainly was, as it would be difficult to imagine a country which had invited military occupation by a number of German divisions and which publicly proclaimed its economic, if not its political dependence on Germany, not being in fact as well as in name a satellite state. I pointed to a map on his wall and observed also that the Finnish Army was now further east than the Wehrmacht.
My outstanding impression of the Foreign Minister was that of a man staring at defeat.
- On conclusion of the Moscow Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States, held October 18–November 1, 1943, the Governments of these three States, together with the Government of China, released, on November 1, a “Declaration of Four Nations on General Security” which pledged the Allies “to continue hostilities against those Axis powers with which they respectively are at war until such powers have laid down their arms on the basis of unconditional surrender …” For text of this and other communiqués issued by the Conference, see vol. i, pp. 703 ff., and Department of State Bulletin, November 6, 1943, pp. 308–311.↩