Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1943, The British Commonwealth, Eastern Europe, the Far East, Volume III

740.00119 European War 1939/1745: Telegram

The Chargé in Finland (McClintock) to the Secretary of State

Helsinki, September 18, 1943—3 p.m.
[Received 10:53 p.m.]

1116. The Foreign Minister asked me to call on him this morning.

1. He thanked me for copy of Secretary Hull’s speech²⁸ which I had given him (paragraph 2 my 1108, September 16²⁹) and asked if he could have a copy for President Ryti whom he was to see at noon. Dr. Ramsay stressed his intense admiration for the speech, its clarity, and fact his Government was in complete accord with principles set forth therein. He said there was nothing in speech Finland did not subscribe to. I asked if Finland also subscribed to preamble in which Mr. Hull stressed that paramount aim of our foreign policy was to defeat our enemies, including Hitler, as quickly as possible.

2. Dr. Ramsay said he had been particularly interested to see Mr. Hull’s reference to the “area of common interest” of United Nations in creating “an effective system of international cooperation for maintenance of peace” and said this brought up a point which had worried his Government: to what extent Soviet Government considered itself bound by principles of Atlantic Charter. He produced from his dossier a report citing issue number 20 of the Bulletin of International News³⁰ of October 4, 1941, quoting Ambassador Maiski³¹ as saying at a meeting of the “Inter Allied Council” at London on September 24, 1941, that Russia accepted principles of Atlantic Charter but with certain modifications and reservations. I replied I did not know source of this report or whether Bulletin of International News was written in Berlin or a United Nations capital; but that important point to note was that subsequently, on January 1, 1942, and without reservation, Soviet Government had signed Declaration of United Nations, which was our instrument of alliance with Russia, and had thus expressly affirmed its support of the principles of the Atlantic Charter. I have sent the Foreign Minister a copy of the Declaration of the United Nations.

3. With reference to the Atlantic Charter of which Dr. Ramsay had a copy I underlined first clause of article 6 and observed that in the extensive discussion of the Charter which I had seen in Finland no one seemed to have noted these very important eight words.³² Dr. Ramsay who is a great underliner himself, in turn heavily underscored this clause.

3a. In the most frank and lengthy discussion I have yet had with the Foreign Minister he went over every aspect of the problem of how Finland could get peace with Russia. As suggested in my 975³³ the Finnish Government has reached the decision it must come to peace but professes to have only a very rudimentary idea of how to achieve it.

4. Recalling Department’s 126, August 11, I emphasized that in following his exposition I should not wish him to get the idea that my Government was interested in assisting Finland to work out peace with Russia and Dr. Ramsay said he clearly understood this and that we were “talking off the record”.

5. The Foreign Minister said frankly he did not have the slightest idea what terms Russia might be willing to offer Finland or indeed if Russia contemplated offering any terms at all. He thought the Russian position was that Finland should come directly to Moscow with proposals but that this was dangerous as the Finns would incur German wrath without at the same time having any assurance that their proposals would lead to serious peace discussions. He said between such terms as those of the Treaty of Moscow of March 12, 1940, and terms involving territorial adjustments on the Karelian Isthmus in favor of Russia there was a wide latitude along which at some point it might be possible to find ground for agreement. As before he said the retention of Viborg and Hangö were vital for Finland but (see my 1071 September 6) he gave me the impression that relinquishment of a Russian claim to Hangö would make it difficult for the Finnish Government to refuse peace. However, faced with absolute silence in the Kremlin the Finnish Government, while wanting to talk peace, stood hesitating.

6. I said I had the impression that the Russians might be in a position to say that so long as German troops occupied one-third of Finland, and while Finnish troops stood deep in Russian territory, there was no reason to discuss peace. I asked, “Are you prepared to get the Germans out of Finland as a prerequisite to peace?”

7. Dr. Ramsay replied “We are”.

8. However, later in the discussion he qualified this remark by saying that Finland could not well accept the risk of such reprisal as the Germans had wreaked on Italy if it did not have a fairly authentic idea of what peace terms the Russians would be willing to discuss. In other words in return for forcing the Germans out of Finland the Finnish Government would expect a reasonable chance of being able to sit down successfully at the conference table with the U.S.S.R. It would also presumably expect, if it removed the obstacle to the maintenance of friendly relations with U.S.—Finnish collaboration with Germany—to rely on at least a modicum of American good will with a view to obtaining a peace embodying the principles set forth by Secretary Hull in his speech of September 12. Dr. Ramsay did not formulate these ideas quite so specifically in the course of a rambling discussion of pros and cons but his thinking will certainly come to this if he and particularly Ryti ever set it down on paper.

9. Dr. Ramsay said it was absolutely basic that if Finland actually came to armed conflict with German forces in Finland no Soviet forces should come to “assist” in repulsing the common enemy.

10. In summary.

(a) As was to be expected the Finnish Government hails Secretary Hull’s enunciation of principles as a mandate of possible salvation. It doubts if Russian agreement with these principles is either complete or sincere.

(b) The Finnish Government very much wants peace but fears the Soviet Government is not interested (see Stockholm’s 2709, August 27).

(c) The Finnish Government may be willing to run the risk of getting the Germans out but only if it has assurances from somewhere, either Moscow or Washington or both, that this risk will be compensated for by prompt peace with Russia on acceptable terms.

(d) Finnish peace terms, as I have previously pointed out, absolutely exclude the cession of Hango and only to a slightly less extent the loss of Viborg. Beyond these two basic points there is room for agreement. Finnish seizures of Soviet territory would ipso facto be relinquished.

(e) It would not be surprising if the Finnish Government made one last approach in Washington seeking to meet us on the basis of Mr. Welles’ definition of the only way American friendship can be regained. Such approach might be along these lines: “We will stop our collaboration with the Germans if you will help us find peace with Russia.”

11. With the Department’s 132, August 19,³⁴ in mind I took particular pains throughout the interview to stress to the Foreign Minister my feeling that you were not interested in Finnish peace attempts at this time and that your last word had been said in our aide-mémoire of March 20.

12. I think the civil departments of the Finnish Government, and especially Ramsay, Linkomies and Ryti might actually be prepared to give the Germans their walking papers if the Soviet Government would offer Finland a tolerable peace. I had impression this morning, however, that Marshal Mannerheim is not being closely consulted; and as to army opinion I refer to paragraph 5 my 1078, September 9.³⁵

McClintock

28. On September 12, the Secretary of State gave a radio address entitled “Our Foreign Policy in the Framework of Our National Interests”; see Department of State Bulletin, September 18, 1943, p. 173.
29. Not printed.
30. The Bulletin of International News was published by the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London between 1924 and 1945; thereafter it was replaced by The World Today.
31. Ivan Mikhailovich Maisky, Soviet Ambassador in the United Kingdom.
32. The first clause of article 6 referred to reads: “after the final destructions of the Nazi tyranny”; see Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. i, p. 367.
33. Dated August 5, p. 288.
34. Not printed; it instructed the Legation in Finland to “take no action and say nothing which any Finn could interpret as encouragement to a Finnish peace at this time.” (740.00119 European War 1939/1582)
35. Not printed; this paragraph stated in part that, “The professional officers corps [of the Finnish Army] is incensed at the thought of giving up ground in Soviet Karelia”, and that the army’s top leadership, including Marshal Mannerheim, estimated the military position to be so strong as to make the cost too high to the Russians to force “another Moscow peace”. (740.00119 European War 1939/1674)