841D.01/220: Telegram
The Minister in Ireland (Gray) to the Secretary of State
[Received 6:52 p.m.]
150. Supplementing my number 141, dated November 9, noon. I gather the impression from confidential sources that there has been no real misunderstanding of our attitude toward partition in London nor apprehension of United States misconception as to Irish Sovereignty versus the Crown but there have been misgivings as to whether the result which we hope to obtain from the note in question will in fact be obtained. There is a fear that by acceptance of this very friendly note or by adroit avoidance of the issue de Valera will gain a standing with us which would defeat the British hope of impairing his prestige by their present policy of forbearance and supply and maneuver us into the position of backing up his claim for the coercion of Ulster.
They would be more inclined to accept this approach, considered as a first step to the desired end, if it were disclosed what second step were contemplated.
They object to the draft which I prepared for two opposed reasons. Though admitting that it was framed on the theory of certain non-acceptance, they fear that taking de Valera publicly to task might have the unexpected effect of exciting sympathy for him in America and exciting a keener resentment against him in England which they [Page 163] deem undesirable at present for internal political reasons. They do not want their hands forced on Irish policy.
They also fear that the generous invitation to him to share in our victory might tempt him to accept.
I think that there is no doubt, however, that we both want to find! the best way to defend ourselves against attack by de Valera on Anglo-American understanding in the post-war period. The major differences between us appear to be as follows: (1) Since the British have got along thus far without help from Eire they do not wish to accept it now with its post-war implications. We, on the other hand, still feel it possible that we might find the ports useful for invasion assembly bases and air fields desirable for air cover. If acceptance unexpectedly did ensue and cooperative assistance were given even at this late date, it would seem to work for a long range conciliation between Eire and Britain which all Liberals should welcome. But as this is properly a British rather than an American concern we are not in a position to urge our view. (2) Britain feels that their generosity toward Eire establishes her record and would prefer to wait till the war ends before taking action. On the other hand if we do not get de Valera on the record as jeopardizing our war effort though entirely dependent on the United Nations for security and supply while the war lasts we should not be in a strong position. Might it not be possible, in conference, to work out our respective policies without prejudice to either side?
The foregoing for the Secretary is confidential.