841D.01/213: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

7184. Personal for the Ambassador. Your 7524, October 30.34 I note your statement that Eden’s absence has been a handicap in obtaining a statement of the British Government’s views, as Cranborne has seemed reluctant to take it up directly with the Prime Minister. I hope that Eden’s return to London will now facilitate an early reply. I also note your report that Cranborne, while not unfriendly to the proposal, said that “any British policy would have to make certain of the security of the British Isles and insure protection for those who had stood with the British in North Ireland”. This statement would appear to reveal a certain amount of suspicion on the part of the British that our ultimate purpose in making this proposal may be to use it as a first step toward ending partition. You may assure Eden and the Prime Minister, if you think it desirable, that we are not trying to bring about an end of partition. That is a British-Irish problem which we have not the slightest desire to be dragged into. However, the British are well aware of the attitude and influence of the Irish-American sections of our population and of the absolute certainty that Irish-American groups will inject this issue into American politics and particularly into the question of American-British relations at the end of the war.

We have also sensed in your telegrams some opposition on the part of the British to our taking this matter up at all with the Irish [Page 162] directly, and we were considerably surprised at Eden’s comment that our proposed approach to the Irish Government directly on this “ran contrary to the theory that Ireland was an integral part of the British Empire”. It is, of course, hardly necessary for us to comment on this except to emphasize that we have not the slightest desire to alter any existing constitutional relationship between Great Britain and Ireland or any relationship which those two Governments may find mutually satisfactory. We feel confident, however, that our proposed approach to the Irish Government would serve an extremely useful purpose not only with regard to our domestic situation and our relations with Ireland but particularly with reference to certain vicious influences which may otherwise be brought to bear on Anglo-American relations after the war. In brief we believe that this approach would serve British interests quite as much as our own, and without any British responsibility in the matter. We do not ask British approval in the sense that they would bear responsibility. We merely wish to know whether they are opposed to this independent approach wholly on our own responsibility.

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