Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1943, General, Volume I

840.50/23962/4

Memorandum of Discussion in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of State (Acheson), July 21, 1943

July 21, 1943

The Chinese Ambassador, Mr. Andrei Gromyko, Chargé d’Affaires of the Soviet Embassy, and Mr. Noel Hall, Minister of the British Embassy, met with Mr. Acheson to discuss the program of negotiations with respect to the draft agreement for a United Nations relief and rehabilitation administration. Mr. Liu Chieh, Minister and Counselor of the Chinese Embassy, and Mr. Roy Veatch of the Department of State were also present.

1. Progress of negotiations regarding the draft agreement for UNRRA

Mr. Acheson explained that he had expected to have available for each of the Embassies copies of all of the important responses this Government had received from the other governments that are considering the draft agreement, and also of this Government’s reply to the note from the Netherlands Government. He said that all of the responses received have been favorable except in the case of the Netherlands note,⁷⁸ which had been critical. Acceptances of the draft agreement, at least in principle, have been received from the Governments of Greece, Yugoslavia, Canada, Brazil, Mexico, Bolivia and Guatemala.⁷⁹

Mr. Acheson said that representatives of a number of other governments had discussed phases of the draft agreement with the Department of State. Some of these discussions raised much the same problems as those raised in writing by the Netherlands Government, especially with respect to the composition and powers of the Central Committee.

Mr. Acheson then outlined the main points raised in the Netherlands note and in the draft reply of this Government. He said that this Government’s reply to the Netherlands probably would be sent within the next day or two and that he would then send to each of the three Embassies copies of this reply and of the formal responses of any importance which this Government has received from the governments considering the draft agreement.

2. Questions regarding the functions and composition of the Central Committee

Mr. Acheson referred to the special concern of governments critical of the draft agreement with respect to the role and composition of the Central Committee. It seemed apparent that concern over this matter was the principal reason for opposition to the proposal on the part of several governments and for the delay in acceptance of the agreement on their part. Since it has been the plan from the first to call the projected conference only after general agreement has been reached on a draft, it seemed apparent that the controversy over the Central Committee must be solved before we can go ahead.

Mr. Acheson said that he wished to counsel with the representatives of the other three big Powers regarding this problem. He supposed that the following represented the three principal alternative ways of handling the matter:

a. Continue the present effort to convince the critical governments that the draft as it now stands is workable and worthy of their support.

b. The four Powers to offer to the others some modification of the powers of the Central Committee.

c. The four Powers to agree to some expansion of the membership of the Central Committee.

In connection with the second alternative, Mr. Acheson listed for the information of the others the following principal suggestions regarding modification of the powers of the Central Committee which had been proposed by one or more of the governments which had been in discussion of the subject:

(1) Reduce, at least to one-third, the proportion of the Council’s membership required to support a request for a special session of the Council.

(2) Member governments participating in the meetings of the Central Committee in which they have a special interest to be given the right to vote at such meetings.

(3) Omit from Article II the power of the Central Committee to admit new members between sessions of the Council.

(4) Transfer from the Central Committee to the Council or a special committee of the Council the power to nominate members of the committees as set forth in Article III, paragraphs 4, 5 and 6.

(5) Modification of the vote required to amend the agreement so that members of the Central Committee would have no special voting right with respect to such amendments.

(6) Modification of the statement of the powers of the Central Committee as set forth in Article III, paragraph 3, definitely limiting such powers to emergency policy decisions, between sessions of the Council, on matters not covered by policies already determined by the Council.

In response to Mr. Acheson’s invitation for suggestions regarding ways of handling negotiations on the Central Committee problem, Mr. Hall suggested that each Embassy might place before its government the suggested changes in the powers of the Central Committee so that the four Powers might be prepared to support some amendment of the draft agreement with respect to the role of the Central Committee if it should later prove to be impossible to secure adequate support for the agreement as it now stands.

Ambassador Wei expressed the opinion that it would be desirable to delay any other action until replies are in from all of the governments. He expressed the hope that the reply to the Netherlands note would have its effect and would lead therefore to agreement without changes in the powers of the Central Committee.

There was general agreement that the Department of State should continue its efforts to secure acceptance of the agreement without modification of the provisions relating to the Central Committee. It was agreed further however that it would be desirable in the meantime for all of the four Governments to give consideration to the various suggestions for modification of the powers of the Central Committee. In order to facilitate such consideration Mr. Acheson stated that he would provide each of the Embassies with a list of the proposals which had been made for modification of the powers of the Central Committee so that these could be placed before the home governments and their comments with respect to the suggestions then be reported to the Department of State as soon as practicable.

Mr. Gromyko asked Mr. Acheson’s opinion as to the reason for delay on the part of so many governments in accepting the agreement and in reply Mr. Acheson said that he thought that a great many governments either feared four-Power domination of the proposed organization, or were at least not clear as to the meaning and implications of many of the provisions of the agreement. He expressed the opinion that it was inevitable that some time would be required for each government to study and discuss the various provisions so that each might have a clear conception of the way the organization would work.

Mr. Gromyko then suggested that it might be useful to send a copy of the American Government’s reply to the Netherlands note to each of the other governments now considering the draft agreement; the argument set forth in that reply might expedite acceptance of the draft by the other Powers, especially those that were concerned about the role of the Central Committee.

There was general agreement that some such action on the part of this Government would be useful and Mr. Acheson said that he would bring the suggestion to the attention of the Department of State. He thought that it might be possible to circulate to all governments considering the draft a statement which would follow the lines of the reply to the Netherlands note if it should seem undesirable to use the exact text of that note.

3. Other changes which may be required in the draft agreement

Mr. Acheson said that the various discussions concerning the draft agreement, with members of the Congress of the United States as well as with other governments, had indicated a number of points in the agreement where some clarification of language would seem to be desirable.

He referred particularly to the language of the financial pledges contained in Articles V and VI, saying that he believed that all of the representatives of other governments that had been in to discuss the draft had raised questions regarding these Articles. He said that the wording of both Articles had also been questioned by members of Congress.

Mr. Gromyko inquired as to the reason for this worry about proposed commitments under Articles V and VI. In response, to illustrate the kind of misunderstanding raised by the present wording of Articles V and VI, Mr. Acheson mentioned the fear of one of the European governments that all of its national resources would be pledged to the organization and that it might be forced to turn over supplies and funds to UNRRA even before it had done anything for its own people. He mentioned also the fear of some of the United States Senators that the natural resources of the United States would be pledged by the wording of Article V, before necessary action had been taken by Congress.

Mr. Acheson went on to say that in both Articles the clause “subject to the requirements of its (the member government’s) constitutional procedure” had been used for the purpose of indicating that the pledge taken at the time of signature of the agreement was subject to subsequent action by the appropriate constitutional bodies within each government and that the pledge would not become specific until such action was taken. He said that apparently this clause was not sufficiently specific however to avoid misunderstanding of the nature of Articles V and VI and that the language would need clarification if the purposes of Articles V and VI were to be understood by many of the governments now considering the draft.

Mr. Acheson said that the Department of State was working on some substitute language for the sentences in Articles V and VI which were under question and that this language would be submitted to each of the other three Powers for consideration as soon as possible.

Mr. Acheson also said that there were a few other spots in the draft where modification of a few words would clarify the intent of the provisions in question without in any way changing the meaning. He thought that probably the other governments would wish to make such changes, if it proves to be necessary to revise the text at all, and he said that he would place proposals for such revisions before the other three governments as soon as the alternative wording of Articles V and VI had been worked out.

Mr. Acheson then referred to one further problem raised in the discussion of the draft agreement which might require something more than clarification of language. He said that several people had pointed out the lack of a provision covering withdrawal of a member government from the Administration and its obligations. He felt that this again probably was a change which would be desired by all governments and he said that he would try to submit to the other three Governments, along with the other possible revisions of the agreement, a proposal for rewording Article IX so as to cover this point.

78. Dated June 28, p. 915.
79. Acceptances of the Governments of Yugoslavia, Mexico, and Bolivia are not printed since they raised no points for discussion. For the same reason acceptances in principle received during July and August from the Governments of the following countries have not been printed: Costa Rica, Cuba, Egypt, El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Iran, Liberia, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Panama, and the Philippines.