Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1943, General, Volume I

840.50/2154: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

London, July 5, 1943—8 p.m.
[Received 11:30 p.m.]

4391. From Biddle, Polish Series, for Department and Governor Lehman.

1. I have sought informally and upon a purely personal basis during the past 10 days to obtain a reasonably representative cross-section of the first impressions made by the UNRRA draft upon the Allied Governments and authorities here.

The opinions cited below, I feel certain will tend to become more realistic given a little time for reflection and an opportunity to examine and discuss the draft text in a more objective light than during the first preliminary study of the document.

2. The primary reaction of all the Governments established here, with the exception of the Czechs and the Greeks (insofar as the latter can be considered to be represented by the Greek Minister of Finance) varied from being definitely cool on the part of the Dutch, Norwegians and even the Belgians, to a lukewarm reception by the Yugoslavs and Poles; the voiced opinions of the officials of the latter two States were naturally tempered by anticipation of extensive and urgent needs.

3. The basic difficulty relates to the limitation of membership on the Central Committee and the following outline briefly summarizes their respective first reactions:

a. The Dutch tend to resent China’s membership on the Central Committee, alleging that China is only potentially, and from a long-term aspect, a great power in the sense of not being in an economic position to contribute, in the near future, to either relief or rehabilitation. Their thesis, in fact, goes so far as to suggest that the Chinese will not be a noteworthy factor in world reconstruction for at least another decade.

On the other hand, the Dutch view of their own position is that the Netherlands Empire, very shortly after its reconstitution, will be in a position to assist substantially in any economic rehabilitation program and even may be able to do so during the latter stage of relief.

b. The Belgians cite the Congo’s war contribution as their claim for membership. I have the feeling, however, that their complaints are more for the record than a substantial conviction. If they are assured of a place on the Supply Committee they should be satisfied.

c. The Norwegians naturally stress their shipping [omission?] contribution and consider that inadequate recognition has been given to the proportional war sacrifices made by them. These sacrifices, they intimate, entitled them to a place on the Central Committee, if only by proxy through the membership of another Western European state. Here I feel the resentment if [is?] psychologically the “small power complex’ and will gradually subside given a considerate hearing of their point of view.

[d]. Most of the Poles tend to view askance the presence of Russia on the Central Committee. China’s membership they consider as not affecting their interests and one gains a distinct impression of a preference for solely Anglo-American membership on the executive if it must be limited to the great powers.

e. The Czechs I think are prepared to accept the draft text as it is. They view realistically the proposed composition of the Central Committee.

f. The Yugoslav attention during the past fortnight has been too deeply concerned with their domestic difficulties for much serious consideration to have been given as yet to UNRRA. Also an appreciation of the fact that they will be one of the principal beneficiaries on the receiving end has apparently tempered any criticisms they might be inclined to make. However, if they thought any other Allied country was inclined to try to force an increase in the Central Committee membership, they would at the present stage, I believe, give such a move full support.

4. All these countries would like to see the French take a lead in protesting against the absence of any continental power on the Central Committee with a demand for an increase in its membership, to the extent of one or possibly two additions to its membership. According to my French informants, representatives of all the Allies here, except the Greek Finance Minister, have suggested, to such of de Gaulle’s people as are still about, that Algiers be urged to take a lead in protesting against the limited composition of the Central Committee.

5. I realize that Algiers is reporting the reaction of the Committee of Liberation and therefore present some of the following local French views as merely providing supplementary background color.

Alphand, who leaves shortly for Africa to discuss the UNRRA draft with the Committee of Liberation and who seems to expect to represent the Committee at the Relief Conference in Washington, told a member of my staff that:

“While every Frenchman resents, in view of the future role France must play in Europe, the failure to place her immediately on the Central Committee, he would not advise that Algiers make more than a formal protest at the moment.”

He went on to say that he would strongly recommend however, that France should sign for only a limited period, maybe only for 6 months, and at best, only until a duly constituted authority had been reestablished in metropolitan France. When this happens the subject of French membership would be again raised with the expectation that France would then be included on the Central Committee, not only because of her paramount position on the continent west of the Vistula after German defeat but also as the representative of the interests of western Europe.

6. There are, as far as I have been able to ascertain, no serious objections to remaining features of the draft text.

Some of the concrete suggestions that have been advanced so far and which must be viewed as first thoughts rather than considered opinions, are as follows:

I. Norwegians, in addition to wanting two European representatives on Central Committee (other than Russia), urge that each regional council should have a representative on the Supply Committee. This latter suggestion might be worthy of consideration.

II. The Poles have brought up the idea of a separate committee of recipient states. Leith-Ross has pointed out to them that the regional councils are, in fact, such committees.

III. The French here assert that two members of the Council should be able to demand its convocation.

IV. Apprehension has been expressed by all the Allies that the European Council may not have sufficient authority. The thesis is advanced that this committee should have wide responsibilities with respect to European relief. Difficulty here, I feel, lies in the uncertainty of many Allied officials about how far Inter-Allied Committee will be transformed into the European Council.

7. Finally, there is an undercurrent of fear being expressed here by some of the western Allied officials that in the distribution of relief the administration of the respective Allied countries will be given inadequate participation. As one representative expressed it: “I have a feeling that there are some groups in Washington who hope to ride to fame and high career on the vehicle of relief and will therefore tend to minimize the role that the national administrations, particularly in the western European countries, can and should play very shortly after the liberation of their countries and the reconstitution of their governments”.

8. At end of yesterday’s formal plenary session of the Inter-Allied Committee, Hoehler gave a short talk about the North African relief work.⁷⁰ He made a special point of emphasizing how OFRRO had worked through the local French administrations and that this procedure had been effective; that the number of Americans connected with the relief tasks had been kept to the minimum and were utilized primarily to assist on the supply side, and finally that it was hoped to follow a similar pattern in connection with other Allied Governments where the local administrative machinery permitted.

Hoehler’s talk made an excellent impression and will be most helpful in clearing the local atmosphere. I do not think that the preliminary reactions to UNRRA cited in this message should be taken too seriously. The Governments here realize on which side their bread is buttered but I have thought it useful for the Department to have a hint of these “first thoughts” for they represent convictions widely held despite their invalidity. [Biddle.]

Winant

70. Fred K. Hoehler had been sent to Algiers in January 1943 to survey North African needs for the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations; on June 18 he was instructed to proceed to the Department, stopping in London en route.