740.0011 Moscow/341
Protocol, Signed at Moscow, November 1, 1943
Most Secret Protocol
of the Conference between the Secretary of State of the
United States of America, Mr. Cordell Hull, the Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom, Mr. A. Eden, and the People’s
Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
Mr. V. M. Molotov, which took place in Moscow from the 19th through the
30th of October, 1943.
[Page 771]
The following took part in the discussions:
|
For the United States:
|
Mr. Harriman,
Major General Deane,
Brigadier
General Vandenburg [Vandenberg],
Captain Ware. |
|
For the United Kingdom:
|
Sir A. Clark-Kerr
Lieutenant General Ismay, |
|
For the U.S.S.R.:
|
Marshal K. E. Voroshilov,
A. Ya Vyshinski,
Major
General Gryzlov. |
“The Consideration of Measures to
Shorten the Duration of the War Against Hitlerite Germany and Her
Allies in Europe”
(Proposed by the Soviet Delegation on the 19th October,
1943)22
On the question put on the agenda of the Conference of representatives of
the Governments of the United States of America, United Kingdom and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the People’s Commissar of Foreign
Affairs, V. M. Molotov on the 19th October, 1943, made the following
proposals which were handed in writing to Mr. Anthony Eden and Mr.
Cordell Hull:
“For the purpose of shortening the duration of the war it is
proposed:
(1) To put into effect such urgent measures on the part of the
Governments of Great Britain and United States of America in
1943, which will ensure the invasion of Anglo-American armies
into Northern France and which, together with the powerful blows
of the Soviet forces against the main forces of the German army
on the Soviet-German front, must radically undermine the
military strategic situation of Germany and lead to a definite
shortening of the duration of the war.
In this connection the Soviet Government considers it necessary
to determine whether the statement made by Mr. Churchill and Mr.
Roosevelt in the beginning of June, 1943,23 to the effect that
Anglo-American forces will carry out the invasion of Northern
France in the spring of 1944, remains in force.
(2) To propose to the Turkish Government on behalf of the three
Powers that Turkey immediately enters the war.
[Page 772]
(3) To propose to Sweden on behalf of the three Powers that she
should provide the Allies with air bases for the struggle
against Germany.”
(a) With regard to point (1) of the
proposals of the Soviet Delgation of 19th October 1943, the
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Great Britain, Mr. Eden, and the
Secretary of State of the United States of America, Mr. Hull, on
the 20th October 1943, endorsed the statement made by the
British Lt-General Ismay and the American Major-General Deane
(see appendices: statement of Lt.-General Ismay and statement of
Major-General Deane) as being an accurate presentation of the
most recent decisions of their Governments, taken at the Quebec
Conference in August 1943.
With regard to the question put
by the Soviet Delegation: whether the statement made by Mr.
Churchill and Mr. Roosevelt in the beginning of June, 1943, to
the effect that Anglo-American troops will carry out the
invasion of Northern France in the spring of 1944, remains in
force, Mr. Eden and Mr. Hull gave an affirmative reply declaring
that the decision to undertake the invasion of Northern France
in the spring of 1944 had been reaffirmed at the recent
conference in Quebec, subject to the conditions quoted by
General Ismay in his statement. Mr. Eden and Mr. Hull added that
this decision has not been
[Page 773]
changed and that preparations to carry out
the above mentioned operation are being pressed forward as
rapidly as possible. |
The People’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs, V. M. Molotov,
stated that the Soviet Government take note of Mr. Eden’s and
Mr. Hull’s statements, as well as of the statements of
Lt-General Ismay and Major-General Deane, and express the hope
that the plan of invasion by Anglo-American troops of Northern
France in the spring of 1944, contained in these statements,
will be carried out on time. |
| (b) With regard to points (2) and (3)
of the proposals of the Soviet Delegation (regarding Turkey and
Sweden) |
Mr. Hull, Mr. Eden, and V. M. Molotov recognise the
desirability of the Governments of the United States of America,
United Kingdom and Soviet Union continuing to study the question
of Turkey and Sweden. |
(c)24 The United
States delegates placed the following proposals before the
conference.
(1) That, in order to effect shuttle bombing of
industrial Germany, bases be made available in the U.S.S.R. on
which U.S. aircraft could be refueled, emergency repaired, and
rearmed.
(2) That more effective mutual interchange of
weather information be implemented. In order to effect this, it
is essential that means of communication between the U.S.A. and
the U.S.S.R. be strengthened.
(3) That air communication
between these two countries be improved. |
V. M. Molotov said that the U.S.S.R. agrees to the United
States proposals in principle and that the appropriate Soviet
authorities will be given instructions to meet with Generals
Deane and Vandenberg for the consideration of concrete measures
which would be necessary to carry out these proposals. |
Cordell Hull
V. Molotov
Anthony Eden
1 Nov
1943.
[Page 774]
[Appendix 1]
Statement Made by Lt. Gen. Ismay Before
Tripartite Conference on October 20th, 194325
I am instructed to address myself to the following proposal put
forward by the Soviet Delegation:—
“In order to shorten the duration of the war it is being
proposed: That the Governments of Great Britain and the
U.S.A. take in 1943 such urgent measures as will ensure the
invasion of Northern France by Anglo-American armies and,
coupled with powerful blows of Soviet troops on the main
German forces on the Soviet-German front, will radically
undermine the military-strategical situation of Germany and
bring about a decisive shortening of the duration of the
war.
In this connection the Soviet Government deems it necessary
to ascertain whether the statement made in early June, 1943,
by Mr. Churchill and Mr. Roosevelt to the effect that
Anglo-American forces will undertake the invasion of
Northern France in the spring of 1944 remains valid.”
The answer to both the points raised by the Soviet Delegation is
provided by the decisions taken at the recent Anglo-American
Conference at Quebec, which was presided over by the President of
the United States and the Prime Minister of Great Britain and
attended by the Chiefs of Staff of the two countries. Thus I shall
be speaking on behalf of the American Delegation as well as the
British Delegation; but my American colleague, General Deane, will,
I hope, interrupt if I say anything with which he does not agree,
and will in any case amplify and explain those matters which are
predominantly American interests.
Let me say at the outset in all truth that at every single
Anglo-American Conference since we have been in the war together,
the thought uppermost in all our minds has been so to arrange our
affairs as to ensure the maximum possible diversion of enemy land
and air forces from the Russian front. I do not for a moment suggest
that in so doing we have thought only of Soviet interests. On the
contrary, it has been unanimously and invariably recognized as the
soundest strategy in the interests of the Allies as a whole. Let me
also say that the urgency of the business has always been present in
our minds. Thus the following resolution was adopted at one of our
earliest Conferences and was absolutely confirmed less than two
months ago at Quebec:—
The overall objective is—
“In co-operation with Russia and other Allies to bring about
at the earliest possible date repeat at the earliest
possible date the unconditional surrender of the Axis in Europe”
[Page 775]
I should not, however, like it to be inferred that we can concentrate
the whole of our combined resources against the Axis in Europe. It is essential for us to maintain
and extend unremitting pressure against Japan for the purpose of
continually reducing her military power and attaining positions from
which her ultimate surrender can be forced. If the Conference so
desires, further information on this subject will be furnished by
General Deane.
I now turn to describe the decisions taken at Quebec as to the
operations to be undertaken in 1943–44 for the defeat of the Axis
powers in Europe. First, there is the bomber offensive. I mention
this first, as not only does it come first in chronological order,
but it is an essential prerequisite to the invasion of North West
Europe. It was decided that the progressive destruction and
dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic system,
the disruption of vital lines of communication and the reduction of
German air combat strength by the prosecution on an ever increasing
scale of the day and night bomber offensive against Germany and
German Occupied Europe from all convenient bases, should continue to
have the highest strategic priority.
As is well known, the American Air Force stationed in the United
Kingdom carry out precision bombing by day whenever the weather is
suitable, while the British Royal Air Force concentrate more
particularly on area bombing against German war industry by night.
The prodigious scale of the damage which has already been done is
not generally recognized. The American Delegation have therefore
brought with them an officer who can give as full details as the
Conference may desire of the effects of the day bombing, while the
British Delegation have similarly brought with them an officer who
can unfold the story of the British night bombing offensive. The
graph which I now pass round shows the steadily mounting weight of
bombs that have been cast on German war industry by the Royal Air
Force alone during the past few months. In August alone it amounted
to over 20,000 tons. The graph also shows by way of contrast, the
weight of bombs cast on England when the whole weight of the German
Air Force was concentrated on us.
It is also to be noted that this combined bomber offensive is to be
prosecuted from all convenient bases. It is hoped that shortly we
will be in possession of airfields in the vicinity of Rome, which
will enable us to attack important war industries in Southern
Germany, Austria, Czechoslovakia and Rumania with almost the same
intensity that we have been attacking Northern Germany during the
past year. These industries have hitherto been out of reach or at
extreme range.
I now turn to the cross-Channel operation which it has been decided
to undertake in 1944. It has been decided that the invasion of
Northern France by Anglo-American forces will be the primary
[Page 776]
U.S./British ground and
air effort against the Axis in Europe in 1944. This invasion is to
be launched as soon as practicable after weather conditions in the
English Channel become favourable.
The scale of the initial assault is to a large extent dictated by the
quantity of special assault shipping and special landing craft which
is available when the time comes. Both in the United States and in
the United Kingdom the greatest efforts are being made to increase
the production of these vital craft. The recent success of the
antisubmarine campaign has enabled us to take the risk of turning
over a larger part of our shipbuilding capacity to the construction
of this type of vessel. It is to be remembered that these special
craft are essential not only for the assault itself, but for
maintaining and reinforcing the invading armies across open beaches
until such time as deep water ports have been captured and put into
order. At a conservative estimate, it is calculated that we will
have to maintain and reinforce over the beaches for a period of two
or three months. It is for this reason, apart from any other, that
it is a physical impossibility to undertake the operation in the
period of winter storms. Comparatively settled weather is
essential.
I cannot yet give details of the scale of the initial assault as this
is still under urgent and detailed examination, but our plans and
preparations are based on being able to get about 18 divisions
ashore after 14 days, together with an appropriate strength of
supporting aircraft. After 90 days we hope to have 30 divisions
ashore, again with an appropriate strength of supporting air
formations. Thereafter three to five divisions per month will be
sent from the United States direct to the theatre of operations.
The German strength in France and the Low Countries is estimated at
40 divisions at the present time, including coastal, G.A.F.25a and training divisions. The beach and coast
defences of France and the low Countries have been built up over the
long period of German occupation. Our experience at Dieppe showed
without any doubt that, even to gain a footing in North West Europe,
is a most formidable operation. Moreover, the enemy disposes of
excellent lateral communications across Europe which enable him to
move reinforcements to the West by road and rail far quicker than we
could reinforce our initial lodgments by sea. The enemy rate of
reinforcement is thus limited by the availability of his forces and
not by his communications.
In view of the above, it was agreed at Quebec that certain conditions
must be present for the invasion to have a reasonable prospect of
success. We are fairly confident that these conditions will be
fulfilled.
First, there must be a substantial reduction, in the strength of the
German fighter force in North West Europe between now and the
[Page 777]
date of the assault. It is
expected that the ever increasing Anglo-American bomber offensive
will produce this result.
The second condition is that the German reserves in France and the
Low Countries as a whole must not be more on the day of the assault
than about 12 full strength, first quality, mobile divisions. This
is of course exclusive of coastal, training and German Air Force
divisions. Furthermore, it must not be possible for the Germans to
transfer from other fronts more than 15 first quality divisions
during the first two months of the operations.
It is hoped that these conditions may be rendered possible by the
following:—
- (I)
- The softening effect of the Anglo-American bomber
forces.
- (II)
- The maintenance of unremitting pressure by Anglo-American
land and air forces in Italy.
- (III)
- Allied landings in Southern France—threatened or actual,
synchronizing with the invasion of Northern France.
- (IV)
- Operations in the Balkans by guerilla forces which will be
sustained by sea and by air.
- (V)
- And lastly, but of course by far the most important of
all, co-ordinated pressure on the Eastern front by the
Soviet forces.
The third condition is that the problem of beach maintenance of large
forces in the tidal waters of the English Channel over a prolonged
period must be overcome. The success of our plans depends on our
ability to construct at least two artificial ports. The experiments
which have been pursued for some time hold out good promise.
I now turn to the decisions covering operations in Italy. These were
conceived in three phases.
- (I)
-
First phase:
- The elimination of Italy as a belligerent and establishment of
air bases in the Rome area, and, if feasible, further
north;
- (II)
-
Second phase:
- Seizure of Sardinia and Corsica;
- (III)
-
Third phase:
- The maintenance of unremitting pressure on German forces in
Northern Italy and the creation of the conditions required for
the cross-Channel assault and of a situation favorable for the
eventual entry of our forces, including the bulk of the
reequipped French Army and Air Force, into Southern
France.
It is to be particularly noted that operations in Italy are to be
carried out by the forces already in the Mediterranean theatre.
Seven U.S. and British battle-tried divisions are to be brought back
in the near future from the Mediterranean to the United Kingdom in
order to form the spearhead for the assault across the Channel.
These are
[Page 778]
divisions which
have had experience in amphibious warfare. It has been laid down
that, wherever there is a shortage of resources of any kind, the
governing principle will be that they will be distributed and
employed with the main object of ensuring the success of the
invasion of Northern France.
The operations described above will stretch our resources to the
limit. It has therefore been decided that Operations in the Balkan
area will be limited to the supply of the Patriot Armies by air and
sea transport, to minor Commando forces and to the bombing of
strategic objectives.
That concludes my survey of the decisions taken at Quebec. It remains
to say a few words about the urgent measures which are being taken
to give effect to these plans. In the first place, U.S. divisions
are being concentrated in the United Kingdom at the greatest rate
that shipping resources allow, and their training in amphibious
operations pressed forward vigorously. General Deane will elaborate
this point. Secondly, United States air forces in the United Kingdom
are being reinforced at the greatest possible rate. General Deane
will also speak on this point. Thirdly, it is scarcely an
exaggeration to say that the United Kingdom is being turned into one
vast airfield. Fourthly, a cross-Channel invasion on the scale
contemplated against long prepared defences, manned by German
troops, is an operation of a character which has never before been
attempted in the history of war. It requires most extensive and
elaborate administrative preparations at the ports of embarkation
and on the lines of communication leading to the ports. All these
measures are being pressed forward with the greatest vigour.
[Appendix 2]
Statements Made by Major General J. R. Deane,
U. S. A., Before Conference 20 October 194326
In the first proposal submitted by the Soviet delegates they
recommended that urgent measures be undertaken in 1943 which would
insure an invasion of Northern France. I should like to outline some
of the measures that are now under way.
In the first place we consider the combined bomber offensive from the
United Kingdom as being by far the most positive and important
preparation for a cross-channel operation. In this connection we
should welcome an opportunity to make a complete presentation to you
gentlemen, and to such others as you may wish, which would give a
comprehensive picture of what has been accomplished in the bomber
offensive and what is planned for the future. As a preview to this
[Page 779]
presentation I have
asked General Vandenberg to present pictures of our most recent
bombing operation against Marianburg. Target in this instance was
the Focke–Wulf aircraft factory. It was moved to Marianburg by the
Germans for security reasons. Its destruction was almost complete.
This particular picture was selected as an illustration because the
objective was the most distant from the United Kingdom that has been
attacked thus far and also it is the closest to the Soviet front,
(at this point General Vandenberg displayed several pictures of
bombing operations and explained their significance.)
As I have said, our most urgent preparation for a cross-channel
operation is the bomber offensive of the British-American air forces
from the United Kingdom and from the Mediterranean. The mission of
the offensive is the progressive destruction and dislocation of the
German military, industrial, and economic systems, and the
undermining of the morale of the German people to a point where
their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened. It is
estimated that the bomber offensive shall be far enough advanced by
1 May 1944 to permit the release of its entire strength to support a
cross-channel operation. The build-up of the force necessary for the
bomber operations will be, for the most part, accomplished by the
addition of United States formations. At the present time the United
States has in the neighborhood of 20 Groups of 4-engined heavy
bombers in the United Kingdom. It is planned that this force will be
expanded to approximately 48 Groups or approximately 2,300 aircraft
by 1 April 1944. Planned fighter aircraft expansion will be from
approximately 9 Groups at present in the United Kingdom to 31 Groups
by 1 April 1944. This should amount to approximately 2,300 fighter
aircraft by that date. The R. A. F. strength will be about the same
and the existing formations will be maintained and kept at full
operation strength.
The expansion indicated above is progressing on schedule, the
necessary ground installations are being constructed, the ground
crews and the operating personnel are being assembled. In order to
furnish fighter support for the cross-channel operation it is
necessary that approximately 100 additional airfields be constructed
in Southern England. This construction is underway and will be
completed prior to the time the operation is launched.
The cross-channel operation agreed upon calls for a build-up of 30
mobile infantry and armored divisions to be in the United Kingdom by
April 1944. This force will include appropriate corps, armies, and
service troops and will be utilized for securing the initial
bridgehead.
The build-up of the ground and air force in Britain will necessitate
transporting more than one million men from the United States to
Great Britain in the next seven or eight months. This will require
[Page 780]
the unloading of 400
personnel ships and over 1,000 cargo vessels in the United Kingdom
during that period. To do so will tax the port capacity of Britain
to the utmost and require that it be diverted exclusively to this
purpose.
Approximately 3,300 assault ships and craft will be necessary for the
operation. To obtain these the landing craft program has been
expanded 35% in the United States despite resulting dislocation in
the over-all production program.
It must be expected that German forces will accomplish almost
complete destruction of German port facilities in France prior to
their capture. It will therefore be necessary to support the
operation initially over the beaches, a condition which will
probably exist for the first 90 days of the occupation. In the early
stages it is estimated that 15,000 tons of supplies per day will be
necessary. This figure will increase as the operation expands.
I have presented but a few of the preparations that are now being
made. I have selected them because they are of major importance, but
as you know for an operation of the magnitude contemplated there are
a great many others. The military mission of the United States in
Moscow is authorized to keep the Soviet thoroughly informed as to
the progress of our preparations. It is hoped that this mission will
be utilized as a medium for closer collaboration between our
respective staffs.
With a view to measures which might be adopted for hastening the
conclusion of the war against Germany I have been authorized to make
certain proposals which I shall read and then distribute the
translation of them for your information. The proposals are as
follows:27
That, in order to effect shuttle bombing of industrial
Germany, bases be made available in the U.S.S.R. on which
U.S. aircraft could be refueled, emergency repaired, and
rearmed.
That more effective mutual interchange of weather information
be implemented. In order to effect this, that U.S.A. and
U.S.S.R. communications be strengthened.
That improved air transport be effected between the two
countries.
Later, in response to a question presented by Mr. Molotov as to the
validity of the decision for a cross-channel operation I made the
following statement:
The decision to undertake a cross-channel operation in the spring of
1944 was reaffirmed at the last conference in Quebec. Now it must be
understood that such decision, as is the case with any military
decision made far in advance, is subject to certain conditions
existing at the time the operation is to take place. The conditions
in this case
[Page 781]
have been
stated to you. We confidently feel that these conditions will exist
and are proceeding with full scale preparations to launch the
attack. One can only appreciate the firmness of the decision by
witnessing the intensive spirit with which preparations are now
being carried out. I have spoken previously of the landing craft
program which has recently been expanded in the United States. The
effects of such a readjustment are felt not only in England but
throughout the breadth of the United States including the California
coast. Such a change in production affects the shipyards along the
coast and the engine manufacturers in the middle west. It is
inconceivable that such dislocation of industry would be permitted
if the intention to launch the operation was questionable.
