740.0011 Moscow/212
Meeting of the Sub-Committee on Iran, October 30, 194334
| Present: | Mr. Kavtaradze | } | Soviet members. |
| Mr. Smirnov | |||
| Mr. Holman | } | British members. | |
| Mr. Iliff | |||
| Mr. Allen | } | American members | |
| Mr. Jernegan |
Mr. Kavtaradze opened the discussion by saying that the documents which had been submitted by the British and American members had required very careful study and analysis, sentence by sentence. Although apparently short, they contained many important points. The more the Soviet members had studied the documents, the more difficulties had developed with respect to them. As an example [Page 675] of these difficulties, Mr. Kavtaradze mentioned the first part of paragraph No. 2 of the British draft declaration No. l.34a By the provisions of this section, the three Governments would make certain undertakings which would require very careful study. We should need to have a clear understanding of what the undertakings were, and what specific means would be available to carry them out. (The first sentence of paragraph No. 2 says that the three governments “undertake to do all within their power to safeguard the people of Iran from the privations and difficulties” caused by the war.) As another example, Mr. Kavtaradze mentioned the final sentence of the same paragraph (which pledged the three Governments to support the foreign advisers working with the Iranian Government). He asked whether we could accept this formula without having full information as to what was being done by the advisers.
Mr. Kavtaradze said that he foresaw that points of this kind, contained in the draft declarations, might lead to future difficulties in the mutual operations of the three Governments in Iran. He thought that general declarations were undesirable; they should be more concrete and specific. Close study would be necessary to produce a declaration in clear form. He then remarked that it would be better to postpone study of this question until after the signature of the Irano-American agreement.34b In reply to Mr. Jernegan’s query regarding the reason for this latter suggestion, Mr. Smirnov suggested that after signature of the Irano-American agreement it might be possible to issue a joint declaration by all three nations with respect to the withdrawal of their troops, instead of a joint British-Soviet statement and a separate American declaration as was now proposed.
Mr. Allen said that he had reported to the Secretary of State the views of the Soviet members, expressed at the previous meeting, to the effect that public declarations at this time would not be desirable since they would be largely repetitions of assurances already given and might be misinterpreted. He said the Secretary of State had expressed appreciation of the logic of the Soviet position and had agreed that reassurances were not necessary “every time the moon changed”. The Secretary had added, however, that his idea had been that a declaration issued at the close of the Conference would be helpful in improving the situation in Iran. Mr. Allen went on to say that perhaps our information regarding Iranian conditions differed from the information of the Soviet Government. From its own reports, the American authorities felt that the situation was not by any means satisfactory.
[Page 676]Mr. Jernegan confirmed this statement, and expressed the belief that the Iranians had not yet recovered from the shock they had received at the time of the Anglo-Soviet entry into Iran. Their recovery was handicapped by the presence of foreign troops in Iran and the fact that a large part of their system of communications was being used for the benefit of the United Nations rather than for the benefit of Iran itself. The Iranians were unable to reorganize themselves and properly direct their efforts. Among the results of this state of affairs was an uncertainty, which Mr. Jernegan was convinced existed, with respect to the motives and intentions of the three powers which had troops in Iran.
Mr. Holman agreed that there was uncertainty in Iran regarding Allied policy. He felt that there was need for reassurance and for financial and economic help to the Iranians. He knew that the Iranians were wondering what was being done at the present Conference. Just before leaving Tehran the British members of the subcommittee had met the Iranian Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, both of whom said that they hoped and expected that something would be done for Iran at Moscow.
Mr. Holman went on to say that he assumed there was nothing in the draft declarations to which the Soviet Government objected in principle, that the question was merely one of clearer expression. The Soviet members made no reply.
Mr. Allen asked whether Mr. Kavtaradze agreed with his own expression that there was no material difference in the policies of the three Governments with regard to Iran. If there were any such difference, Mr. Allen felt that the committee should try to reconcile the opposing views, or at least find out what they were.
Mr. Smirnov repeated his doubts regarding the utility of general declarations of the type proposed, containing no definite information. He said that it was quite clear that the attitude of the three Governments towards Iran was fully expressed in the Tripartite Treaty of Alliance (Anglo-Soviet-Iranian). Further evidence was contained in the discussions which had preceded the Iranian declaration of war against Germany. That Iranian action had also shown clearly what Iran’s own attitude was.
Therefore, Mr. Smirnov could not share the point of view expressed by the British and American members that there was a feeling of suspicion in Iran towards the three Governments. During the two years that he had spent there, he had never had a hint of any such feeling. He was convinced that both the Iranian Government and the Iranian people had full faith in the Tripartite Treaty.
In Mr. Smirnov’s opinion, the shock which Mr. Jernegan had mentioned [Page 677] had not been to the present Iranian Government and people, but to the Germanophiles who had been in power at the time of the occupation. The greater part of the Iranian people had condemned the German sympathies which had then existed. He could not agree that the results of that shock still persisted. If that were the case, we would not have the cooperation of the Iranian Government which we were receiving, as exemplified by the Iranian declaration of war.
So far as the withdrawal of Allied troops was concerned, Mr. Smirnov said the Iranians had full faith in the existing agreement. They knew that the foreign troops were not interfering with the internal life of the country and that they were being maintained on Allied account and not in any way at the expense of Iran. Mr. Smirnov failed to see the uncertainty and confusion in the Iranian Government which had been mentioned.
With respect to communications, Mr. Smirnov said that everything was being done to meet the civil demands of the country. British, Soviet and American representatives met every month to discuss this matter. Transport bound south from the Caspian Sea carried Soviet cargo for Tehran. During June and July of this year the U.S.S.R. had delivered 25,000 tons of wheat to Tehran.
Like the rest of the world, Mr. Smirnov continued, Iran was interested in the present Conference, but it was fully satisfied that its interests were already protected by the Tripartite Treaty. The Iranians knew that the result of the Conference would lead to a quicker defeat of Germany, which in itself would satisfy them.
Mr. Holman asked whether, if the Iranians themselves would like to have the proposed declarations made, the Soviet Government would still have objections to their issuance.
Mr. Smirnov replied that this raised the question of whether it would be desirable to query the Iranian Government on such a point. It might serve as a precedent for other countries, such as Turkey, to which assurances of one kind or another had been given. The Conference would have to decide such a question.
Mr. Allen agreed that there was some merit in Mr. Smirnov’s observation, a precedent might in fact be set. Like the Soviet Government, the Government of the United States would prefer not to make declarations unless some positive help was to be derived from them. He felt that the crux of the difference among the members of the subcommittee was a difference of opinion regarding the need for a declaration regarding Iran at this time. The Soviet members indicated agreement.
Mr. Allen then referred to the earlier Soviet suggestion that after the signing of the proposed Irano-American agreement conditions [Page 678] would be more suitable for the issuance of a joint declaration. He said that this seemed to indicate some progress by the sub-committee.
Mr. Holman remarked that if this were agreed upon, the representatives of the three powers in Tehran could be working out details and preparing drafts, pending completion of negotiations on the Irano-American agreement.
Mr. Smirnov said that he could not commit himself on the subject of a later joint declaration because he did not know the details of the proposed Irano-American agreement. (The American members pointed out that a text of the latest draft had been given him at the first meeting, but he stated it had not yet been translated.) Mr. Smirnov understood that the agreement followed the lines of the Tripartite Treaty but differed from it in some respects, principally in that the Treaty involved an exchange of rights for undertakings, whereas the proposed agreement was primarily concerned with the legal status of the American troops in Iran. He knew what had been in the first draft but not what might be provided in the new draft.
Mr. Jernegan stated that the new draft was substantially the same as the first draft and that it contained almost word for word the provisions of the Tripartite Treaty with regard to respect for Iranian rights, non-intervention in Iranian affairs and the withdrawal of troops after the war.
Mr. Allen pointed out that the hour for the final meeting of the Conference was approaching, and asked whether the sub-committee could agree upon a report to the Conference to the effect that it had been unable to concur on the issuance of declarations at the present time but recommended further study by the representatives of the three Governments at Tehran regarding the possibility of the issuance of a declaration or declarations at the time of signature of the Irano-American agreement. He thought that such a recommendation by the sub-committee would be quite in keeping with the action of the main Conference in setting up procedures for continued consultation among the three powers through their representatives at various capitals. As the Soviet members failed to reply, he emphasized that he was asking merely that the possibility of a declaration or declarations at the time of signature of the Irano-American agreement be kept under consideration. He thought that Mr. Smirnov had himself suggested such a possibility.
Mr. Smirnov agreed in principle to Mr. Allen’s suggestion, and the British members also indicated agreement. The Soviet members, however, expressed some doubt regarding the practicability of carrying on a study of the questions involved simultaneously with the negotiation of the Irano-American agreement.
[Page 679]Mr. Iliff then prepared the following draft report, which was unanimously adopted by the sub-committee:
“The Committee reports to the Conference that
- “a) After an exchange of views they detect no fundamental difference in the policy towards Iran of any of the three Governments.
- “b) The Committee was unable to reach agreement on the expediency of making any immediate declaration or declarations with regard to Iran.
- “c) The issue of such a declaration or declarations might be further considered by the representatives of the three Governments in Tehran with a view to the three Governments coming to a decision about the expediency of issuing such a declaration or declarations after the signature of the proposed Irano-American Agreement, and after appropriate consultation with the Government of Iran.”
Mr. Kavtaradze asked the members to note that this report did not specify that the declarations must be made at the time of signature of the Irano-American agreement.
It was agreed that the American, British and Soviet members should each inform the chiefs of their respective delegations of this report, and that Mr. Kavtaradze, as chairman of the sub-committee, should also transmit the report to Mr. Molotov in his capacity as chairman of the main Conference.
- Enclosure No. 6 to unnumbered despatch from Mr. George V. Allen, Tehran, November 4, 1943.↩
- See Conference Document No. 27, p. 732.↩
- For documentation regarding this proposed agreement, see vol. iv, pp. 453 ff.↩