Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1943, General, Volume I

740.0011 Moscow/212

Meeting of the Sub-Committee on Iran, October 27, 1943⁹⁹

October 27, 1943

Present:	Mr. Kavtaradze	}	Soviet members.
	Mr. Smirnov
	Mr. Holman	}	British members.
	Mr. Iliff
	Mr. Allen	}	American members
	Mr. Jernegan

The sub-committee proceeded to the discussion of the draft declarations which had been proposed by the British Delegation and the amendment and parallel declaration suggested by the American delegation. The three draft declarations under consideration were as follows: No. 1, a tripartite United States, United Kingdom and U.S.S.R. statement of general policy toward Iran;¹ No. 2, a United Kingdom and U.S.S.R. renewal of Soviet and British pledges to withdraw their troops from Iran within six months after the end of hostilities;² and No. 3, (so designated by the Soviets) a parallel but independent American declaration regarding withdrawal of troops.³

The course of the discussion, which lasted more than three hours, may be summarized as follows:

The Soviet members questioned the competence of the sub-committee to deal with matters affecting Iran, in view of the provisions of Article 6 of the tripartite Anglo-Soviet-Iranian Treaty of Alliance,⁴ which they suggested required Iranian participation in any discussions concerning Iran. They pointed out that Mr. Molotov, at the plenary session of the conference on October 24, had stated that a few days before the Conference opened the Iranian Ambassador at Moscow⁵ had called to request assurances that Iran would be consulted with regard to any decisions concerning his country and had been assured that no decisions regarding Iran were expected to be taken at the present conference.

The American members pointed out that Mr. Eden, in his reply to Mr. Molotov, had made it clear that no new decisions affecting the status of Iran under the treaty were contemplated and that the conversations, if they proved successful, could only be beneficial to Iran. Mr. Allen said he had assumed that Mr. Molotov’s action in subsequently agreeing to the appointment of a sub-committee on Iran and in nominating Soviet members of the sub-committee had constituted Mr. Molotov’s acceptance of Mr. Eden’s point of view. If there could be no discussion of Iran, the establishment of the sub-committee would have been pointless.

With respect to the treaty provisions, Mr. Holman of the British Delegation pointed out that Article 6 only obligated Great Britain and the Soviet Union to refrain from action prejudicial to Iran or affecting her status under the treaty.

It was further suggested, by both the American and British members that, if the Soviets felt it necessary, the proposed declarations might, following agreement by the Conference as to wording, be submitted to the Iranian authorities for their views regarding the advisability of the declarations and their publication.

The Soviet members said that since the declarations in most respects merely repeated assurances and undertakings given in the Tripartite treaty and in an agreement which the United States had recently proposed to Iran, they saw no necessity or occasion for issuing new declarations at this time, the situation having remained unchanged since the tripartite treaty was signed.

Both the American and British members strongly expressed the view that declarations of the kind proposed would be welcomed by the Iranian Government and people and would have a beneficial effect upon the general situation there. It was further pointed out that the United States had not yet made any public declarations of the kind proposed and that it might be undesirable for the American Government to issue a statement following the conference unless the other two governments did likewise, since an American statement alone might give rise to speculation regarding the reason for British and Soviet silence.

Mr. Smirnov asserted that he did not believe there was any alarm or inquietude in Iran regarding the policy of the Allies. He was sure that the Iranian people were entirely satisfied that the provisions of the tripartite Treaty of Alliance were being and would be carried out. With respect to American forces, he said there had never been any doubt regarding their purpose or the intention of the United States to withdraw them after the war, and he was certain the Iranians realized this. In any case, the draft American-Iranian agreement⁶ contained all the assurances in this regard which it was proposed to embody in declaration No. 3. The Soviet members expressed the fear that a new declaration would have an effect opposite to that intended, since the Iranians would be disturbed by this indication that Allied intentions in Iran were susceptible of discussion. Mr. Smirnov doubted that the reaction of the “Iranian Government and people, i.e., the ruling class” would be that intended to be achieved by the proposed declaration.

Mr. Allen said that he felt the question should be looked at from a broad point of view. The present conference had been called to establish a basis for cooperation among the three great powers. Iran was the one place in the world where the three nations came into most direct and intimate contact and the only country which had on its soil substantial numbers of troops of our three armies. Some uneasiness on the part of the people of a country in such a situation was almost inevitable. If the three great powers could show the Iranian people and the world that they were able to arrive at a just and honorable agreement on policy at that point of contact, it would have very beneficial effect not only in Iran but elsewhere, particularly among small states, some of which have shown an inclination to question the motives of the large Powers. Mr. Allen could not imagine that the friendly, open and honest declarations which had been proposed would be received with anything but satisfaction in Iran. This point of view was fully supported by the British members. Mr. Jernegan especially emphasized the importance of American participation, for the first time, in a statement regarding Iran.

Mr. Smirnov agreed that a statement of principles was helpful on appropriate occasions, but he did not believe that such an occasion existed with regard to Iran at the present time.

When pressed to suggest any objections they might have to the wording of the proposed declarations, the Soviet members raised questions regarding the exact meaning of certain, parts of the draft declarations. In particular, they questioned the final sentence of paragraph 2 of the British draft declaration No. 1, as amended by the American Delegation. It was explained that the undertaking to support “the various foreign advisers, groups and agencies working with the Iranian Government” referred primarily to the Millspaugh mission and similar groups of Americans employed by the Iranian Government,⁷ but that it was not exclusive and would apply also to British and Soviet nationals or officials in similar positions and to such agencies as the three great powers might set up to assist in the rehabilitation of Iranian economy. The Soviet members questioned the propriety of undertaking to support an agency of the Iranian Government or an agency established in Iranian territory by foreign governments. They suggested that this might make it appear that we regarded the foreign advisers as the directors of Iranian policy, rather than as servants of the Iranian Government, and that we proposed to interfere in internal Iranian affairs in a manner contrary to the Iranian constitution. In general, they felt that this section of declaration No. 1 would be regarded as an infringement of Iranian sovereignty.

Mr. Jernegan said that the Iranian Government had already proclaimed its need for foreign assistance by requesting, on its own initiative, the services of the American advisers. The situation in Iran was not comparable to that in other countries, and the proposed declaration, therefore, should be judged in the light of the peculiar existing conditions. He explained that the foreign advisers were having an extremely difficult time and that it was widely felt in Tehran that they could not succeed unless they had the support of the three powers. He had heard criticism of all three governments for alleged failure to provide such support. A declaration of this kind, therefore, should have an excellent effect in strengthening the position of the advisers.

The Soviet members further questioned the wisdom of renewing the undertaking to do everything possible to spare the Iranian people the privations of war. This was substantially the same undertaking as that contained in the Tripartite Treaty. If it were re-stated, the Iranians would at once demand concrete measures to carry it out; they would be inspired to dump all their troubles on our heads immediately.

Since the discussions of the proposed drafts did not appear to be progressing, Mr. Allen asked whether Mr. Smirnov would care to prepare counter-drafts for consideration. The Soviet members made no direct reply.

The British members asked whether the Soviet members would be willing to accept the draft declarations in principle, leaving aside for the moment the question of their publication. Mr. Smirnov said that he could not express an opinion at the moment; there were some points which might not be in accord with Soviet policy and which would require further study. Mr. Jernegan said that he would like very much to have the observations of the Soviet members on any such points, since one important purpose of the present meeting, as he understood it, was to thrash out any differences of opinion among the three powers. The Soviet members indicated agreement but did not pursue the subject further.

In conclusion, Mr. Kavtaradze said that he thought the meeting had produced a useful exchange of views. We were all agreed that parts of the draft declarations represented repetitions of the Tripartite Treaty, in so far as Great Britain and the Soviet Union were concerned. The Soviet members, however, did not consider that any convincing reasons had been presented for the issuance of public declarations at this time. Certain new points had been raised during the conversation, which the various delegations would probably wish to study before the next meeting.

Mr. Allen mentioned that the sub-committee had two points for decision: (a) whether it was desirable to publish the declarations; and (b) whether their form and wording was acceptable or should be changed. Mr. Jernegan added that he thought a third, very important, matter was to make sure that there existed in fact, as in appearance, complete unanimity of the three governments with regard to their policy in Iran.

Mr. Allen remarked in passing that the Secretary of State had regarded it as important that a declaration be made regarding withdrawal of American troops from Iran. Mr. Allen could not say, therefore, whether the Secretary might not consider it desirable to issue such a declaration, even if the Soviet and British Governments did not wish to follow suit, although he was sure the Secretary would not wish to do so from Moscow if it would embarrass the other two governments.

As a final thought, Mr. Allen suggested as a point to be considered the possible public reaction if the Conference failed to issue a statement of any kind regarding Iran.⁸

99. Enclosure No. 5 to unnumbered despatch from Mr. George V. Allen, Tehran, November 4, 1943.
1. Conference Document No. 27, enclosure 1, p. 732.
2. Ibid, enclosure 2, p. 733.
3. Conference Document No. 29, paragraph 4, p. 736.
4. For text of the treaty signed at Tehran, January 29, 1942, see Department of State Bulletin, March 21, 1942, p. 249. Article 6 reads: “(i) The Allied Powers undertake in their relations with foreign countries not to adopt an attitude which is prejudicial to the territorial integrity, sovereignty, or political independence of Iran, nor to conclude treaties inconsistent with the provisions of the present Treaty. They undertake to consult the Government of His Imperial Majesty the Shahinshah in all matters affecting the direct interests of Iran, (ii) His Imperial Majesty the Shahinshah undertakes not to adopt in his relations with foreign countries an attitude which is inconsistent with the alliance, nor to conclude treaties inconsistent with the provisions of the present Treaty.”
5. Majid Ahy.
6. For correspondence relating to discussions looking toward the negotiation of an executive agreement covering the presence of American troops in Iran, see vol. iv, pp. 453 ff.
7. For correspondence in connection with the Millspaugh Mission and other groups of Americans employed by the Iranian Government, see vol. iv, pp. 510 ff.
8. In his despatch to the Secretary of State from Tehran on November 4, 1943, Mr. Allen stated: “At no time during the second meeting of the sub-committee did the Soviet members advance any affirmative suggestion, their attitude throughout being negative. It was noticeable that they frequently made no response to the arguments and observations presented by the American and British members, whose views appeared to be substantially in accord.” (740.0011 Moscow/212)