740.0011 Moscow/10–1843
Summary of the Proceedings of the Seventh Session of the Tripartite Conference, October 25, 1943, 4 p.m.74
Mr. Vyshinski informed the Conference that since there were still a few minor changes of a drafting nature to be made in the text of the Four-Nation Declaration the Drafting Committee could not present it to the Conference today and suggested tomorrow’s meeting instead.
Mr. Molotov turned to consideration of Item 7 on the Agenda, the treatment to be accorded Germany, concerning which a proposal had previously been submitted by the Secretary.75
The Secretary said that he wished to point out that this paper was not designed to be an all-inclusive study of the many problems involved but was more in the nature of an outline and framework which might form the basis for further study and discussion.
Mr. Eden said that his Government had studied with great interest the Secretary’s proposals and considered them a very useful contribution on the subject. He proposed that the document be studied by sections. This proposal was accepted by the Conference.
Mr. Eden said, in regard to the first section dealing with inter-Allied control, that he felt this was a subject which might very appropriately be turned over to the Politico-Military Commission in London, if it was agreed to set up such a commission, since in his opinion the subject was one which was related to the contents of the British memorandum of July 176 which was to be the basis for setting up the Commission.
Mr. Molotov then interrupted the proceedings of the conference to announce that Soviet forces had captured Dnieperpetrovsk and another important center in the Ukraine.
Mr. Eden suggested that the next two paragraphs of the document dealing with the duration of control over Germany and the question of reparations might also be referred to the London commission.
[Page 630]The Secretary said that he thought that the question of reparations was sufficiently specialized as to require a special commission which, however, could work under the supervision of the London commission.
After some further discussion as to the mechanics of giving further study to this document, Mr. Eden returning to the document itself stated that his Government favored the total disarmament of Germany with the retention of only enough police force to preserve order.
Mr. Molotov said that he agreed with Mr. Eden’s proposals but that there were certain questions in the text which were not clear; for example, point three referred to the scrapping of German war materiel.
The Secretary replied that he thought it likely that someone at the peace conference might suggest that some part of German war equipment be turned over to the Soviet Government to take off out of sight and scrap, but what was done with it after that was of course another question.
Mr. Molotov then raised the question as to the form in which the decisions of the Conference on the question of Germany should be embodied: whether in a declaration, in an agreement, or in some other manner.
The Secretary stated that he thought that the Conference could well pass this document on to some agency for detailed study and to adopt such amendments as might be necessary. He emphasized again that the document was merely an outline.
Mr. Eden agreed.
Mr. Molotov then inquired whether the Conference should give publicity to any decisions reached on Germany.
The Secretary said that he thought it might be desirable to have a special committee appointed to consider all the results of the Conference with a view to determining, subject to the approval of the three Foreign Ministers, what part of that work could appropriately and beneficially be made public.
Mr. Eden said that he envisaged three types of documents that might emerge from the Conference: (1) documents which could be given to the press in whole; (2) secret documents which should be given no publicity at all; and (3) the fact of agreement could be made public but not the exact decisions reached.
Mr. Molotov inquired under which category the present document on Germany fell, in Mr. Eden’s opinion.
Mr. Eden replied that he thought it fell in the third category.
Mr. Molotov then explained that the Soviet Government was strongly of the opinion that no publicity whatsoever should be given [Page 631] to any decisions which might be adopted regarding political, economic or other treatment of Germany after the war since to do so would merely serve to unite the German people further in their war effort and would play into the hands of Hitler. He added that the Soviet Union had been reproached by the British and United States press on their lack of clarity in regard to their attitude toward Germany, but he could assure the Conference that such criticism would not make them like Hitler any the more.
Mr. Eden then stated that the British Government would not like to see a united Germany remain but would prefer to see it divided into separate states and particularly the separation of Prussia. He said the British Government would therefore encourage any separatist tendencies within Germany but there was a division of opinion within the British Government as to the desirability of attempting to impose the dismemberment of Germany by forcible means.
Mr. Molotov said he would like to say that the Soviet Union gives its full approval of all measures which would render Germany harmless in the future.
Mr. Eden said that he would like to know the view of the Soviet Government on the question of the dismemberment of Germany, including the possible use of force for this purpose.
Mr. Molotov said that he understood that the draft submitted by the Secretary was in the nature of a minimum program which might be expanded. He added that it had been their impression that the United States Government was willing to go farther on the question of dismemberment of Germany than the British, but that from a study of the Secretary’s proposal he saw no evidence of that. Furthermore there had been no specific proposals from the British Government on this point.
Mr. Eden replied that he had stated the view of his Government, which was that of his Prime Minister who was very much disposed to take into account the views of the Soviet Government on this question.
Mr. Molotov said he would reply to that question in due course but first he would like to have some expression from the Secretary as to the position of the American Government.
The Secretary said that he had little to add to what was stated in the United States proposal which had been put in as a possible contribution to the consideration of the entire question. He said that his Government had been struck by the widely divergent views among Allied governments on the subject of the dismemberment of Germany. In high quarters in the United States when the study of this problem had begun there had been a general disposition to favor the dismemberment of Germany, but as the discussions progressed and conflicting [Page 632] and often very convincing arguments were advanced for or against, there was an increasing disposition to keep an open mind on this point and to explore it more fully before determining upon the final attitude, although dismemberment is still in favor.76a
Mr. Molotov said that the Soviet Government was somewhat behind in its study of the post-war treatment of Germany due to the greater preoccupation of its leaders with the military prosecution of the war. He added that to the United States Government and to Mr. Hull in particular belongs the honor of setting forth the first definite expression of an attitude toward Germany. He stated that the Soviet Government is of the opinion that the proposals presented by the Secretary to the Conference set forth correctly the program that should be adopted toward Germany but that the Soviet Government regards his program as a minimum and not a maximum one. He said that he understood from the Secretary’s observations here that he himself did not expect that discussion of the problems should confine itself to the exact contents of the document. On the subject of dismemberment Mr. Molotov said that he believed this was a subject requiring further study; that there was a strong movement in Soviet public opinion for the dismemberment of Germany; and that there were those who would not be satisfied with the extent of the Secretary’s proposals on this point. He added that the Soviet Government, as it always does, pays great attention to the feelings of the Soviet public and also to the feelings of the public of Allied nations, but also must consider the political advisability of any such step. He concluded that the Soviet Government had come to the definite conclusion that the dismemberment of Germany was not excluded but that the question would require further study.
After an intermission, Mr. Molotov said he noted that in the United States document the question of German frontiers was left until the final peace settlement, and he inquired whether this meant that Germany was to be allowed to keep any of her conquests.
Mr. Eden replied that he was sure there was general agreement that Germany must be made to return to her pre-Anschluss frontiers.
The Secretary added that he thought indeed that there was unanimity on that point and also on the question of East Prussia.
Mr. Molotov commented that there could be no two opinions on the necessity of forcing Germany to disgorge her conquests.
[Page 633]Mr. Molotov said that it might be possible now to turn to the question of Austria concerning which the British had submitted a proposal.77
The Secretary said he had nothing to add to what the British had proposed.
Mr. Molotov agreed to send the British proposal on Austria to the Drafting Committee.
The Conference then turned to consideration of Item 13 “Peace Feelers from Enemy States”.77a
Mr. Eden stated that his Government had sent to the Soviet and United States Governments an account of all serious approaches in regard to peace which it had received from the smaller enemy states. In regard to the question of the Rumanian approach he said he would like to have Mr. Molotov’s views.
Mr. Molotov said that in regard to the general question of Rumania his Government was of the opinion that there should be no dealing with the Rumanian Government except on the basis of unconditional surrender. In regard to the second point raised by the British in previous correspondence, namely the advantage of establishing contact with the Maniu78 group, he felt that this was not advisable as Maniu had nothing to offer and they had nothing to discuss with him.
Mr. Eden said that subject to the Secretary’s attitude the British Government felt that it was for the Soviet Government to decide such questions involving Rumania.
The Secretary said he had nothing to add to what Mr. Eden had said.
Mr. Eden then said he would like to see the Conference adopt some resolution to the effect that the three Governments represented here would inform each other of any peace feelers and consult with one another with a view to concerted action. The British proposal on this point79 was submitted to the Drafting Committee.
Mr. Molotov said that Mr. Eden’s letter on the subject of Rumania had raised the question by what means Rumania could be induced to interfere with the German war effort.
Mr. Eden replied that he thought it had been agreed to leave that matter to the Soviet Government.
Mr. Molotov said that in regard to Hungary there had been some disagreement with the British Government which he hoped to liquidate. He said that the Soviet Government was opposed to any [Page 634] negotiations except on the basis of unconditional surrender of the Hungarian Government, and that while they were most interested in interfering with the German war machine on any territory, whether Hungary or Rumania, he did not believe that half measures or negotiations were of any value. He added that the same applied to Finland.
Mr. Eden then suggested that he and Mr. Molotov should study this question apart from the general conference and that in his Government’s opinion, since the Soviet Union had a primary interest, it would seem logical that it should decide questions of this character in regard to countries which were engaged in active warfare against it alone.
The Secretary voiced no opposition to this statement.
It was agreed that the Conference at its next session would consider Item 17 dealing with resistance movements in Yugoslavia; Item 1, the Soviet proposal for measures to shorten the war; and Item 2, the Four-Nation Declaration.
- Drafted by Charles E. Bohlen of the American delegation.↩
- Conference Document No. 20, p. 720.↩
- See Conference Document No. 7, p. 708, and footnote 84, p. 710.↩
- See, for example, documents entitled “Germany: Partition” (August 17. 1943), and “The Political Reorganization of Germany” (September 23, 1943), in Department of State, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939–1945 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1949), pp. 554–560.↩
- Conference Document No. 21, p. 724.↩
- For related documents, see pp. 484 ff.↩
- Iulius Maniu exiled president of the National Peasant Party of Rumania.↩
- Conference Document No. 33, p. 737.↩