Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1943, General, Volume I

740.0011 Moscow/10–2043

Record of the Second Meeting of the Tripartite Conference Held at the Quest House of the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs Moscow, October 20, 1943, 4 p.m.

Moscow, October 20, 1943, 4 p.m.

Present:	Mr. Eden
	Sir A. Clark Kerr
	Lt.-General Sir H. Ismay
	Colonel Price
	Mr. Cordell Hull
	Mr. A. Harriman
	Major-General Deane
	Brigadier-General Vandenberg
	Captain Ware
	Mr. Molotov
	Marshal Voroshilov
	Major-General Gryzlov
	Mr. Vyshinski
	Mr. Berezhkov
Interpreters:	Mr. Pavlov
	Mr. Birse

Mr. Molotov was asked to preside at this meeting, and after some hesitation, he accepted.

Mr. Molotov referred to the Soviet proposals which had been handed around on the previous day. He asked for a reply.

Mr. Eden said that if agreeable he would ask General Ismay, Chief Staff Officer to Mr. Churchill as Minister of Defence, to give an account of the decisions taken at Quebec and the action taken by the British and U.S.A. Governments. General Deane would, if necessary, amplify what General Ismay said.

[Here follow statements by General Ismay and General Deane on the military factors involved in the preparation for the projected cross-Channel invasion of France in 1944. The statement by General Ismay is printed as Appendix 1 to the Most Secret Protocol, page 774; the statement by General Deane (the last two paragraphs of which are not included in the record of this meeting) is printed as Appendix 2 to the Most Secret Protocol, page 778.]

Mr. Molotov and Marshal Voroshilov then asked a number of questions, which were duly answered, clearing up doubtful points in connection with the build-up of Anglo-American Air Forces in the United Kingdom and with the transfer of the British and U.S. Divisions from the Mediterranean theatre to the United Kingdom.

Mr. Eden referred to General Deane’s statement in respect of the number of British aircraft which would be available in the United Kingdom by 1st April, 1944. He said that the figures were:—

• Bombers—about 1900 (of which 1600 were Heavy Bombers)
• Fighters—nearly 2000.

Mr. Molotov thanked General Ismay and General Deane and said that their reports included an account of the effort which had so far been made and which the Soviets valued highly. It was of great value to the Soviets that General Ismay and General Deane had given detailed information about what had been done and about future plans. During the reading of the reports he and Marshal Voroshilov had asked a few questions on the points which interested them. As suggested previously by Mr. Eden, they would study these reports and they might ask for supplementary details. He had one preliminary question to ask: Were these proposals supplementary to the Soviet proposals and what was the fate of the latter?

Mr. Hull asked to what proposals did he refer.

Mr. Molotov said that the Soviet Government had made three proposals with regard to shortening the war and he wanted to know what was Mr. Hull’s and Mr. Eden’s attitude to those proposals.

Mr. Hull doubted whether it was desirable for him to express an opinion on questions which were purely military.

Mr. Eden said that it was the British intention that General Ismay’s and General Deane’s statements should be the answer to Mr. Molotov’s first question in the paper which had been handed round on the previous day. Perhaps when Mr. Molotov and his associates had looked at the statement, copies of which would be given to them for study, they could again discuss the position.

Mr. Molotov had also raised two interesting questions on which Mr. Eden was ready to express his preliminary views, namely:—

1. Turkey’s immediate entry into the war.

2. The use of Swedish air bases.

If Mr. Molotov agreed, he would make some preliminary observations.

Mr. Molotov said that he would be glad to fall in with Mr. Eden’s wishes.

Turkey

Mr. Eden thought there was no disagreement between them as to the desirability of bringing Turkey into the war.²⁰ The only question he wanted to discuss was when could this most usefully be achieved in the common interest. As regards the war material which Britain was supplying to Turkey, it had been made clear to Turkey that this was being sent to enable her to play her part in the war against Germany. A draft lend-lease agreement had been prepared for Turkey to sign. When the time came to ask Turkey to give effect to the agreement and if Turkey failed to do so, there would be an immediate halt in the supplies.

As regards the British attitude to the Balkans, Britain would welcome Turkey’s help to drive the Germans out of the Balkans, but Britain was not interested in Turkish intervention in the Balkans once the Germans had withdrawn. With regard to the military position, from what had been said they would see that we were withdrawing our forces from the Eastern Mediterranean for use in Italy or for the Cross-Channel operations. If we were now to approach Turkey to enter the war, she would ask for the forces which we undertook to send to her aid if Germany attacked her. She was nervous about Istanbul. We had promised 25 squadrons to help the Turks, and the aerodromes have been prepared. We have not got these 25 squadrons in the Eastern Mediterranean and under present conditions Turkey, whose military preparedness is still very backward, would, as our partner in the offensive, probably be more of a liability than an asset.

To some extent the strategic situation had been modified during the last few months. A few months ago we wanted Turkish airfields from which to bomb the Roumanian oilfields. Now we could use Italian airfields. Turkey’s partnership would have certain advantages, but they would be of a different character. At present Turkey was giving us some help in the Dodecanese in the way of oil supplies and she was taking some action which is of non-neutral character. If, however, our Soviet friends thought that we ought to press Turkey, we should be glad to consider the matter.

Mr. Molotov asked whether the above was Mr. Eden’s view and that of H.M. Government.

Mr. Eden said that it was the British Government’s point of view, but it was not a point of view which was held very strongly.

Mr. Hull on being asked by Mr. Molotov, said that he could not add anything to Mr. Eden’s statement. He preferred not to speak on military matters. Mr. Eden, who was fully conversant with the position, had, no doubt, spoken accurately as far as his Government was concerned, and he thought that the U.S.A. Government shared the same opinion.

Mr. Eden said that the British Government much desired a common policy. Their views were not rigid and he was ready to exchange views with Mr. Molotov.

Mr. Molotov agreed.

Sweden

Mr. Molotov asked about the Soviet proposals with regard to Sweden.

Mr. Eden confessed that Mr. Molotov’s idea was a new one but new ideas were not necessarily bad ones. Swedish opinion was to some extent influenced by the Soviet attitude to Finland. If a joint approach were to be made with regard to facilities in Sweden, the chances of success would be increased if the Soviet Government could indicate their intentions about the independence of Finland—he presumed that it was their intention to have an independent Finland.

Apart from the political question, their Staffs should examine what air protection they could give Sweden. Judging by our experience with Portugal,²¹ Sweden was sure to ask for some assistance. The technical aspect would have to be examined. He was ready to submit proposals to his Government, and to ask for an examination by the Staff.

Mr. Molotov said that his proposal referred to the war against Germany and he feared that the extension of the question to Finland would only prevent them from studying the question as proposed. The Soviet Government valued the British and American Governments’ success in the negotiations with Portugal, and they welcomed it. He would like to ask Mr. Hull for his opinion.

Mr. Hull thought that Mr. Molotov would have observed from his remarks on military questions that he thought he should refer such questions to his Government before undertaking to elaborate upon them. Naturally, he had his views, but he preferred to wait overnight in order to confer with his Government.

Mr. Eden endorsing what Mr. Hull had said thought that the Portuguese parallel could not be applied to Sweden. Britain and Portugal had been allies for six hundred years, and this fact had enabled us to obtain facilities. It also helped us to negotiate the same facilities for the Americans. Britain had no alliance with Sweden, nor had the Soviet Union. However he was interested in the idea and he would consult his Government.

Mr. Molotov understood Mr. Eden’s wish to consult his Government. As to the parallel with Portugal, he did not insist upon that point, but only thought it the right opportunity to congratulate Mr. Eden.

Mr. Molotov then referred to the first point of the Soviet proposals which spoke of shortening the war. This question appeared to be a popular question. The chief question in the Soviet proposal referred to the statement made by President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill with regard to an invasion in the spring of 1944. He wanted the meeting to understand him. He did not insist upon an immediate reply, but he would be grateful for a reply in due course. When General Ismay began to read his report, he correctly emphasized that all his remarks referred to the desire to shorten the war, and he had set out in detail an account of the decisions taken in Quebec. The point was that the Soviet statement had referred to Mr. Roosevelt’s and Mr. Churchill’s letter to Marshal Stalin of June 3rd about the Washington conference in May.²² That communication stated that the invasion was to take place in the spring of 1944. After Washington there was the Quebec conference and the Soviet Government had received no indication as to whether the May decision was still in force. He thought his colleagues would understand that the Soviet Government was greatly interested in this question, namely whether the decision was still in force or had been withdrawn.

Mr. Eden thought that there was some misunderstanding. As far as he knew the May decisions had been confirmed by the conference at Quebec, and therefore the answer to Mr. Molotov’s question was “Yes”, subject to the conditions quoted by General Ismay in his statement. All the preparations for the operation were going ahead.

General Deane said that the decision to undertake a cross-Channel operation in the spring of 1944 was reaffirmed at the last conference in Quebec. Now it must be understood that such decision, as in the case with any military decision made far in advance, is subject to certain conditions existing at the time the operation is to take place. The conditions in this case have been stated to you. We confidently feel that these conditions will exist and are proceeding with full scale preparations to launch the attack. One can only appreciate the firmness of the decision by witnessing the intensive spirit with which preparations are now being carried out. I have spoken previously of the landing craft program which has recently been expanded in the United States. The effects of such a readjustment are felt not only in England but throughout the breadth of the United States including the California coast. Such a change in production affects the shipyards along the coast and the engine manufacturers in the middle west. It is inconceivable that such dislocation of industry would be permitted if the intention to launch the operation was questionable.

Mr. Molotov said he understood from what had been said that if conditions did not deteriorate before the spring, then the decisions would be carried out.

Mr. Harriman said that General Deane was here to keep the Soviet Government informed weekly or even daily of the progress of operations.

Mr. Molotov said he was very grateful.

20. For the attitude of the United States toward the question of the entry of Turkey into the war, see bracketed note, vol. iv, p. 1057.
21. See vol. ii, section under Portugal entitled “Interest of the United States in obtaining water-port and airport facilities in the Azores.”
22. The records of this Conference and of the Quebec Conference in August 1943 are scheduled for publication in subsequent volumes of Foreign Relations.