Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1943, General, Volume I

740.0011 Moscow/34d: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the American Delegation

Washington, October 12, 1943.

Amdel 7. The second numbered paragraph of telegram number 1470, September 26, from Moscow⁶⁸ quoted Molotov’s secret communication with respect to the proposed message to General Eisenhower⁶⁹ concerning Italy as follows: Obviously the Allies must be interested in the strict execution by Italy under the control of the Allies of the detailed terms of the armistice agreed upon and ratified by the Allies. The Soviet Government therefore perceives no reason for giving instructions regarding the lightening of the terms of the military armistice for Italy as is suggested in point 2 of the message, particularly as it is not clear from the contents exactly what form of lightening the terms is being considered. Furthermore it is necessary to bear in mind that an alteration of the provisions ratified by the Allied Governments obviously can only take place with the agreement of these three Governments.

An aide-mémoire received from the British Embassy⁷⁰ with reference to the above paragraph comments as follows: As regards point 2 which questions the agreed policy of the United States Government and the British Government of regulating the application of the terms of the armistice according to services rendered, the Prime Minister has made it clear to the President that in his opinion we cannot be put in a position of having to defer on this point to the Soviet Government. (Mr. Churchill said, the aide-mémoire continues, “We cannot be put in a position where our two armies are doing all the fighting but Russians have a veto and must be consulted on any minor variation of the armistice terms which Eisenhower considers militarily essential. Unconditional surrender and terms expressing it are basic principle. The Commander in Chief must be free to apply it as, when and how he thinks most helpful.”). The British suggested that the Department might wish to draft an answer to the Soviet Government along the foregoing lines, adding that they would be glad to have an opportunity to comment upon it before any reply is sent. After it had gone the British Government would instruct the British Ambassador at Moscow to inform Mr. Molotov that it had nothing to add to the answer sent by the United States Government.

After consultation with General Hilldring,⁷¹ we are informing the British Embassy that it seems preferable to make our position clear to the Russian Government during the forthcoming talks at Moscow as the question would presumably come up for discussion there under Items 1 and 6 of British agenda.⁷²

[Stettinius]

68. Vol. ii, p. 377.
69. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater.
70. Dated October 11, vol. ii, p. 385.
71. Maj. Gen. John H. Hilldring, Chief of the Civil Affairs Division, Special Staff, War Department.
72. The Secretary of State replied on October 15, 1943 (in Delam No. 4, U.S.S. Phoenix), that he entirely agreed with the British aide-mémoire both as to the military authority of the Allied Commander in Chief and the responsibility of the U.S. and British Governments when the conduct of serious military operations was involved. He recommended that “messages more or less identic along these lines should be sent to the Soviet Government by both British and American Governments without awaiting our arrival at Moscow for discussion of the subject there.” (740.0011 Moscow/31)