740.00113 European War 1939/1218: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Winant ) to the Secretary of State

9000. With reference to the British approach in Moscow regarding the Russian-Polish dispute arising out of the draft report of the Inter-Allied Sub-Committee on Axis Acts of Dispossession, the Foreign Office informs us that on December 14 Clark Kerr38 gave a note to Molotov39 and discussed the subject with him in accordance with the Foreign Office instruction summarized in Embassy’s 8415 of December 2. Clark Kerr reported that Molotov made no comment but listened with sympathy and agreed to look into the matter.

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The Foreign Office feels that at this stage it would be most desirable to have some informal expression in Moscow of an American wish that political differences should not enter the sphere of the Sub-Committee’s work, and that the draft fact-finding report should be agreed on without delay. The Soviet representative has admitted that there is nothing in the draft report as it now stands to which he objects. There is no reference in it to eastern Poland or to the memorandum submitted by the Polish Government to the Sub-Committee. The draft report is also acceptable to the Poles. All that is needed is a modification of Istchenko’s instructions to enable him to sign the report or approve it in line with an informal suggestion that the chairman alone should sign it after the national representatives have indicated their approval. This would mean dropping the demand that the Polish memorandum to the Sub-Committee be formally “withdrawn” or that every reference to Poland be eliminated from the draft report, and accepting as an alternative, if the Soviet wished, (1) a reservation by the Soviet representative dissociating himself from all references to Poland in the report, (2) an amendment in the draft report emphasizing that no political implications, particularly as regards boundary questions, were to be drawn from anything in the report (see paragraph 1 of Embassy’s 7864, November 11).

The Foreign Office felt that if a formal American approach had been made simultaneously with the British approach there would have been an impression in Moscow of unduly concerted action between the United States and Britain. They believe, however, that there is now a favorable opportunity. Some time has elapsed since the British approach was made. The American approach might be purely informal and could be justified by the facts that (1) the United States is a signatory to the declaration of January 5, 1943, (2) it has a representative on the Sub-Committee through whom it has been made aware of the difficulties now holding up the draft report, and (3) it has an interest in Russian collaboration on technical matters.

We believe it to be important that the Sub-Committee’s work, now practically completed, shall not be held up indefinitely through a political difference that has no reflection whatever in the report. The establishment of the Sub-Committee was publicly announced following the declaration of January 5. Questions have been asked in Parliament regarding the progress of the work of following up the declaration and eminent lawyers in Parliament take a continued interest in the subject. It would, therefore, hardly be possible to conceal [Page 459] a breakdown from the British public and Allied circles generally in London and such a breakdown would undoubtedly be prejudicial to other attempts at technical collaboration.40

Winant
  1. Sir Archibald J. K. Clark Kerr, British Ambassador in the Soviet Union.
  2. V. M. Molotov, People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.
  3. In telegram No. 9945, November 14, 1944, 9 p.m., the Chargé in the United Kingdom reported that no meeting of the Sub-Committee had been held since November 9, 1943, and that attempts to settle differences out of committee had been unsuccessful. No reply had been received to the British representations to Molotov in December 1943. The Chargé reported that the British Foreign Office’s attitude was that the committee should remain in suspense but that there should be no formal dissolution. (740.00113EW/11–1444)