740.0011 European War 1939/27117
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Welles)
The Ambassador of Chile and the Minister of the Interior of Chile called this morning at my request.
I told Señor Morales that, as a result of our last very agreeable and satisfactory conversation, I felt there were only two further points to be discussed between us.
The first of these points, I said, had to do with the request of Señor Morales that I make available to him, secretly and for the secret information of the President of Chile, a specific statement showing how American ships that had left Chile had been sunk in the Caribbean as a result of clandestine radio messages sent by German agents in Valparaiso to German military or naval agents. I said that the Navy Department had prepared two documents for me, one of these a memorandum showing in considerable detail how five American ships had been sunk as a result of these subversive activities in Chile and the place and manner of their sinking. The other document, which was solely for the information of the President of Chile and the Minister of the Interior, contained the deciphered texts of two of these clandestine messages. I handed the Minister the two messages in question, copies of which are attached.61
The Minister said that he would keep these messages in the secrecy requested and that the information given him was exactly what he required.
The second point, I said, had to do with the request made by the Minister that certain defense matériel be made available immediately to the Government of Chile for use when the breaking of relations [Page 45] by Chile took place. I said that on this subject I wished to speak very frankly with the Minister. I said that last August I had given to the Chilean Ambassador in Washington a confidential memorandum62 showing the categories of military and naval matériel which the United States Government would be able and prepared to make available to Chile in the event that Chile broke relations with the Axis powers. In addition to that memorandum, I said, the United States had been furnishing Chile naval and military matériel since early last winter just as if Chile had actually signed a lend-lease agreement with the United States, and that in this manner the United States had made it plain to Chile that it desired to furnish Chile with every possible means of defense, in view of the defenseless condition of Chile, notwithstanding the fact that Chile had taken no definite action with regard to her relations with the Axis powers. The subsidiary list63 which the Minister had now sent to me through the Chilean Embassy contained many items which were not on the list which I had handed the Chilean Ambassador last August and raised a question which it would seem to me neither Chile nor the United States would desire to confront, namely, a question which appeared to give rise to the interpretation—quite unfounded, of course—that Chile was now prepared to break relations with the Axis powers because of the new bargain struck between the United States and Chile, a bargain furnishing Chile additional quantities of defense matériel not already contemplated by the Government of the United States. I said I felt that it was better for both countries not to take any action which would give rise to an unfounded interpretation of this character.
I stated that when Chile broke relations with the Axis powers, the lend-lease agreement already negotiated could be signed immediately and that I could only reassure the Minister once more, as I had frequently stated to the Chilean Ambassador, that this Government would be prepared to do everything possible to cooperate with Chile by the furnishing of matériel under the lend-lease agreement for the defense of the territory of Chile. I concluded by stating that I felt under these conditions it was far better to leave the exact determination of what matériel should be sent and when it should be sent to the military and naval experts of our two countries. Both General Espinosa and Admiral Moreno, the Chilean military and naval representatives in Washington, had the complete confidence and regard of our own military and naval authorities and I said I felt quite sure that both Governments could safely rely upon their military and naval experts to find a satisfactory and efficient solution of the defense problem.
[Page 46]At this point the Ambassador interrupted to say that the Minister should always bear in mind the fact that the United States Government had been making continually available to Chile during the past eleven months large quantities of defense matériel, both military and naval, and that the two Governments should have sufficient confidence one in the other to rest assured that the United States and Chile would cooperate completely with regard to the Chilean defense problem.
Señor Morales said that he was entirely satisfied to leave the matter in this way and that he would at once inform the President of Chile by cable of the statements I had made to him. He said that he had now planned to arrive in Santiago on January 2 and that as soon as he returned, he would send me a personal message through the Chilean Ambassador in Washington to let me know the exact date upon which Chile would break relations. The Ambassador suggested that January 15 would be an appropriate date inasmuch as that date marked the anniversary of the Rio de Janeiro conference. Señor Morales agreed to this suggestion and said he thought it might be possible that the date for breaking relations be even earlier than that. I concluded by stating that I desired to emphasize my own great respect and admiration for the Chilean Government and people and that I felt the one important thing now to avoid was the permitting of so long a time to elapse before relations were broken as to allow conjecture as to Chile’s attitude to be current once more in the press of all of the other American Republics. I said that I thought if the action contemplated were taken promptly, and by that I meant within the next two or three weeks, the reaction throughout the Hemisphere would be most enthusiastic and satisfactory and that in that event the history of the past months would soon be forgotten and Chile would be welcomed by all of the other American Republics into the fold of the American nations who were cooperating for the security of the Western Hemisphere and for the preservation of the ideals which we all shared.
The Minister said that immediately upon his return to Santiago he would emphasize in his statements to the Cabinet and to the Chilean Senate that he had found in Washington nothing but friendship for Chile and a very great measure of understanding for the desire of the Chilean Government now to align itself with the other American nations who had come out against the Axis powers. He said he would emphasize that the Government of the United States had at no time, in any way or manner, brought the slightest pressure to bear upon Chile and that the only interpretation he could give to American policy with regard to Chile was that it was for Chile to decide whether she would break relations or not, but that if she did break relations the United States would do everything possible to cooperate with her.