Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1942, The Near East and Africa, Volume IV

741.67/176: Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State

Ankara, June 11, 1942—10 a.m.
[Received June 12—8:05 a.m.]

571. For President, Secretary and Under Secretary. Saraçoğlu asked me to call at Foreign Office yesterday. He said that in view of certain recent developments he wanted to give me background of Turk-British and Turk-Soviet relations during recent years.^23a

Relations between Turkey and Soviet were most cordial prior to negotiations which led up to Montreux Convention, both nations living up to spirit as well as letter of their treaty not to enter into political negotiations with a neighboring nation without consulting the other and not to conclude any agreement without concurrence of the other. Prior to meeting of Montreux Conference Turkey and Soviet exchanged views and although differences of opinion existed among the other nations Turkey and Soviet were in complete accord at time conference convened. On arriving at Montreux, Turks ascertained that without their knowledge Soviets had changed their position. This aroused certain amount of suspicion in Ankara. In order to overcome the resultant difficulties Britain acted as mediator and found solution acceptable to Turkey and Soviet. In consequence Turkish policy was reoriented away from Soviet and towards Britain, notwithstanding which, Soviet resumed its friendly attitude towards Turkey and former cordial relations were resumed.

When Germany manifested aggressive designs in respect to Czechoslovakia and Danzig, British inquired whether Turkey was prepared to associate itself with other nations in maintaining peace. Turks replied that they would prefer to discuss relations with Britain first. Resulting discussions ultimately led to Anglo-French-Turkish alliance.

When British and French went to Moscow in 1939, relations between Soviet and Turkey were cordial and the two countries exchanged views concerning progress of discussions taking place in Moscow. While Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations²⁴ went badly, the Anglo-French-Turkish discussions went well. Soviets became uneasy and when a breakdown of their negotiations with the British and French threatened, sent Potemkin²⁵ to Ankara.

Saraçoğlu suggested to Potemkin the conclusion of a Turkish-Soviet treaty on the one hand and an Anglo-French-Turkish treaty on the other, thus constituting Turkey a bridge across the gap between Britain and France and the Soviet Union. Saraçoğlu believed that his proposal would induce the Soviets to come to an agreement with the British and French lest they be “left out”. Potemkin proposed to Saraçoğlu that the conclusion of the Soviet-Turkish treaty be delayed pending the completion of the Anglo-French-Turkish negotiations. To this Saraçoğlu agreed. When the latter negotiations were completed Saraçoğlu was invited to Moscow and took with him drafts of the proposed Soviet-Turkish and Anglo-French-Turkish treaties. While he was en route to Moscow the Soviets attacked Poland.

During the first 4 hours of their 6–hour conference, Stalin²⁶ discussed principally the proposed Anglo-French-Turkish treaty and in the course of the discussion suggested certain changes of a minor nature in the draft Saraçoğlu had brought with him. Saraçoğlu expressed the opinion to Stalin that the British would agree to these changes. Up to this point in their conference, Stalin had been extremely pleasant to Saraçoğlu and most disagreeable to Molotov.²⁷ Stalin then briefly referred to the proposed Soviet-Turkish treaty in general terms indicating that the draft was substantially satisfactory. As Saraçoğlu rose to leave, Stalin handed him a memorandum and suggested that he take it with him and study it. Saraçoğlu glanced at the memorandum and on seeing the word “Straits” said that he could not accept the memorandum, returned to his seat and the discussions continued. Saraçoğlu stated that he could not discuss the Straits, to which Stalin replied that there was nothing proposed in the memorandum which was not “natural” and that if Saraçoğlu would examine the memorandum carefully he would find that “it merely sought information” adding that the Montreux Convention gave Turkey many rights in connection with the control of the Straits and that he merely wished to know how the Turkish Government intended to exercise these rights. Saraçoğlu replied that if he were to tell Stalin how Turks intended to exercise their rights under Montreux Convention, any such statement would be tantamount to a commitment and Turkey would lose its freedom of action. Saraçoğlu then proceeded to point out other objections to the memo. Stalin reached for the paper, tore it up, threw it on floor and stamped on it. Notwithstanding Stalin’s obvious displeasure at Saraçoğlu’s attitude, former said he would sign Soviet-Turk treaty. Thereupon Saraçoğlu requested British and French to accept minor changes suggested by Stalin in proposed Anglo-French-Turk treaty and they agreed to do so.

Saraçoğlu was not informed by Stalin or Molotov that at very time Soviets were negotiating with him, they were negotiating with Von Ribbentrop.²⁸ After obtaining agreement of British and French to changes suggested by Stalin, Saraçoğlu notified Kremlin he was ready to sign both Soviet-Turk and Anglo-French-Turk treaties. Reply he received was to effect Kremlin was about to suggest further changes in Anglo-French-Turk treaty. Saraçoğlu answered he could not remain in Moscow any longer and left immediately thereafter. He was courteously treated on his return trip including having a Soviet warship placed at his disposal. By time he reached Istanbul, Anglo-French-Turk treaty²⁹ had been signed at his direction. Speed with which treaty was concluded without further consulting Soviets, resulted in a coolness between Soviets and Turkey. From that time on Soviets no longer kept Turkey informed of their negotiations with neighboring powers and after a while Turks ceased furnishing similar information to Soviets. While relations between [the] two countries continued “correct”, former friendship and intimacy no longer existed.

When Iran was occupied by Soviets and British,³⁰ Turks were kept informed by British and received no information from Soviets. A guarantee of integrity of Iran was given to Turkey by British. Subsequently, Soviets gave Turkey a similar guarantee. However, as Soviet guarantee was word for word that previously received from British, Saraçoğlu regards guarantee “as a British child.”

Day before Molotov’s recent visit to London,^30a British renewed to Turk Government their unqualified guarantee of Turkey’s territorial integrity including “Straits and all Turk interests”. At same time British expressed belief Soviets would give a similar guarantee to Turkey. Soviets, however, have not given a similar guarantee such as was given at time of occupation of Iran, but instead have informed Turkey they consider Soviet-Turk treaty of 1941³¹ to be in full force and effect; pointed out Soviets have accepted Atlantic Charter;³² and invited attention of Turk Government to agreement between Soviet and Britain that neither country would make peace without consent of other. These assurances are not in writing but were read by Vishinsky to Turk Chargé in Kuibyshev.

Saraçoğlu then read to me telegram received within past few days from Turk Ambassador in London giving substance of a talk with Eden.³³ Telegram informed Saraçoğlu that Eden was disturbed at attempts of Axis propaganda to cause trouble between Turkey and Soviet and expressed concern of British Government lest recent agreement by Germany to deliver war material to Turkey be utilized by Germans as they had done in case of Yugoslavia for purpose of infiltrating into Turkey by means of technicians and specialists. Turk Ambassador reassured Eden on both these counts and then referred to recent unfriendly attitude of Soviet towards Turkey. Eden replied that the new 20-year alliance between Britain and Soviet³⁴ should go far towards reassuring Turkey.

Saraçoğlu then told me that it was his intention to instruct Turk Ambassador in London to inform Eden that Britain had been relying upon Turkey since 1939 and that it could confidently continue to do so, and that Turkey had no ambitions vis-à-vis the Soviet, British could give Soviet any guarantees it desired to this effect on behalf of Turkey.

Saraçoğlu concluded this phase of his remarks with the remark “Turkey does not wish a foot of territory from anyone and will not yield a foot of its territory to anyone”.

Saraçoğlu then stated that toward end of 1941 he had received a telegram from Turk Ambassador in Washington, which quoted a letter of Sir Wilmot Lewis,³⁵ published in London Times, to effect that Soviet had territorial aspirations in regard to Baltic States, Rumania and Poland, and to the Straits and remarked that he had paid little attention to this report at the time. However, he had recently received further telegrams from Ambassador in Washington, two of which again quoted Sir Wilmot Lewis. In first of these telegrams Lewis was quoted as having stated that now and at end of the war “Soviet eyes will be on Poland and Turkey because these countries have ambitions against the Soviet Union”. The second also quoted remarks of Lewis with regard to Turkey and Straits. Saraçoğlu observed that he was somewhat concerned at Lewis’s continued references to Turkey and Straits as he believed he might reflect views of at least one or more individuals in British Foreign Office.

Saraçoğlu then remarked he noticed that the American correspondents in Kuibyshev had recently been sending telegrams to their newspapers in the United States, supporting the view that the Soviet Union “must have strategic frontiers” and said that a continuance of this course could only result in encouraging the Soviet Union to make unreasonable territorial demands.

Saraçoğlu stated that he had inquired of Hugessen³⁶ as to whether Molotov, during his recent stay in London had made any demands which would affect Turkey and that the Ambassador had assured him that no such demands had been made. He added that the Turkish Ambassador in Washington had expressed the opinion to him that Molotov would have even more difficulty in Washington than in London, were he to advance any demands affecting Turkey.

In conclusion Saraçoğlu expressed the hope that the Department would inform him of any phase of any negotiations that it might have with the Soviet Government which might in any manner affect Turkish interests.

I may add to the foregoing my personal conviction that the Turks will faithfully adhere to their alliance with Britain and that no amount of German blandishment, trickery or threats will swerve them from this course. While they may make minor concessions to Germany from time to time in order to relieve the pressure to which they are being constantly subjected, I am convinced they will not go over to the Axis and that they will fight if attacked.

Steinhardt

1. This diplomatic setting is described in Harry N. Howard, “Germany, the Soviet Union, and Turkey during World War II,” Department of State Bulletin, July 18, 1948, pp. 63 ff.
24. See Foreign Relations, 1939, vol. i, pp. 232 ff.
25. Vladimir Petrovich Potemkin, Assistant People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union. The Ankara visit (April 29–May 5, 1939) was one of several made by Mr. Potemkin to the capitals of the countries of Eastern and Southeastern Europe at this time; see Max Beloff, The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union, 1929–1941, vol. ii, 1936–1941 (New York, 1949), pp. 240–242.
26. Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin, President of the Council of People’s Commissars (Premier) of the Soviet Union.
27. Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, Soviet People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs.
28. Joachim von Ribbentrop, German Foreign Minister; for Soviet negotiations, see Foreign Relations, 1939, vol. i, pp. 312 ff.
29. Treaty of Mutual Assistance, signed at Ankara, October 19, 1939, League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. cc, p. 167.
30. For correspondence on this subject, see Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. iii, pp. 383 ff.
31. For reports concerned with the visit of Mr. Molotov to London and Washington during May and June, 1942, see vol. iii, pp. 543–596, passim.
31. Joint Soviet-Turkish Declaration, March 24, 1941; see telegram No. 79, March 24, 1941, 6 p.m., from the Ambassador in Turkey, Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. iii, p. 836.
32. For text, see ibid., vol. i, p. 367; with regard to Soviet acceptance of the Charter, see bracketed note, ibid., p. 378.
33. Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
34. Anglo-Soviet treaty of alliance, signed at London May 26, 1942, League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. cciv, p. 353. For correspondence concerning the negotiation of this treaty, see Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. iii, pp. 490–566, passim.
35. Washington correspondent of the London Times.
36. Sir Hughe M. Knatchbull-Hugessen, British Ambassador in Turkey.