740.0011 European War 1939/19498: Telegram
The Minister in Egypt ( Kirk ) to the Secretary of State
[Received February 18—2:30 p.m.]
273. Personal for the Secretary and Under Secretary. I don’t wish to inject a further disturbing note at this time of preoccupation [Page 72] farther east but after telegraphing for months about the importance of preserving this theater of war as a springboard for offensives against the Axis I feel that the time has come when I must know if from necessity or merely from lack of a practical realistic concept if this part of the world is being laughed off as a factor in the defeat of Hitlerism.
A few months ago there seemed to be the possibility that the importance of this area was about to be recognized and that we ourselves were to take the initiative in galvanizing the British into some kind of a dynamic force that could cope with the situation and then in supplying them with the necessary equipment for the task. That would have meant the preservation of the entire Mediterranean, the reduction of Italy to impotency, the elimination of Spain and Portugal as a part of Hitler’s scheme of expansion, the immobilization of Vichy with its fleet and its strategic position in North Africa and the encouragement of Turkey to believe that life with Hitler was not the only salvation.
The war with Japan ended that hope. All effort and all concentration was diverted there and if I led from emotion and not from reason I should acquiesce. But as a hardboiled realist I know that there are only two ways of beating Japan viz. bomb the existence out of Toyko, Yokohama, Osaka, Kobe, et cetera or else beat Hitler first. All the generals that have passed through here tell me that the first can’t be done without the use of Vladivostok but they all admit that there are only three points from which Hitler can be hit and those are the British Isles, Russia and here. I’m sure Churchill14 has seen to the stocking of England with forces against invasion, I assume that everything is being done to ration the Russians with supplies but in this area I can see nothing but deterioration. British bungling has been demonstrated time and again and the lack of material is no longer an excuse, for this last offensive has shown that lack of unified command, defective strategy and dilatory methods have constituted the chief factors of defeat. All these elements have brought us to the present situation and as a consequence this place is now wide open from the land, from the sea and from the air. The British forces here already proven inadequate have been decreased to strengthen the Far East effort which has frittered away its heroic effort in a so-called “delaying campaign” which except for the stupendous show of MacArthur15 has necessitated apologies from all of us.
The fact is that the Middle East means the Mediterranean, it means the richest oil fields, it means the communications to India and China [Page 73] and on to Japan and it means the springboard for offensives against Germany and Italy which after all happen to be the spots which are germinating the hell to which we have been reduced. I ask again are we going to laugh off this area for if so my job is merely one of discreet preparation for a possible evacuation of Americans.
Cables are futile things. Either they are cold and clammy when they reach their destination or else they smack so of exaggeration that they negative their purpose. But please realize I have never received any intimation of what we really think of this situation out here and have only been confronted with the goings and comings of visitors from home who have said “yes it’s important to hold the Middle East but—”. It is possible that Hitler does not wish to strike here or may not be able to do so. Good, but the fact remains that he may be able to and if so he will succeed unless something is done immediately either to ward off or to oppose him when he does. Are the British or are we paying any attention to such a contingency. I ask you, because neither the British Ambassador nor the Minister of State nor the Commander-in-Chief here can tell me. Believe me, my question does not spring from hysteria but from plain common sense. After all, if this war is not prolonged until it is lost, it is we who have got to win, and win not only with material but with the domination of our judgment in the strategy of selecting the time and place for the infliction of direct and ruthless blows against the Axis Powers, for which the world has been too long awaiting. This theater if preserved is indicated for that purpose. Are we going to preserve it and are we going to use it or are we going [to] waste ourselves in farflung delaying actions which are inconclusive and which do not strike the Axis power at its source.