883.00/1248
Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Murray) to the Under Secretary of State (Welles)
Mr. Welles: We of course defer to your views respecting the suggested telegram to Cairo. However, we are inclined to the belief that the situation of the Latin American Republics is not analogous to that of Egypt at present, in that the former are not in an active theater of war. If one of the Latin American Republics were a scene of hostilities to which the British had been diverting large quantities of ordnance and shipping acutely needed by themselves, they would hardly hesitate to offer friendly advice should we become involved in serious difficulties with the government of that republic.
It will be recalled that even prior to our entry into the war the British formally invited our intervention in the affairs of Iran.11 When we, uninvited, intervened in the affairs of Iraq,12 the British expressed warm appreciation of our action. Our proposed action in the present instance, of course, contemplated something far short of “intervention” and, as will be noted, envisaged merely the expression of a “hope” by this Government that a means might be found to keep Egypt on even keel in the present vital period of military operations there, in which we have a heavy stake.
In view of the actual importance of the Near East as a combat area and avenue of military supplies in respect of which this Government has already devoted substantial efforts and assumed large commitments, would you not agree in a general way that we cannot remain wholly inactive when any country in that area shows definite possibilities of going to pieces, either politically or economically?13
- See Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. iii, pp. 383 ff.↩
- See ibid., pp. 486 ff.↩
- Marginal note by Welles: “re your last paragraph—Under certain circumstances yes—but not in Egypt at present—SW”.↩