740.0011 European War 1939/23593: Telegram

The Minister in Afghanistan (Engert) to the Secretary of State

54. Suggestion contained in my no. 49, August 7, 10 p.m., was based on the general feeling here that the Afghanistan Government is wondering whether the arrival of the German Army at the gates [Page 55] of the Caucasus and the Caspian Sea does not require certain revisions, in its foreign policy. In this and subsequent telegrams I shall analyze briefly the factors which will most likely determine Afghanistan’s policy in the immediate future.

(1)
The Russian reverses and events in India have overshadowed all other matters and although official circles appear to be relatively calm there are many wild bazaar rumors in circulation which are either abetted or exploited by the Axis Legations to create the impression that Russia’s collapse is imminent.
(2)
Considering that Russia and Great Britain have as in Iran been looked upon as the two traditional enemies of Afghanistan, it is hardly surprising that the present situation should have brought out much of the latent pro-German sentiment in the vague hope that the Axis Powers, being hostile to both the old enemies, might in some way prove Afghanistan’s salvation.
(3)
However, fear of Russia has dominated Afghan policy far more than fear of Britain and the British are today much less unpopular than the Soviets. But as there is a further lack of confidence in British and Allied generalship and strategy and consequently in the ability to win the war decisively or even to hold India, the pro-British elements dare not assert themselves.
(4)
At the present moment the principal reaction to German successes has, therefore, been undisguised relief that the shadow of the Soviet menace if not entirely removed has at least grown much less. The reactionary Mullahs, for example, have never ceased to inveigh against what they call Soviet godlessness and their political position in the country has undoubtedly been greatly strengthened; the military now feel that Russia will not for a long time be in a position to invade or even menace Afghanistan’s northern provinces; and the Afghan Foreign Office is pleased because it can permit itself a bolder tone in dealing with the Soviet Embassy and perhaps flirt with the tempting thought of Afghan Irredentist aspirations in Russian Turkestan.
(5)
On the other hand toilers [sic] will give them important consideration which is causing the Afghan Government and even more especially the ruling family to view the military situation with deep apprehension and that is the possibility of the ex-King Amanullah who it will be recalled was deposed in 1929 and has since lived in Italy—arriving on the Russo-Afghan border supported by Axis arms and money to raise the standard of revolt. This would be facilitated by the fact that the Uzbegs and most of the other tribes in Russian Turkestan might now turn against the Soviets if further German successes should bring the Axis within striking distance of Transcaspia.
(6)
As it is generally believed that quite a number of Afghans are pro-Amanullah if only to use him to rally the discontented elements against the present Government, the King and the revoltable [sic] group of his relatives now in power have an obvious stake in the outcome of the war. In other words as far as the present regime is concerned an Axis victory would constitute a far graver danger than the Soviets ever were, but so long as there is serious doubt in their minds whether the United Nations can bring the war to a successful conclusion the Afghan Government will want to run with the hare and not with the hounds.
(7)
I believe we should therefore take advantage of the respite we still have before the Axis is able to bring direct physical pressure to bear on the Afghan Government. For if the German thrust into the Caucasus should necessitate our abandoning one or more of the trans-Persia routes the possibility of transit through Afghanistan of supplies to Russia and China might assume practical importance. To attempt it in the manner adopted in Persia would in Afghanistan lead to such complete disintegration and lawlessness that even larger forces than the Allies can spare would be insufficient to keep the route open. It could only be done with the good will and cooperation of the Afghan Government which in turn would require convincing it that the risks were not too great, that is, that adequate military protection would be forthcoming and that the territorial integrity and independence of the country would be guaranteed by the United Nations.
(8)
Any overtures it may eventually be decided to make in this direction on behalf of the United Nations had best come from us as the Afghans would find it so much easier to acquiesce if we took the initiative rather than the British and/or the Russians, in the meantime I am continuing to harp on the fighting spirit of the United States and the British Empire and our complete confidence in ultimate victory. I am pointing out that so long as the Russian Armies have not been destroyed and Russian resistance has not collapsed Hitler will have to face another Russian winter which is only 2 months off.
(9)
In my wanderings from the Bosphorus to the Indus I have never found a community where the external stimulus of a financial character [did not?] fall on fruitful soil, and can state where we should as soon as possible i. e., before we want anything ourselves, intimate the possibility of a small loan (perhaps to finance karakul exports et cetera or under Lease-Lend) provided the British agree. Please see also my number 47, August 6 [5], 10 a.m. in this connection. We should then be in a favorable position to suggest—when the time comes for the Afghan Government to define its attitude toward [Page 57] the war—that no decision be taken to the detriment of the war effort of the United Nations.

I have not discussed the above with my British colleague pending an expression of the Department’s views.

Engert