891.77/714
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Alling)
The Minister63 called at his request and brought up the subject of the operation by the American Army of the Trans-Iranian Railroad. He said that according to his understanding, the United States Army was to operate the southern section of the railroad, that is, the part between Bandar Shahpur and Tehran, while the Russians were to continue to operate the northern part beyond Tehran. I told him that that was also my understanding. He said that this division of responsibility was bound to bring unsatisfactory results and that, in his opinion, it would be to the advantage of all concerned—Americans, Russians and Iranians—to have the American Army operate the entire line. I told him that I could appreciate his point of view, but that I had no information as to the local considerations which had brought about the decision to have the American Army operate only a portion of the line. The Minister was most insistent that his point of view be taken into consideration. I gathered the impression that he felt that the Russians would be likely to let the portion of the line that they are operating deteriorate and that after the war, the Iranians would find themselves with a sadly inferior section of railroad.
The Minister then went on to bring up another question in regard to the railroad. He said that we would recall that under the Tripartite Agreement, Iran had granted the Russians and the British the right to operate the Trans-Iranian Railroad. He was somewhat concerned that since part of the line was now about to be operated by the [Page 317] American Army, the Russians and British might later insist that this was not a complete fulfillment of the terms of the Tripartite Agreement. Subsequently, upon reviewing the matter, it was ascertained that the British had already informed the Iranians that they had no objection to American operation of the line. According to the same telegram from Tehran,64 the Soviet Ambassador was seeking authority from his Government to give similar assurance to the Iranians. The Minister was informed of this information, but he did not seem to be convinced that British and Russian approval had, in fact, been given. It might be desirable to check on this point with our Legation at Tehran.