891.00/1066: Telegram
The Minister in Iran (Dreyfus) to the Secretary of State
[Received December 14—1:55 a.m.]
434. My 428, December 9. Some reliable facts and indications as to the causes of and responsibility for the Tehran riots are beginning to emerge. This much seems clear—while the ostensible cause and motivating force as far as public was concerned was food shortage the real and underlying causes were political. Political intriguers used food shortage as a sentimental issue to gain their own ends. These intriguers were of following two groups with common immediate aim of getting rid of Qavam but with distinct ultimate objectives: First, military clique headed by Shah and consisting of Yazdan Panah, Chief of Staff; Radsar, Chief of Police, and a number of young officers of the Court group; secondly, civilian group including Peikar Party, a youth organization; Azad, Rahnema and Safavi, newspaper editors; Akbar Massoudi, formerly Sarem ed-Doleh; deputies—Massoudi, Bayat, Nikpur, and Yamin Esfandiary; Ali Soheli; Tadayyon; and Hassan and Karim Akbar of Gilan. There are those who believe Qavam himself encouraged demonstration of the students in order to forestall Majlis vote of no confidence.
It seems to me probable that Shah is responsible for the demonstrations with the ultimate object of setting up a military government including his group of young officers. It seems fairly well established that this military group prevented effective police action and thus perhaps caused the riots. Timmerman85 reports that a colonel believed to be Col. Arfa addressed crowds assuring them that military had orders not to molest them. The civilian group probably also had some part in organizing the demonstrations but whether independently or in liaison with Shah’s group is not clear.
Several conflicting cross currents developed as the crowds became rebellious—manifestations developed against the British and Majlis as well as against Government. For example when Azad and Massoudi harangued the crowds against the Government Massoudi received only a severe beating for his efforts.
Qavam informs me that Shah telephoned him several times on Tuesday ordering him to resign. He refused only after receiving assurance from Allied envoys that they would give him support.
In summary, responsibility for demonstrations and for lack of effective police control would seem to lie primarily on shoulders of Shah and military clique and secondarily on the civilian groups. This onus is great since Timmerman reports “this demonstration [Page 220] could have been broken and beaten within a period of half an hour if proper police methods had been applied.”
I have been in full agreement with views expressed in Department’s 363, December 9 that no purpose would be served by change of Prime Minister. I feel even more strongly on this point after the events of the last few days. In my opinion Qavam should be supported and given every encouragement to master the forces of evil which are arrayed against them. It has seemed clear to me for some time that the dissolution of the Majlis is necessary if there is to be continuity of government and anything substantial accomplished. I should prefer to withhold present judgment in this regard until the situation is clarified. Qavam informs me he is meeting Majlis groups and has gone so far as to suggest Majlis might be closed temporarily “for repairs”. He is now engaged in selecting his Cabinet.
Situation in Tehran is quiet and commerce is gradually opening. However early withdrawal of tanks, cavalry and police patrolling streets in force might lead to recurrence of riots. British troops have paraded through streets but are not patrolling. Eighty arrests have been made. Press continues closed and Qavam is considering opening four Government controlled newspapers.
- L. Stephen Timmerman, American Adviser in regard to Iranian City Police.↩