Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1942, The Near East and Africa, Volume IV

891.00/1964a: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

Washington, December 11, 1942—9 p.m.

6280. Please urgently transmit to Foreign Office substance of the following:

During the past year the Government of the United States has felt itself to have an increasingly direct interest in conditions in Iran. We have been led to adopt this position primarily because of the importance of Iran in the war effort of the United Nations, an importance which is of course fully recognized by the British Government. In addition to our general interest, in common with all of the United Nations, in the successful prosecution of the war in all theaters, we have felt a special responsibility in connection with Iran for the following reasons.

A. American prestige in that country places this Government, we believe, in a position to exert a powerful influence on behalf of the United Nations, and it is felt that this is an important asset which should be conserved and utilized.

B. The Iranian Government has requested a large number of American advisers to strengthen the internal administration of the country, and we feel an obligation to see that the work of these advisers is begun and carried out under conditions favorable to their success. We understand that the British Government has been heartily in favor of the dispatch of these advisory missions; on several occasions the British Government has, in fact, taken the initiative in suggesting their formation. It is, of course, obvious that such advisers can exert a most effective influence on behalf of our common cause.

C. The American Government has made heavy commitments in connection with the furnishing of supplies to the Soviet Union and is therefore directly concerned in the maintenance of the route by which a large part of these supplies must necessarily be transported. In addition, the United States military authorities have recently agreed to undertake the physical operation of the Iranian ports, railroads, and highways by which supplies for Russia are moved through Iran.

We have been given to understand on various occasions that the British Government welcomed the interest of the United States in Iranian affairs and that our active cooperation in settling the problems which arise from time to time was desired. We feel sure that the British Government understands that our policy is in no way motivated by considerations of self-interest but is directed solely toward the furtherance of the common war effort and the preparation of foundations for satisfactory and lasting peacetime conditions in Iran, as in the rest of the world.

With this in mind the Government of the United States has, as the British Government is aware, taken an active part in the exchanges of views and negotiations which have taken place since the middle of October 1942 in connection with the acute political and economic situation in Iran. It has been the consistent view of the Department of State that a satisfactory solution of the problem could only be achieved through adequate provision, in one way or another, for the minimum economic needs of the Iranian people and through the maintenance to the maximum possible extent of Iranian authority and responsibility in the internal affairs of that country. Quite apart from the obvious moral principles involved, principles to which the United Nations are pledged and to which we know the British Government subscribes without reservation, it has been the opinion of the Department that purely practical considerations would in any case dictate that the military forces and civil responsibilities of the United Nations Governments concerned should be kept to a minimum in Iran, in order to permit the employment of those military forces and of the civilian personnel in other areas where they would be of more immediate value in the prosecution of the war.

Accordingly, in its communications to the British Government and to the American Minister at Tehran in connection with the crisis which began in October, the Department has repeatedly expressed its desire that early and adequate arrangements be made for the transportation to Iran of supplies of wheat which would prevent famine in areas deficient in grain stocks. In taking this position, the Department has recognized that the Iranian Government might be in part at fault in not taking proper steps to ensure the best use of available food supplies within the country. However, we have felt that the urgency of the matter precluded prolonged discussions or reorganization of the Iranian agencies concerned and we have further felt that the use of coercion upon the Iranian authorities would not only have many undesirable repercussions but would also probably fail to achieve the objective sought. From the exchange of communications which has taken place between Washington and London, we have gathered that the Foreign Office was in substantial agreement with this point of view.

With particular reference to the question of coercion, the Foreign Office will recall that the Department has more than once expressed its feeling that a military occupation of Tehran or the establishment of a puppet government would be undesirable, and in the light of views expressed by the Foreign Office to our Embassy at London and by the British Embassy in Washington to the Department, we have believed that the British Government was in agreement.

The Department has likewise on three occasions expressed its fear that action taken by the British authorities in Iran against Iranian subjects alleged to be engaged in activities inimical to the United Nations would have serious and unfortunate repercussions unless handled with great care. In particular we urged that the Iranian authorities themselves be allowed to handle such matters. On November 25 the Foreign Office advised our Embassy that it, too, felt that caution should be exercised and that it had telegraphed the British Minister at Tehran to this effect. Foreign Office further stated that it hoped it would not be necessary to take action against the wishes of the Iranian Government.

In view of the apparent agreement, as indicated above, of the Foreign Office and the Department with respect to the principal questions involved, the Department has noted with surprise and regret that events in Iran during recent weeks do not seem to have been in accord with the policies of our two Governments. These events, as they have been reported to the Department, may be summarized as follows:

A. Despite the clear recognition by all three Governments of the urgency of the matter, signature and publication of the Anglo-American-Iranian agreement for the supply of wheat to Iran was delayed for several weeks apparently in large measure because of the desire of the British authorities in Iran to impose successively more difficult conditions upon the Iranian Government before proceeding to signature. Whatever the reason, however, the agreement was concluded only on December 4, when popular dissatisfaction in Iran had become so great that it failed to have the reassuring effect anticipated.

B. Despite the assurances given to the American Embassy at London on November 25 with regard to the contemplated arrests of prominent Iranians, the British authorities in Iran on December 8 proceeded to intern the Governor General of Isfahan. We are informed that this action was taken without prior consultation with the Iranian Government and that it produced a most unfortunate effect.

C. The British Minister at Tehran informed the American Minister on December 9 that a battalion of British troops would enter the city that same afternoon.

D. The American Minister at Tehran reported on December 9 that the British authorities in Iran had for some reason failed to bring to Tehran the 3500 tons of barley and 1500 tons of flour earmarked for Iran and held at Basra. Likewise on December 9 the British Minister advised the Shah that the British Government would not look with favor on the importation of wheat into Iran unless the Iranian Government were favorable to the Allies. It is understood that the British Minister made a similar statement to the Iranian Prime Minister. It is superfluous to point out that this attitude is in direct conflict with the previous action of the Foreign Office in instructing the Minister of State at Cairo and the British Minister at Tehran to endeavor to arrange immediate shipment of barley and wheat to Iran from Iraq and from other near-by sources. It is likewise in striking contrast to the statement made by the Foreign Office on December 10 to the American Embassy at London to the effect that the Foreign Office fully realized that the extreme shortage of wheat, particularly in Tehran, is the primary cause of unrest and disorder in Iran.

In the light of the foregoing, which is submitted solely with a view to a closer coordination of British and American action, the Department ventures to express the hope that the British Government will take such steps as it deems desirable to bring about a more accurate reflection in Iran of the policies laid clown by the British Government in London.

Hull