891.5018/5: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Winant ) to the Secretary of State

4050. We have received a communication from the Foreign Office which in substance reads as follows:

The Foreign Office has been giving much thought recently to the supply situation in Iran with particular reference to the need for insuring more efficient collection and distribution of foodstuffs if famine conditions such as arose in the last war are to be avoided.

The Allies have been obliged during the last 9 months to import into Iran over 50,000 tons of wheat from all sources including the United States. This was necessary as an emergency measure to prevent famine conditions during the winter. But the shipment of such bulky commodities as wheat to Iran by sea besides placing an additional strain on Allied shipping resources can only be effected at the expense of supplies for the Soviet Union to which the largest possible share of Iranian port and transport capacity must be devoted. At the same time it is clearly desirable in [on] grounds both of humanity and interest to see that Iran does not go short of supplies and that order is preserved within an area so vital to Allied communications.

The problem therefore is to find means of insuring that Iran is adequately provisioned without the need for large imports. Normally Iran is self sufficient in all staple foodstuffs except sugar. Recent shortages have been mainly local and are due partly to the breakdown of administration following the Anglo-Soviet occupation38 last autumn and partly to transport difficulties resulting from war conditions. Given suitable administrative action the Foreign Office feels that these difficulties should not prove insuperable but the Iranian Government “who have many awkward tasks on their hands have not yet shown themselves able to deal adequately with the food problem”. The British Legation at Tehran has done everything possible to impress the Iranian Government with the gravity of the present position but fears that more positive steps are necessary to prevent famine. If famine occurs, the Allies would be faced with the alternatives of allocating more shipping, which can ill be spared, for the [Page 146] transport of supplies to Iran or allowing disorder and distress to continue unchecked.

The British Government have already appointed additional officers to service in certain Iranian provincial towns whose main duty is to assist the authorities in the collection of this year’s harvest. But the British Chargé d’Affaires believes some more effective central control is necessary to effect any substantial improvement in the food situation. He has accordingly suggested that a food board should be constituted, with American, British, Soviet and Iranian members; and that this board should have executive power and direct the food policy of the country in all its aspects. The British Chargé has not yet sounded the Iranian authorities whose agreement would clearly be necessary, “but he has reason to believe that the scheme would not be unwelcome to them.” He states that the American Minister has expressed himself as personally in favor of some such scheme provided the Iranian Government agrees, and feels that one of the United States relief experts “for whose services the Persian Government are understood to have applied, might usefully represent the United States on such a board”.

The Foreign Office concludes that the proposal is at present “a tentative one only” but that it is anxious to have the views of the United States Government and the Soviet Government before any steps are taken to put it to the Iranian Government. If the American and Soviet Governments agree in principle that some such measures are desirable, it is the Foreign Office idea that the details could be worked out “by our representatives in Tehran in collaboration with the Persian Government.”

Winant
  1. For correspondence on this subject, see Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. iii, pp. 383 ff.