891.24/202½

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. John D. Jernegan of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs10

Participants: Mr. Allah Yar Saleh, Chief of Iranian Trade and Economic Commission
Mr. Murray11
Mr. Alling12
Mr. Fred Winant (DE13)
Mr. Jernegan

Mr. Saleh said that he was disturbed by an apparent tendency on the part of the Iranian Government to feel that no results could be expected from attempting to deal directly with the United States [Page 127] on the question of supplies. He had the impression that the Tehran authorities might shortly conclude that his mission in the United States was useless. This attitude, he believed, was largely due to the failure to obtain the wheat which he had been instructed to purchase and also to statements made by the British representatives in Iran to the effect that needed commodities could best be secured through the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation. Mr. Saleh said that he himself was becoming rather discouraged, not because he, personally, would mind being recalled to Iran but because he felt that American-Iranian relations in general would become less close if the Iranian Government should conclude that the United States no longer took an interest in the welfare of Iran. He himself had always worked for closer relations and looked to the United States to do much for Iran.

Mr. Murray assured Mr. Saleh that we were far from losing interest in Iran, quite the contrary. He explained, as Mr. Winant had already done, that the difficulties in connection with the wheat had arisen because of the existence of a previously drawn-up British program of supply about which we had not been informed. On account of the very serious shipping shortage we were unable to insist upon the shipment of additional wheat, except for the 5,600 tons for which arrangements are now in process, but we were definitely watching to see that the British program was carried out. Mr. Saleh was informed that our Minister in Tehran is keeping us currently informed regarding the situation, with special reference to actual arrivals of wheat in Iran. According to a recent telegram, some 7,000 tons had been received since the first of April, which seemed to indicate that British deliveries were, in fact, being kept up. Mr. Saleh said that he was exceedingly glad to hear this, since his greatest worry had been that the American Government was not itself investigating but merely accepting without question the assurances given by the British. He said that for a time British deliveries had been suspended entirely, which had caused the Iranian Government to lose all faith in British promises in this respect.

Mr. Murray then referred to the organization now being set up for handling Iranian supply requests, whereby a central supply council is to be established in Tehran with Iranian, British and American representation. This council will consider the needs of Iran and pass on its recommendations to the Middle East Supply Center in Cairo, on which the United States will also be represented. The M. E. S. C. will then forward recommendations to London and Washington, for final consideration. It was explained that this would afford the American Government a triple opportunity to make sure that everything possible was done to meet Iran’s requirements. Mr. Saleh expressed [Page 128] himself as very pleased that such an arrangement was to be put into effect.

Mr. Murray emphasized that Mr. Saleh’s mission would still play a very important role here under the new arrangement, since he would be needed to supervise the actual procurement of goods in the United States and to deal directly with the various agencies of the American Government concerned. In this connection, Mr. Winant said that he felt it would be most desirable to have Mr. Saleh available to present the Iranian case whenever a request should come up for consideration. He said that there was a plan under study to establish a central committee with authority to pass on foreign requests, and he hoped that it would be possible to have foreign representatives appear, either directly or indirectly, before that committee whenever a matter affecting their country was brought up. Mr. Murray went on to say that the State Department attached great importance to Mr. Saleh’s continued presence in the United States and very much hoped that the Government at Tehran would not get the impression that he no longer served a useful purpose here. He said that we would cable our Minister in Tehran to explain what we are doing here, our views on the supply situation in general and on Mr. Saleh’s mission in particular, in order that the Minister might keep the Iranian Government informed.

Mr. Saleh reiterated several times his belief that the United States should deal directly with the Iranian Government in matters of supplies, rather than permit everything to be channeled through the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation. He said that Iran much preferred not to have to deal with the British and only acquiesced in their intervention out of necessity. For example, last fall he had attempted to obtain a quantity of tires. There were considerable delays, and finally the British had told the Iranian Government that the tires could be obtained only through the U. K. C. C. and had persuaded the Tehran authorities to agree to a distribution of 40% of the tires to the U. K. C. C. for British use in Iran, 40% for the Iranian Government and 20% for Iranian civilian use. Despairing of getting the tires through the American Government direct, Tehran had agreed to this arrangement.

  1. A report of this conversation was sent to the Minister in Iran in telegram No. 115, May 5, midnight, not printed.
  2. Wallace Murray, Adviser on Political Relations.
  3. Paul H. Alling, Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs.
  4. Division of Exports and Defense Aid.